Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind / Edition 1

Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind / Edition 1

by Michael Tye
     
 

Can neurophysiology ever reveal to us what it is like to smell a skunk or to experience pain? In what does the feeling of happiness consist? How is it that changes in the white and gray matter composing our brains generate subjective sensations and feelings? These are several of the questions that Michael Tye addresses, while formulating a new and enlightening

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Overview

Can neurophysiology ever reveal to us what it is like to smell a skunk or to experience pain? In what does the feeling of happiness consist? How is it that changes in the white and gray matter composing our brains generate subjective sensations and feelings? These are several of the questions that Michael Tye addresses, while formulating a new and enlightening theory about the phenomenal
"what it feels like" aspect of consciousness. The test of any such theory, according to Tye, lies in how well it handles ten critical problems of consciousness.

Tye argues that all experiences and all feelings represent things, and that their phenomenal aspects are to be understood in terms of what they represent. He develops this representational approach to consciousness in detail with great ingenuity and originality. In the book's first part Tye lays out the domain, the ten problems and an associated paradox, along with all the theories currently available and the difficulties they face. In part two, he develops his intentionalist approach to consciousness. Special summaries are provided in boxes and the ten problems are illustrated with cartoons.

A
Bradford Book

Representation and Mind series

The MIT Press

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Product Details

ISBN-13:
9780262700641
Publisher:
MIT Press
Publication date:
01/22/1997
Series:
Representation and Mind series
Edition description:
Reprint
Pages:
266
Product dimensions:
5.90(w) x 8.90(h) x 0.60(d)
Age Range:
18 Years

Table of Contents

1The Ten Problems3
1.1Phenomenal Consciousness Introduced3
1.2The Problem of Ownership10
1.3The Problem of Perspectival Subjectivity12
1.4The Problem of Mechanism15
1.5The Problem of Phenomenal Causation18
1.6The Problem of Super Blindsight19
1.7The Problem of Duplicates21
1.8The Problem of the Inverted Spectrum26
1.9The Problem of Transparency30
1.10The Problem of Felt Location and Phenomenal Vocabulary31
1.11The Problem of the Alien Limb33
2Why the Problems Run So Deep37
2.1Must the Physical Be Objective?38
2.2Perspectival Subjectivity and the Explanatory Gap43
2.3Physicalism and Phenomenal Causation50
2.4On the Denial of Perspectival Subjectivity53
2.5The Paradox of Phenomenal Consciousness56
2.6The Available Strategies62
2.7The Way Ahead66
3Can Anyone Else Feel My Pains?71
3.1The Repudiation of Phenomenal Objects72
3.2Publicizing the Phenomenal: Split Brains78
3.3Phenomenal Objects as Events84
3.4A Closer Look at Events87
4The Intentionality of Feelings and Experiences93
4.1Intentional States and Intentional Content94
4.2How Perceptual Sensations Represent100
4.3Afterimages105
4.4The Problem of Ownership Revisited109
4.5Pains111
4.6Other Bodily Sensations116
4.7The Format of Sensory Representations120
4.8Background Feelings123
4.9Emotions125
4.10Moods128
5What What It's Like Is Really Like133
5.1Why Be an Intentionalist?134
5.2Phenomenal Content: The PANIC Theory137
5.3Colors and Other "Secondary Qualities"144
5.4Can Duplicate Brains Differ Phenomenally?150
5.5Some Putative Counterexamples155
6The Tale of Mary and Mechanism: A Theory of Perspectival Subjectivity161
6.1The Real Nature of the Phenomenal162
6.2Perspectival Subjectivity and the Paradox165
6.3Mary's Room171
6.4Some of Mary's Philosophical Relatives174
6.5The Explanatory Gap178
7Can You Really Imagine What You Think You Can?183
7.1The Status of the PANIC Theory184
7.2Imaginability and Perception: A Parallel185
7.3Troublesome Possibilities?188
7.4Zombie Replicas and Other Duplicates194
7.5Inverted Experiences201
7.6Inverted Earth206
Appendix: Blindsight209
A.1 Three Sorts of Visual Agnosia209
A.2 An Empirical Proposal215
Notes219
References231
Name Index241
Subject Index245

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