Summa Contra Gentiles Book 2: Book Two Creation / Edition 1

Summa Contra Gentiles Book 2: Book Two Creation / Edition 1

by St. Thomas Aquinas
     
 

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ISBN-10: 0268016801

ISBN-13: 9780268016807

Pub. Date: 10/28/1992

Publisher: University of Notre Dame Press

The Summa Contra Gentiles is not merely the only complete summary of Christian doctrine that St. Thomas has written, but also a creative and even revolutionary work of Christian apologetics composed at the precise moment when Christian thought needed to be intellectually creative in order to master and assimilate the intelligence and wisdom of the Greeks and

Overview

The Summa Contra Gentiles is not merely the only complete summary of Christian doctrine that St. Thomas has written, but also a creative and even revolutionary work of Christian apologetics composed at the precise moment when Christian thought needed to be intellectually creative in order to master and assimilate the intelligence and wisdom of the Greeks and the Arabs. In the Summa Aquinas works to save and purify the thought of the Greeks and the Arabs in the higher light of Christian Revelation, confident that all that had been rational in the ancient philosophers and their followers would become more rational within Christianity.

This exposition and defense of divine truth has two main parts: the consideration of that truth that faith professes and reason investigates, and the consideration of the truth that faith professes and reason is not competent to investigate. The exposition of truths accessible to natural reason occupies Aquinas in the first three books of the Summa. His method is to bring forward demonstrative and probable arguments, some of which are drawn from the philosophers, to convince the skeptic. In the fourth book of the Summa St. Thomas appeals to the authority of the Sacred Scripture for those divine truths that surpass the capacity of reason.

The present volume deals with God’s freedom in creation, his power as creator of all things, and the nature of man, particularly the unity of soul and body within man. Book 1 of the Summa deals with God; Book 3, Providence; and Book 4, Salvation.
 

Product Details

ISBN-13:
9780268016807
Publisher:
University of Notre Dame Press
Publication date:
10/28/1992
Series:
Summa Contra Gentiles Ser.
Edition description:
1
Pages:
351
Sales rank:
969,261
Product dimensions:
5.38(w) x 8.00(h) x 0.90(d)

