Storm on the Horizon: Khafji--The Battle that Changed the Course of the Gulf War [NOOK Book]


Storm on the Horizon is the little-known story of the key land battle of Desert Storm: the Battle for Khafji -- and how that engagement has become part of military history. Combining some of the most powerful writing on war ever with a Marine's eyeview of combat, former Marine officer David J. Morris has brilliantly recreated this crucial battle that nearly changed the outcome of the Persian Gulf War. Storm on the Horizon is war writing at its finest.
On January 29, 1991, ...
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Storm on the Horizon: Khafji--The Battle that Changed the Course of the Gulf War

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Storm on the Horizon is the little-known story of the key land battle of Desert Storm: the Battle for Khafji -- and how that engagement has become part of military history. Combining some of the most powerful writing on war ever with a Marine's eyeview of combat, former Marine officer David J. Morris has brilliantly recreated this crucial battle that nearly changed the outcome of the Persian Gulf War. Storm on the Horizon is war writing at its finest.
On January 29, 1991, Saddam Hussein launched his three best armored divisions across the Kuwaiti border and into the Islamic Holy Land of Saudi Arabia. Their mission: to disrupt the massive U.S.-led Coalition preparing to evict them from Kuwait, and to bloody the Americans on CNN. Caught without warning in the path of this juggernaut were scattered groups of lightly armed U.S. Marines and Special Forces soldiers. Storm on the Horizon is the gripping and compelling story of how these elite fighting men escaped the Iraqi onslaught and reversed the assault with an unprecedented combination of high-tech weaponry and American know-how. This is the story of the first battle of the smart-bomb age.
Storm on the Horizon drops you in the middle of the most intense battle of the Persian Gulf War. The Marines are trapped and outnumbered, their weapons no match against the Iraqi tanks bearing down on them. Their only lifeline to the rear is a barely functioning radio. Drawing upon extensive veteran interviews and previously classified reports, David J. Morris's vivid minute-by-minute narrative takes you through the battle from its beginning as a scattered collection of skirmishes to its fiery final act in the streets of the abandoned Saudi Arabian town of Khafji. Morris captures this ordeal through the eyes of the men who were there, giving readers a rare front-row seat to an incredible sequence of events. Max Morton, the pilot of a Cobra attack helicopter is forced to make an emergency landing in the heart of Khafji as the Iraqis are attacking. He and his crew narrowly escape after locating a tank of mystery fuel at a local oil refinery. Medic Kevin Callahan, member of a team of Marines caught behind enemy lines, watches helplessly as a female U.S. Army soldier and her male comrade are captured by Iraqi soldiers and spirited to Baghdad. Ronald Tull, suffering untold wounds, wakes up next to his burning light-armored vehicle thinking that it has been struck by an enemy tank round. Only later does he learn the full horror of the events that led up to the death of his seven buddies who were on board.
But Storm on the Horizon is far more than a battle saga. It is a thoughtful examination of a new generation of fighting men coming to terms with its own war, a journey into the minds of men under supreme stress, and a heartfelt account of the innocence lost in a heartbeat and mourned for a lifetime.
At once an unflinching chronicle of men at war and an appalling tableau, Storm on the Horizon looks into the savage heart of modern combat and raises troubling questions about the era of conflict that lies ahead.
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Editorial Reviews

