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Social Foundations of Limited Dictatorship: Networks and Private Protection During Mexico's Early Industrialization
This innovative new book contributes simultaneously to two different disciplinary fields: comparative political economy and Mexican history. It does so by attempting to explain why Mexico—contrary to the predictions of several dominant theories of economic growth—enjoyed a comparatively high rate of economic growth and development under the highly authoritarian dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz (1876–1911). In conducting a detailed political analysis of Diaz's rule, Armando Razo introduces network analysis to the study of institutions and growth, and shows how dictators can maintain their power with credible growth-enhancing policies.
1101955103
Social Foundations of Limited Dictatorship: Networks and Private Protection During Mexico's Early Industrialization
This innovative new book contributes simultaneously to two different disciplinary fields: comparative political economy and Mexican history. It does so by attempting to explain why Mexico—contrary to the predictions of several dominant theories of economic growth—enjoyed a comparatively high rate of economic growth and development under the highly authoritarian dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz (1876–1911). In conducting a detailed political analysis of Diaz's rule, Armando Razo introduces network analysis to the study of institutions and growth, and shows how dictators can maintain their power with credible growth-enhancing policies.
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Social Foundations of Limited Dictatorship: Networks and Private Protection During Mexico's Early Industrialization
This innovative new book contributes simultaneously to two different disciplinary fields: comparative political economy and Mexican history. It does so by attempting to explain why Mexico—contrary to the predictions of several dominant theories of economic growth—enjoyed a comparatively high rate of economic growth and development under the highly authoritarian dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz (1876–1911). In conducting a detailed political analysis of Diaz's rule, Armando Razo introduces network analysis to the study of institutions and growth, and shows how dictators can maintain their power with credible growth-enhancing policies.
Armando Razo is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Indiana University. He is the co-author, with Steve Haber and Noel Maurer, of The Politics of Property Rights: Political Instability, Credible Commitments, and Economic Growth in Mexico, 1876-1929 (2003).