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| New Introduction: The Passing of the Crisis | ||
| Preface | ||
| Acknowledgments | ||
| Introduction: The Crisis in Antitrust | 3 | |
| Pt. I | The Theory | |
| 1 | The Historical Foundations of Antitrust Policy | 15 |
| 2 | The Goals of Antitrust: The Intentions of Congress | 50 |
| 3 | The Goals of Antitrust: The Responsibility of the Courts | 72 |
| 4 | Business Behavior and the Consumer Interest: Some Rudiments of Theory | 90 |
| 5 | The Consumer Welfare Model | 107 |
| 6 | The Method of Antitrust Analysis | 116 |
| 7 | Injury to Competition: The Law's Basic Theories | 134 |
| Pt. II | The Law and the Policy | |
| 8 | Monopoly and Oligopoly: The Problem of Horizontal Size by Internal Growth | 163 |
| 9 | The Crash of Merger Policy: The Brown Shoe Decision | 198 |
| 10 | Horizontal Mergers | 217 |
| 11 | Vertical Mergers | 225 |
| 12 | Conglomerate Mergers | 246 |
| 13 | Horizontal Price Fixing and Market Division | 263 |
| 14 | Resale Price Maintenance and Vertical Market Division | 280 |
| 15 | Exclusive Dealing and Requirements Contracts | 299 |
| 16 | "Barriers to Entry" | 310 |
| 17 | Boycotts and Individual Refusals to Deal | 330 |
| 18 | Predation Through Governmental Processes | 347 |
| 19 | Tying Arrangements and Reciprocal Dealing | 365 |
| 20 | Price Discrimination | 382 |
| Pt. III | Summation | |
| 21 | Recommendations | 405 |
| 22 | Final Thoughts | 408 |
| Epilogue | 426 | |
| Appendix to Chapters 13 and 14 | 443 | |
| Notes | 455 | |
| Index of Cases | 469 | |
| Subject Index | 473 |
Anonymous
Posted October 9, 2001
In the Antitrust Paradox, Judge Robert H. Bork gives a fascinating, though demanding, review of the most important antitrust issues in the United States. The central, pragmatic thesis of Bork is maximization of consumer welfare (also called economic efficiency) and not the protection of small businesses in addressing any antitrust issue. Unfortunately, the legislative, executive and judiciary branches of power as well as the practicing bar have not always shown consistency in making, interpreting, and applying antitrust rules. The main reason for their shared sub-optimal performance in that area is the too-often absence of a rudimentary understanding of market economics according to Bork. As a practicing marketer and lawyer, I agree with his observation. Law and economics are two complementary disciplines that should be taught together as part of the academic requirements or at least whose teaching could be made optional at the undergraduate level in our universities.
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