Publishers Weekly
In late January 1991, during the Gulf War, the Saudi Arabian coastal city of Khafji and several U.S. Marine outposts stretching inland were overrun by a three-division Iraqi ground attack. Confusion about the strength of the enemy attack led to Marines being trapped in the city itself; confusion in communications and about location led to several "friendly fire" fratricides. The U.S.-led coalition positions and Khafji itself were eventually retaken by U.S.-supported Saudi National Guard counterattacks that proved the Saudis had a good deal to learn. So did the Marines, Morris shows, particularly about air-ground cooperation, but they also learned the serious weaknesses of the vaunted Iraqi forces (which may have influenced coalition strategy later). The real strength of the book, however, is not in its strategic analyses but in the portraits of the men on the ground, few of them above the rank of captain, derived from exhaustive interviewing by the author, a former Marine officer. Morris conveys how the fog (and smoke, dust and sand) of war looks to the people in it, while clarifying the situations for the reader, not something that most military histories manage. Many of the men were almost as isolated as in pre-radio days, but Morris shows their training to have kicked in purposefully. (Feb. 3) Copyright 2003 Reed Business Information.
Library Journal
This ground-level view of the 1991 Gulf War's Battle of Khafji comes hard on the heels of Anthony Swofford's highly successful Jarhead. In a work that is often insightful but frequently lacking in objectivity, Morris, a former marine, focuses on the U.S. Marine Corps and the dominant role it played. The author shows the units involved from the time of deployment to the Gulf up to the battle's end. Morris highlights the confused and slapdash nature of the initial months of the Gulf deployment, excelling in depicting the confusing and intense nature of combat, even on the modern push-button battlefield. His portrayals of "friendly fire" mishaps and the paralyzing effect those incidents had on the battle's latter stages are masterly. In the initial portion, however, the clich s of hatred toward journalists, high-ranking officers, and our Arab allies and other branches of the armed forces appear too often without clear indication if they are the opinions of the author or his subjects. Morris shows a great deal of talent as a military historian but perhaps needs a subject from which he can distance himself. Recommended for large public libraries and those with active military collections.-Brian K. DeLuca, Avon Lake P.L., OH Copyright 2004 Reed Business Information.
Kirkus Reviews
A memorable study of a transformative battle, now largely "condemned to the dustbin of history." Former Marine officer and debut author Morris, who entered the service shortly after Gulf War I ended, offers a vivid account of the Battle of Khafji, when, in a scarcely imaginable act of hubris, Saddam Hussein sent three armored and mechanized army divisions into Saudi Arabia. The battle, which began nearly a month before Operation Desert Storm sent Americans into Iraq, lasted only three days. Yet it afforded plenty of opportunities for the fog of war to enshroud American forces; no contingency plan having been made for such an invasion, for instance, air traffic controllers did not immediately dispatch planes to relieve the coastal sector's American and Arab Coalition defenders, so that "the greatest air force in the history of warfare was sitting idle while Marines battled Iraqi main battle tanks with rifles." Once the communications snafus were cleared up, American planes did take to the skies-and quickly inflicted heavy losses on their own men. At the same time, American units that had been caught unaware had to avoid being cut to pieces in the crossfire between their comrades and allies and the oncoming Iraqi forces. All in a day's work, Morris remarks: "The gods of war roll the dice, and the dumb grunts in the middle of it get to sort it out." The battle soon turned, and, writes Morris, "American forces and their allies saw up close and for the first time the staggering psychological impact of modern precision-guided munitions upon an outmoded Third World army." Yet the American command failed to learn the obvious lessons from Khafji-namely, that the Iraqis were less tough and lessmotivated than had been assumed. Had the generals done so, Morris suggests, they might have been emboldened to crush the vaunted Republican Guards the first time around "and thus taken away Saddam's main instrument for survival," which presumably would have made Gulf War II unnecessary. Lucid and well-written; a worthy companion to Anthony Swofford's Jarhead (Mar. 2003). Agent: Agnes Birnbaum/Bleecker Street Associates
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Product Details

  • ISBN-13: 9780743265669
  • Publisher: Free Press
  • Publication date: 2/16/2004
  • Sold by: SIMON & SCHUSTER
  • Format: eBook
  • Pages: 336
  • Sales rank: 1,114,750
  • File size: 11 MB
  • Note: This product may take a few minutes to download.

Meet the Author

David J. Morris is a former Marine infantry officer. He is a graduate of Texas A&M University and holds an advanced degree in English from San Diego State University. His work has appeared in Salon and Rock and Ice magazines. He lives in San Diego, California.
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Read an Excerpt

Chapter One

The Persian Gulf Theater

Winter 1991

I calculated that it is only by a counterstrike that one can disrupt the enemy's preparation for a new offensive. To force the enemy to take the offensive earlier than at the time which he had set is more advantageous for us than to sit and wait until he is fully prepared.

-- Soviet General Vassili I. Chuikov, remarks regarding the Soviet offensive at Stalingrad, October 1942.

