The Social Dilemma: Of Autocracy, Revolution, Coup d'Etat, and War

by Gordon Tullock, Charles K. Rowley

Overview

The Social Dilemma reflects Tullock’s contributions to areas of public choice that typically are ignored by mainstream scholars, who tend to focus on cooperative, democratic states. Tullock explores instead the workings of the dictatorial state and the economics of war between nations.

Gordon Tullock is Professor Emeritus of Law at George Mason University, where he was Distinguished Research Fellow in the Center for Study of Public Choice and UniversityProfessor of Law and Economics. He also taught at the Universityof South Carolina, the Universityof Virginia, Rice University, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, and the Universityof Arizona. In 1966 he founded the journal that became Public Choice and remained its editor until 1990.

Charles K. Rowley was Duncan Black Professor of Economics at George Mason Universityand a Senior Fellow of the James M. Buchanan Center for Political Economy at George Mason University. He was also General Director of the Locke Institute.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780865975385
Publisher:	Liberty Fund, Incorporated
Publication date:	12/12/2005
Series:	The Selected Works of Gordon Tullock , #8
Edition description:	Volume 8
Pages:	402
Product dimensions:	6.00(w) x 9.00(h) x 1.00(d)
Age Range:	18 Years

Table of Contents

Introduction, by Charles K. Rowley ix

1. THE ROOTS OF THE SOCIAL DILEMMA
The Roots of Conflict 3
The Cooperative State 13
The Exploitative State 22

2. THE GOALS AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS OF AUTOCRACIES
Introduction to Gordon Tullock's Autocracy 33
The Uses of Dictatorship 48
Becoming a Dictator 63
The Problem of Succession 82
Democracy and Despotism 107
Monarchies, Hereditary and Nonhereditary 141

3. REVOLUTION AND ITS SUPPRESSION
Revolution and Welfare Economics 163
The Paradox of Revolution 174
The Economics of Repression 186
"Popular" Risings 201
Legitimacy and Ethics 225

4. THE COUP D'ETAT AND ITS SUPPRESSION
Coup d'Etat: Structural Factors 261
The Theory of the Coup 273
Coups and Their Prevention 292

5. THE ECONOMICS OF WAR
International Conflict: Two Parties 311
Agreement and Cheating 334
Three or More Countries and the Balance of Power 354
Epilogue to The Social Dilemma:
The Economics of War and Revolution 368

Index 371