The Strategy of Conflict / Edition 1 by Thomas C. Schelling | 9780674840317 | Paperback | Barnes & Noble
The Strategy of Conflict / Edition 1

The Strategy of Conflict / Edition 1

5.0 1
by Thomas C. Schelling
     
 

ISBN-10: 0674840313

ISBN-13: 9780674840317

Pub. Date: 12/12/2006

Publisher: Harvard University Press

A series of closely interrelated essays on game theory, this book deals with an area in which progress has been least satisfactory—the situations where there is a common interest as well as conflict between adversaries: negotiations, war and threats of war, criminal deterrence, extortion, tacit bargaining. It proposes enlightening similarities between, for

Overview

A series of closely interrelated essays on game theory, this book deals with an area in which progress has been least satisfactory—the situations where there is a common interest as well as conflict between adversaries: negotiations, war and threats of war, criminal deterrence, extortion, tacit bargaining. It proposes enlightening similarities between, for instance, maneuvering in limited war and in a traffic jam; deterring the Russians and one's own children; the modern strategy of terror and the ancient institution of hostages.

Product Details

ISBN-13:
9780674840317
Publisher:
Harvard University Press
Publication date:
12/12/2006
Edition description:
Reprint
Pages:
328
Sales rank:
294,502
Product dimensions:
6.00(w) x 8.00(h) x 1.00(d)

Table of Contents

  • I. Elements of a Theory of Strategy

    • 1. The Retarded Science of International Strategy
    • 2. An Essay on Bargaining
    • 3. Bargaining, Communication, and Limited War


  • II. A Reorientation of Game Theory

    • 4. Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision
    • 5. Enforcement, Communication, and Strategic Moves
    • 6. Game Theory and Experimental Research


  • III. Strategy with a Random Ingredient

    • 7. Randomization of Promises and Threats
    • 8. The Threat That Leaves Something to Chance


  • IV. Surprise Attack: A Study in Mutual Distrust

    • 9. The Reciprocal Fear of Surprise Attack
    • 10. Surprise Attack and Disarmament


  • Appendices

    • A. Nuclear Weapons and Limited War
    • B. For the Abandonment of Symmetry in Game Theory
    • C. Re-interpretation of a Solution Concept for “Noncooperative” Games


  • Index

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The Strategy of Conflict 5 out of 5 based on 0 ratings. 1 reviews.
Anonymous More than 1 year ago