Early on the morning of January 17, 1991, the multinational Coalition arrayed against Saddam Hussein kicked off an air campaign the likes of which the world had never seen. Capitalizing on nearly two decades of unprecedented American techno-military advancement, the execution of such a wide-reaching surgical campaign signaled a revolution in warfare. Conceived by a top secret U.S. Air Force planning cell known as Checkmate and its iconoclastic leader, Colonel John Warden, this air assault made use of a ground-breaking new class of weapons technologies developed in the years after the Vietnam War. Unlike the comparatively crude carpet-bombing campaigns of World War II and Vietnam, this operation, portentously named Instant Thunder, was designed to systematically demolish Saddam's leadership structure without leveling Iraq's cities along with it. What made Instant Thunder unique, however, was not just the technology it exploited but the extreme discretion with which it was prosecuted: Rather than try to methodically kill off every arm of the vast Iraqi war machine, Instant Thunder zeroed in on the Iraqi central nervous system: its electrical grid, its telecommunications networks, its radar installations, its command-and-control nodes, leaving Saddam's vaunted armored divisions to die on the vine. Taken as a whole, Warden's audacious plan seemed as much an argument to prove the supremacy of airpower as it was an attempt to force Saddam out of Kuwait.

Handpicked to fire the opening salvos of this new war was a four-ship flight of Apache helicopter gunships from the Army's 101st Airborne. Piercing Iraqi airspace just after 2:00 AM., they unleashed a volley of Hellfire missiles into a key battery of Iraqi radar dishes poised on the Saudi border, opening the door to flights of electronic jamming aircraft and Stealth fighters. Wave upon wave of American aircraft soon thundered over Baghdad, unleashing their deadly cargo, in some cases near waiting television cameras. And as CNN floated these images around the world, the war began to take on the queer character that has since become fixed in the public imagination, that of spectral bridges, buildings, and tanks being silently obliterated as if by magic on a million television screens, of antiaircraft fire arcing gracefully into the Iraqi sky. Thus the illusion of virtual war was born. After a week of round-the-clock bombing, Saddam was nearly blind, deaf, and dumb as his telecommunications and command networks were decimated.

Nevertheless, Saddam was far from defeated, and the air campaign, while strikingly effective, left plenty to be desired as far as ground commanders were concerned. The practical problem with this new war was that it was focused so intently upon the fat targets in central Iraq that it left much of the Iraqi army dispersed throughout Kuwait totally unmolested. Ten days into the landmark campaign, at which point American Stealth fighters were essentially operating at will over Baghdad, the Iraqi tanks and howitzers across the berm from the Marines were practically untouched. As Colonel Manfred A. Rietsch, a Marine air group commander noted, "We weren't able to concentrate on the areas that affected our Marines. There were certain areas where there was a lot of enemy activity that appeared to be untouched by the JFACC [U.S. Air Force headquarters in Saudi Arabia]."

General Boomer, the head Marine in the Gulf, was particularly concerned about Saddam's III Corps, the most dangerous enemy unit in Kuwait. III Corps occupied Kuwait City and was arrayed in depth along the Saudi border with belts of conscript infantry divisions protecting the Corps's mobile reserve, the 3rd Armored and the 1st and 5th Mechanized Divisions. Although not the vaunted Republican Guard, these were some of Saddam's best divisions. The elite 3rd Armored, outfitted with Russian T-72 tanks, was far and away the best trained and equipped unit in the Iraqi army and was often lumped in the same category as the Republican Guard by intelligence experts. III Corps was commanded by Major General Salah Aboud Mahmoud, one of Saddam's most trusted field commanders, who had distinguished himself in the closing campaigns of the Iran-Iraq War. He was that rare Iraqi general who had been promoted by dint of his operational talent rather than his political connections.

Making matters worse, III Corps posed an unnerving artillery threat with Soviet-made howitzers that easily outranged their American counterparts. That artillery tubes were the preferred means for delivering chemical weapons only heightened Boomer's concern, which at times blossomed into near-paranoia. Indeed, Boomer once spoke to his staff of a dream where he "woke up at two or three o'clock in the morning...shaking, soaking wet...from a terrible bad dream where two divisions on line are attempting to go through two breaches...being bogged down in the minefields and obstacle belts...and in the middle of all that somewhere between 1,100 and 1,400 artillery tubes were raining a fiery death and destruction. My Marines are dying." After repeated appeals to JFACC, Boomer and his staff were eventually able to begin shifting more air missions onto targets inside Kuwait.