Table of Contents

Introduction 11(10)
Bibliography 21(8)
1. The connection between the following considerations and the preceding ones
29(1)
2. That the consideration of creatures is useful for instruction of faith
30(2)
3. That knowledge of the nature of creatures serves to destroy errors concerning God
32(2)
4. That the philosopher and the theologian consider creatures in different ways
34(2)
5. Order of procedure
36(1)
6. That it is proper to God to be the source of the being of other things
36(2)
7. That active power exists in God
38(1)
8. That God's power is His substance
39(1)
9. That God's power is His action
40(1)
10. How power is attributed to God
41(1)
11. That something is said of God in relation to creatures
42(1)
12. That relations predicated of God in reference to creatures do not really exist in Him
43(1)
13-14. How the aforesaid relations are predicated of God
44(2)
15. That God is to all things the cause of being
46(3)
16. That God brought things into being from nothing
49(5)
17. That creation is neither motion nor change
54(1)
18. How objections against creation are solved
55(1)
19. That in creation no succession exists
56(2)
20. That no body is capable of creative action
58(2)
21. That the act of creating belongs to God alone
60(5)
22. That God is omnipotent
65(3)
23. That God does not act by natural necessity
68(3)
24. That God acts conformably to His wisdom
71(2)
25. How the omnipotent God is said to be incapable of certain things
73(4)
26. That the divine intellect is not confined to limited effects
77(2)
27. That the divine will is not restricted to certain effects
79(1)
28-29. How dueness is entailed in the production of things
79(6)
30. How absolute necessity can exist in created things
85(6)
31. That it is not necessary for creatures to have always existed
91(2)
32. Arguments of those who wish to demonstrate the world's eternity from the point of view of God
93(4)
33. Arguments of those who wish to prove the eternity of the world from the standpoint of creatures
97(3)
34. Arguments to prove the eternity of the world from the point of view of the making of things
100(2)
35. Solution of the foregoing arguments, and first of those taken from the standpoint of God
102(4)
36. Solution of the arguments proposed from the point of view of the things made
106(3)
37. Solution of the arguments taken from the point of view of the making of things
109(3)
38. Arguments by which some try to show that the world is not eternal
112(3)
39. That the distinction of things is not the result of chance
115(3)
40. That matter is not the first cause of the distinction of things
118(2)
41. That a contrariety of agents does not account for the distinction of things
120(4)
42. That the first cause of the distinction of things is not the world of secondary agents
124(4)
43. That the distinction of things is not caused by some secondary agent introducing diverse forms into matter
128(3)
44. That the distinction of things does not have its source in the diversity of merits or demerits
131(5)
45. The true first cause of the distinction of things
136(3)
46. That the perfection of the universe required the existence of some intellectual creatures
139(3)
47. That intellectual substances are endowed with will
142(2)
48. That intellectual substances have freedom of choice in acting
144(2)
49. That the intellectual substance is not a body
146(3)
50. That intellectual substances are immaterial
149(2)
51. That the intellectual substance is not a material form
151(1)
52. That in created intellectual substances, being and what is differ
152(3)
53. That in created intellectual substances there is act and potentiality
155(1)
54. That the composition of substances and being is not the same as the composition of matter and form
156(2)
55. That intellectual substances are incorruptible
158(6)
56. In what way an intellectual substance can be united to the body
164(4)
57. The position of Plato concerning the union of the intellectual soul with the body
168(5)
58. That in man there are not three souls, nutritive, sensitive, and intellective
173(4)
59. That man's possible intellect is not a separate substance
177(5)
60. That man derives his specific nature, not from the passive, but from the possible, intellect
182(9)
61. That this theory is contrary to the teaching of Aristotle
191(2)
62. Against Alexander's opinion concerning the possible intellect
193(4)
63. That the soul is not a temperament, as Galen maintained
197(1)
64. That the soul is not a harmony
198(1)
65. That the soul is not a body
199(2)
66. Against those who maintain that intellect and sense are the same
201(1)
67. Against those who hold that the possible intellect is the imagination
202(1)
68. How an intellectual substance can be the form of the body
203(4)
69. Solution of the arguments advanced above in order to show that an intellectual substance cannot be united to the body as its form
207(3)
70. That according to the words of Aristotle the intellect must be said to be united to the body as its form
210(2)
71. That the soul is united to the body without intermediation
212(1)
72. That the whole soul is in the whole body and in each of its parts
213(2)
73. That there is not one possible intellect in all men
215(12)
74. Concerning the theory of Avicenna, who said that intelligible forms are not preserved in the possible intellect
227(5)
75. Solution of the seemingly demonstrative arguments for the unity of the possible intellect
232(7)
76. That the agent intellect is not a separate substance, but part of the soul
239(7)
77. That it is not impossible for the possible and agent intellect to exist together in the one substance of the soul
246(3)
78. That Aristotle held not that the agent intellect is a separate substance, but that it is a part of the soul
249(5)
79. That the human soul does not perish when the body is corrupted
254(5)
80-81. Arguments to prove that the corruption of the body entails that of the soul [and their solution]
259(8)
82. That the souls of brute animals are not immortal
267(5)
83. That the human soul begins to exist when the body does
272(12)
84. Solution of the preceding arguments
284(3)
85. That the soul is not made of God's substance
287(3)
86. That the human soul is not transmitted with the semen
290(3)
87. That the human soul is brought into being through the creative action of God
293(3)
88. Arguments designed to prove that the human soul is formed from the semen
296(3)
89. Solution of the preceding arguments
299(9)
90. That an intellectual substance is united only to a human body as its form
308(4)
91. That there are some intellectual substances which are not united to bodies
312(4)
92. Concerning the great number of separate substances
316(4)
93. Of the non-existence of a plurality of separate substances of one species
320(2)
94. That the separate substance and the soul are not of the same species
322(1)
95. How in separate substance genus and species are to be taken
323(2)
96. That separate substances do not receive their knowledge from sensible things
325(3)
97. That the intellect of a separate substance is always in act of understanding
328(2)
98. How one separate substance understands another
330(7)
99. That separate substances know material things
337(2)
100. That separate substances know singulars
339(2)
101. Whether separate substances have natural knowledge of all things at the same time
341(2)
Subject Index 343(6)
Index of Proper Names 349

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