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More About This Textbook
Overview
The essays in this book develop and explore the Bayesian idea that rational actions maximize expected values, where an action's expected value is a weighted average of its agent's values for its possible total outcomes. The author establishes principles for distinguishing options in decision problems and pays much attention to games—both isolated and iterated. The book also views critically Gauthier's revisionist ideas about maximizing rationality.
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Table of Contents
Preface; Part I. World Bayesianism: 1. Utility and the Bayesian paradigm; Part II. Problems for Evidential Decision Theory: 2. Newcomblike problems; 3. Not every prisoners' dilemma is a Newcomb problem; 4. Some versions of Newcomb's problem are prisoners' dilemmas; 5. Infallible predictors; 6. Kent Bach on good arguments; 7. Maximising and prospering; Part III. Causal Decision Theory: 8. Notes on decision theory: old wine in new bottles; 9. Partition theorems for causal decision theories; 10. Expected utilities and rational actions and choices; 11. Maximisation, stability of decision and actions in accordance with reason; 12. Useful intentions; Part IV. Interacting Causal Maximisers: 13. The need for coercion; 14. Hyperrational games; 15. Utility maximizers in iterated prisoners' dilemmas; 16. Backward induction arguments: a paradox regained; References; Index of names.