After nearly two weeks of round-the-clock bombing, Saddam was feeling pinched and was searching for ways to hit back. In a tactic reminiscent of the Iran-Iraq War, where an air "war of the cities" between Tehran and Baghdad had raged, Saddam launched a barrage of Scud missiles toward Tel Aviv, banking on Israel's tradition of swift retribution to drive a wedge between the Arab and Western members of the Coalition. However, aggressive Washington-led diplomacy headed off any Israeli revenge attacks with, among other things, the promise of commando raids on Saddam's mobile Scud launchers. This development further dimmed prospects for Marine commanders, as in order to placate the Israelis, critical air missions were diverted to what became known as the the Great Scud Hunt. This campaign was an illustrious failure, and in the end only a handful of missile launchers were ever confirmed as destroyed.

During this same time frame, Major General Mike Myatt, commander of the First Marine Division, began launching what he dubbed "ambiguity operations," designed to confuse Iraqi defensive preparations, Myatt declaring, "I want to fuck with the Iraqis' heads." This unorthodox deception effort consisted of widely scattered artillery raids along the Kuwaiti frontier and the creation of a highly unusual unit known as Task Force Troy. Troy, headed up by Myatt's deputy, General Tom Draude, was a bogus division composed of a handful of APCs (armored personnel carriers) jam-packed with radios and loudspeakers, which rolled along the border simulating the sounds and radio traffic of a full-strength Marine division, complete with fake call signs and operations orders.

Adding to the confusion along the border, just before midnight on January 21, a platoon from the Marines' First Force Reconnaissance Company was attacked at Observation Post 6 by a company of Iraqi infantry. That morning the Marines had gotten word from a captured lieutenant that an entire infantry company was preparing to defect in their sector. After conversing with an advance group of eight Iraqis, things quickly soured as the Marines heard rounds being chambered in the darkness. The Marines were soon enveloped by machine-gun and RPG fire, and after a disjointed hour-long gun battle, backlit by the phantasmal glow of Iraqi artillery illumination rounds, the Marines managed to extract themselves from the observation post and move to a predesignated rally point beneath a nearby bridge. They emerged unscathed, albeit confounded as to the Iraqis' intentions. No blood trails were found the following morning, although Iraqi defectors later confirmed that the attack had been conducted by a commando company from the 36th Division. The Iraqis suffered five dead.

By late January, the failure of the Scud attacks and air strikes, along with the bewildering situation near the Kuwaiti border, all added to the pressure on Saddam to act, to do something. As one Pentagon official put it, "Only an idiot would sit there forever while his military was being destroyed." On the twenty-seventh, the plan for the offensive into Saudi Arabia was approved by Saddam. Some reports assert that he in fact caravanned to the southern Iraqi border town of Basra to confer with his field commanders about the upcoming operation.

Saddam, who had once told his staff that "the air force has never decided a war in the history of war," seemed to have concluded that the time had come to draw the Allies into a slugfest where his tanks and artillery could slaughter the Americans. In September 1980, Saddam had done this very thing, launching a daring preemptive attack deep into Iranian territory that only bogged down after outrunning its supply lines. He hoped to do one better in Saudi Arabia.

Like Ho Chi Minh before him, Saddam was keenly aware of how impatient and irresolute the American public can be. He knew that if he produced enough body bags or POWs renouncing their country on the evening news, Americans would cry to their president to bring the boys back home. With a surprise thrust into Allied lines, Saddam would bloody the Americans on CNN and chop their resolve off at the knees.

Saddam's plan called for a three-pronged drive into northeastern Saudi Arabia by the 3rd Armored Division and 1st and 5th Mechanized Divisions. The exact military objectives of the offensive remain unclear. Iraqi knowledge of American unit locations and strengths during this time frame was spotty at best. It appears that the focus remained upon dealing a strong blow against the Coalition, striking at its weak points, primarily the Khafji region, which was manned by inexperienced Saudi and Qatari units, as well as lashing out against the American units that had for several weeks been taunting frontline Iraqi troops with artillery raids and psychological operations.

A major concern for the Coalition was the colossal Marine logistics complex at Kibrit. Located at an abandoned airfield 30 miles south of the Kuwait border, it was in the direct line of the Iraqi assault. Kibrit, the largest fuel and ammunition dump in the Marine Corps's history, had been erected on a previously unheard-of scale, sprawling over 25 square miles and at one point containing nearly two million gallons of gasoline. Kibrit had sprouted up practically overnight in preparation for the ground war and had been brazenly situated forward of friendly lines in order to maximize the attack's forward momentum.

