Strategies and Games: Theory and Practice / Edition 1

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Game theory has become increasingly popular among undergraduate as well as business school students. This text is the first to provide both a complete theoretical treatment of the subject and a variety of real-world applications,primarily in economics, but also in business, political science, and the law.

Strategies and Games grew out of Prajit Dutta's experience teaching a course in game theory over the last six years at Columbia University.The book is divided into three parts: Strategic Form Games and Their Applications, Extensive Form Games and Their Applications, and Asymmetric Information Games and Their Applications. The theoretical topics include dominance solutions, Nash equilibrium, backward induction, subgame perfect equilibrium, repeated games, dynamic games, Bayes-Nash equilibrium, mechanism design, auction theory, and signaling. An appendix presents a thorough discussion of single-agent decision theory, as well as the optimization and probability theory required for the course.Every chapter that introduces a new theoretical concept opens with examples and ends with a case study. Case studies include Global Warming and the Internet, Poison Pills, Treasury Bill Auctions, and Final Jeopardy. Each part of the book also contains several chapter-length applications including Bankruptcy Law, the NASDAQ market, OPEC, and the Commons problem. This is also the first text to provide a detailed analysis of dynamic strategic interaction.

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What People Are Saying

Eric Maskin
There is a profusion of game theory texts now available. Prajit Dutta's book is clearly one of the best. It will be of particular interest to undergraduates with a background in economics, who seek a deeper understanding of how strategy plays a role in competition, particularly dynamic competition.
Thomas A. Gresik
Professor Dutta strikes an excellent balance between formal development of the fundamental ideas in game theory and interesting economic applications. This book introduces advanced undergraduates and beginning graduate students to the exciting and elegant world of game theory.
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Product Details

  • ISBN-13: 9780262041690
  • Publisher: MIT Press
  • Publication date: 2/26/1999
  • Edition description: New Edition
  • Edition number: 1
  • Pages: 506
  • Sales rank: 330,649
  • Product dimensions: 8.00 (w) x 9.00 (h) x 0.62 (d)

Table of Contents

A Reader's Guide
Pt. 1 Introduction 1
Ch. 1 A First Look at the Applications 3
Ch. 2 A First Look at the Theory 17
Pt. 2 Strategic Form Games: Theory and Practice 33
Ch. 3 Strategic Form Games and Dominant Strategies 35
Ch. 4 Dominance Solvability 49
Ch. 5 Nash Equilibrium 63
Ch. 6 An Application: Cournot Duopoly 75
Ch. 7 An Application: The Commons Problem 91
Ch. 8 Mixed Strategies 103
Ch. 9 Two Applications: Natural Monopoly and Bankruptcy Law 121
Ch. 10 Zero-Sum Games 139
Pt. 3 Extensive Form Games: Theory and Applications 155
Ch. 11 Extensive Form Games and Backward Induction 157
Ch. 12 An Application: Research and Development 179
Ch. 13 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium 193
Ch. 14 Finitely Repeated Games 209
Ch. 15 Infinitely Repeated Games 227
Ch. 16 An Application: Competition and Collusion in the NASDAQ Stock Market 243
Ch. 17 An Application: OPEC 257
Ch. 18 Dynamic Games with an Application to the Commons Problem 275
Pt. 4 Asymmetric Information Games: Theory and Applications 291
Ch. 19 Moral Hazard and Incentives Theory 293
Ch. 20 Games with Incomplete Information 309
Ch. 21 An Application: Incomplete Information in a Cournot Duopoly 331
Ch. 22 Mechanism Design, the Revelation Principle, and Sales to an Unknown Buyer 349
Ch. 23 An Application: Auctions 367
Ch. 24 Signaling Games and the Lemons Problem 383
Pt. 5 Foundations 401
Ch. 25 Calculus and Optimization 403
Ch. 26 Probability and Expectation 421
Ch. 27 Utility and Expected Utility 433
Ch. 28 Existence of Nash Equilibria 451
Index 465
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  • Anonymous

    Posted April 27, 2000


    This is a perfect book of game theory. There are all the items we have to learn in this book. Strategic form game, dominant strategy, Nash equilibrium, prisoner's dilemma, zero sum games, IEDS, finitely repeated games, and about the economy (for example; OPEC) Especially there are many basic theories of the games. Most of pages are spent to explain the basic theory. This is one of the most wonderful points of this book because these kinds of books tend to be too difficult for beginners to understand. But this book is easy to understand for beginners because there are a great many examples for each section, and what is better, the objective level of this book is very high. Of course specialists are also able to enjoy this book. But some problems that you must be careful for exist in this book. First, if you have no knowledge about game theory, you had better read an introductory book before reading this book. No matter how easy this book is, it is too difficult for people who have no knowledge about game theory. Second, you have to have an ability to understand mathematics. In this book, there is a lot of calculation in each section, for examples; quadratic functions, differential functions, and differrentiation, what is worse, most of calculation is omitted. This is worst thing of this book. If you have a very strong interest in game theory, and you can meet or overcome the most of these points, I do recommend this book.

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