The Strategy of Conflict / Edition 1

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Overview

'In eminently lucid and often charming language, Professor Schelling's work opens to rational analysis a crucial field of politics, the international politics of threat, or as the current term goes, of deterrence. In this field, the author's analysis goes beyond what has been done by earlier writers. It is the best, most incisive, and most stimulating book on the subject.'
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Editorial Reviews

Annals of the American Academy

In eminently lucid and often charming language, Professor Schelling's work opens to rational analysis a crucial field of politics, the international politics of threat, or as the current term goes, of deterrence. In this field, the author's analysis goes beyond what has been done by earlier writers. It is the best, most incisive, and most stimulating book on the subject.

Journal of Politics

An important contribution to understanding the conduct of the ambiguous conflict between the communist bloc on the one hand and the United States and its Free World Allies on the other.

The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences

Against the backdrop of the nuclear arms race in the late 1950s, Thomas Schelling's book The Strategy of Conflict set forth his vision of game theory as a unifying framework for the social sciences. Schelling showed that a party can strengthen its position by overtly worsening its own options, that the capability to retaliate can be more useful than the ability to resist an attack, and that uncertain retaliation is more credible and more efficient than certain retaliation. These insights have proven to be of great relevance for conflict resolution and efforts to avoid war. Schelling's work prompted new developments in game theory and accelerated its use and application throughout the social sciences. Notably, his analysis of strategic commitments has explained a wide range of phenomena, from the competitive strategies of firms to the delegation of political decision power.

Annals of the American Academy
In eminently lucid and often charming language, Professor Schelling's work opens to rational analysis a crucial field of politics, the international politics of threat, or as the current term goes, of deterrence. In this field, the author's analysis goes beyond what has been done by earlier writers. It is the best, most incisive, and most stimulating book on the subject.
Journal of Politics
An important contribution to understanding the conduct of the ambiguous conflict between the communist bloc on the one hand and the United States and its Free World Allies on the other.
Read More Show Less

Product Details

  • ISBN-13: 9780674840317
  • Publisher: Harvard University Press
  • Publication date: 12/12/2006
  • Edition description: Reprint
  • Edition number: 1
  • Pages: 328
  • Sales rank: 352,683

Meet the Author

Thomas C. Schelling is Distinguished University Professor, Department of Economics and School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland and Lucius N. Littauer Professor of Political Economy, Emeritus, Harvard University. He is co-recipient of the 2005 Nobel Prize in Economics.

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Table of Contents

  • I. Elements of a Theory of Strategy
    • 1. The Retarded Science of International Strategy
    • 2. An Essay on Bargaining
    • 3. Bargaining, Communication, and Limited War


  • II. A Reorientation of Game Theory
    • 4. Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision
    • 5. Enforcement, Communication, and Strategic Moves
    • 6. Game Theory and Experimental Research


  • III. Strategy with a Random Ingredient
    • 7. Randomization of Promises and Threats
    • 8. The Threat That Leaves Something to Chance


  • IV. Surprise Attack: A Study in Mutual Distrust
    • 9. The Reciprocal Fear of Surprise Attack
    • 10. Surprise Attack and Disarmament


  • Appendices
    • A. Nuclear Weapons and Limited War
    • B. For the Abandonment of Symmetry in Game Theory
    • C. Re-interpretation of a Solution Concept for “Noncooperative” Games


  • Index

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