Amid all this sound and fury, Boomer and his staff were focused inward, consumed with the preparations for the impending Kuwait offensive, set to roll in late February. The Marines had been given what many considered to be a suicide mission. They were to attack due north into the teeth of the Iraqi defenses, breaching two major obstacle belts loaded with burning oil pits, elaborate tank traps, miles of barbed wire, and row upon row of antipersonnel mines. While a new age in warfare may have been heralded over the skies of Baghdad, for those on the ground it seemed as if nothing had changed.

The breach itself was expected to be an exceedingly complex operation, with two 10,000-man divisions leapfrogging each other, all while exposed to the fearsome Iraqi artillery corps. In the doomstruck atmosphere that dominated the preparations, nightmarish visions of mustard and nerve gas attacks swept through the ranks, driving some to request transfer stateside. It seemed to some as if the legion follies of World War I were about to be relived. One light-armored vehicle company was told by higher headquarters to expect 85 percent casualties.

As a result of the immense, elaborate efforts dedicated to the coming thrust, the border itself was left only lightly manned. The entire Marine command was so intent upon the attack succeeding, so obsessed with the grim prospect of mass casualties, that the only units left protecting Kibrit, the fattest target imaginable, were a few scattered companies of light-armored vehicles and Ross's platoon. This outward complacency extended all the way down to the enlisted-man level. As one Marine lance corporal put it, "The last thing we expected was for Saddam to invade Saudi Arabia."

The U.S. Army forces in theater were also distracted, caught up in the preparations for the far-western Hail Mary run set to crush the Republican Guard in southern Iraq. This armor-heavy thrust exacted an enormous logistical and psychological toll as millions of man-hours were expended getting the army's lumbering tank formations in place along with their extensive fuel and ammunition trains, all of which deflected attention away from the border and Iraqi activities in the here and now.

Adding to the Coalition's woes, the Iraqis were exploiting their knowledge of American reconnaissance satellite patterns garnered from when the U.S. had shared overhead imagery with Saddam during the Iran-Iraq War. This striking case of blowback allowed the Iraqis to begin surreptitiously staging vehicles and equipment in southern Kuwait without setting off any alarms at the Coalition high command in Riyadh. Rolling forward in brutally enforced radio silence, Saddam's legions slunk into their designated assembly areas while the mighty juggernaut, the largest American military force assembled since World War II, was looking the other way.

Copyright © 2004 by David J. Morris
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Table of Contents


Dramatis Personae


Prologue: 8:00 P.M., January 29, 1991, Observation Post 4, on the Kuwaiti Border Fifty Miles West of Khafji

Part I The Outpost Battles

1 The Persian Gulf Theater, Winter 1991

2 Camp Schwab, Okinawa, Japan, July-August 1990

3 January 19, 1991, Northeastern Saudi Arabia

4 6:00 P.M., January 29, 1991, Observation Post 4

5 8:20 P.M., January 29, 1991, Observation Post 4

6 Approximately 8:45 P.M., January 29, 1991, the Berm, Observation Post 4

7 9:00 P.M., January 29, 1991, the Berm, Observation Post 4

8 Approximately 9:00 P.M., January 29, 1991, Observation Post 4

9 Nighttime, January 29, 1991, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 250 Miles South of Observation Post 4

10 Approximately 9:15 P.M., January 29, 1991, Observation Post 4

11 Approximately 9:30 P.M., January 29, 1991, Observation Post 4

12 12:45 A.M., January 30, Observation Post 4

13 Dawn, January 29, 1991, Just South of the Kuwaiti Border

Part II The Battle for Khafji    

14 6:45 A.M., January 29, 1991, Observation Post 8, Six Miles North of Khafji

15 January 29, 1991, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group Forward Headquarters, Four Miles North of Khafji

16 9:00 P.M., January 29, 1991, Khafji

17 Morning, January 30, 1991, Khafji

18 Mid-Morning, January 30, 1991, Khafji

19 2nd Saudi Arabian National Guard Brigade Headquarters, Five Miles West of Mishab

20 11:00 P.M., January 30, 1991, on the Coastal Highway Just South of Khafji

21 Nighttime, January 30, 1991, Five Miles Northwest of Khafji

22 Dawn, January 31, 1991, Khafji

23 7:00 A.M., January 31, 1991, Khafji


Where Are They Now?

Roster of the Fallen

U.S. Marine Corps Key Words and Acronyms




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Customer Reviews

Average Rating 4.5
( 6 )
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Sort by: Showing all of 6 Customer Reviews
  • Anonymous

    Posted June 23, 2004


    I found this book to be a breath of fresh air after the litany of sloppily-composed and researched books that have come out about the most recent war against Iraq. The writer, while a former marine, presents a fair and moving account of this 'first battle of the smart bomb age.' Storm on the Horizon, while ostensibly about the 1991 war, speaks volumes about our current predicament in Iraq and should be read by all those interested in events in that corner of the globe. Highly recommended.

    1 out of 1 people found this review helpful.

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  • Anonymous

    Posted May 11, 2004

    A virtually unknown battle, until now.

    This is a very exciting account about a much forgotten battle. I found it very engrossing and hard to put down. It does a great job at conveying the chaos and devastating lethality of modern combat.

    1 out of 1 people found this review helpful.

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  • Anonymous

    Posted March 26, 2004

    A Marvelous War Story

    This book starts slow, it is history, and becomes a page-turner, it is a marvelous war story. Monumental innovations act as hinges, opening doors that will lock behind. The Battle of Hastings always comes to mind first for me: the Normans 'simply' added stirrups to their saddles, giving them a longer lance reach and a more powerful stand in the saddle. With this the course of western history was altered and Britain was never the same. 'Little' Khafji arises as a big monolith. This book is bound to become a movie just because of the characters and sheer power of the human story line. Battle documentation is not the only story here. Not since I read 'On Wings of Eagles' by Ken Follett have I enjoyed such unlikely and true story line of operations in the enemy¿s camp. But, these are not mercenaries, these are listening-post U.S. soldiers attacked on point by an enormous experienced armored column exploiting a potential deadly flaw. Saddam Hussein invades Saudi Arabia over U.S. units. Some of our men are trapped by the invasion force. The book points to so many important benchmarks that it would have perhaps been another generation before we recognized them had Mr. Morris not interviewed over 100 soldiers who participated in a battle most people would not recognize by name. We would have lost the human touch so important in understanding the power of this new warfare unleashed by well-trained and 'braveheart' men who understood in many cases better than their commanders the power in their hands, and volunteered to use it when their odds were amazingly long. As a former soldier I laughed out loud many times and gripped my book many other times. Yet my wife is militarily challenged and still steadily plows through 'Khafji' as I write this review. After Khafji, wars will never again be fought the same by armies who own the weapons used by the Allies against Iraq. Part of the weaponry, and the unique insights from the book document this, is not just hardware but the heart and mind of the forward observer, the 'special forces' grunt if you will, who directs now not only just artillery but also ordinance on an order of magnitude greater power and accuracy. You will be introduced to the men who did their job well like David against Goliath. This book is R-Rated for language, the language of soldiers. The words change a little from generations, but this portrays troop life since soldiers camped and fought. If you read this book you will not forget the last chapters and the characters reciting them to Dave Morris.

    1 out of 1 people found this review helpful.

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  • Anonymous

    Posted January 25, 2004

    Truth and Consequences

    Well written and researched. In your face gutsy writing style that keeps you absorbed in the details and personality dramas. Morris tells it like it was in the heady pre-Desert Storm days on the Kuwaiti border with elite US Marine units. What the public saw was the media-tailored precision air strikes. This book shows the other side of not-so-pretty ground combat operations where life and death decisions are made in a blink and sometimes the good guys screw up. What is evident is the human determination and valor displayed during these events to wrest order from incredible adversity. Highly recommended for those interested in small unit actions and tactical level operations. Raw and revealing.

    1 out of 1 people found this review helpful.

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  • Anonymous

    Posted June 19, 2013

    I read this book already in paperback. It brought back many memo

    I read this book already in paperback. It brought back many memories of the time I spent over there with "The Big Red One", 1st Inf Div as we readied for the Ground War to start.

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  • Anonymous

    Posted September 7, 2009

    No text was provided for this review.

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