The Arab Spring Five Years Later: Vol 2: Case Studies

by Hafez Ghanem (Editor)

Overview

Volume 1 of The Arab Spring Five Years Later is based on extensive research conducted by scholars from a variety of backgrounds, including many associated with the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). The original research papers are gathered in volume 2 and are available for readers who wish to go even further in understanding the economic background of the Arab Spring. Papers examine women's issues and agricultural practices in Morocco; urban transportation, small enterprises, governance, and inclusive planning in Egypt; reconstruction in Iraq; youth employment in Tunisia; education in Yemen; and more.
In addition to Hafez Ghanem, contributors include Mongi Boughzala (University of Tunis ElManar, Tunisia), Mohamed Tlili Hamdi (University of Sfax, Tunisia),Yuriko Kameyama (JICA), Hideki Matsunaga (JICA), Mayada Magdy (JICA), Yuko Morikawa (JICA), Akira Murata (JICA), Kei Sakamoto (JICA), Seiki Tanaka (JICA), Masanori Yoshikawa (JICA), and Takako Yuki (JICA).

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780815727224
Publisher:	Bloomsbury Publishing
Publication date:	12/29/2015
Sold by:	Barnes & Noble
Format:	eBook
Pages:	453
File size:	18 MB
Note:	This product may take a few minutes to download.

About the Author

Hafez Ghanem is vice president for the Middle East and North Africa at the World Bank and a nonresident senior fellow in Global Economy and Development at the Brookings Institution. He is a former assistant director general of the UN's Food and Agriculture Organization and a former country director at the World Bank. He is coauthor of After the Spring: Economic Transitions in the Arab World and author of numerous articles on Arab economies.

Read an Excerpt

The Arab Spring Five Years Later

Volume 2 Case Studies

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By Hafez Ghanem

Brookings Institution Press

Copyright © 2016 THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
All rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-8157-2722-4

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CHAPTER 1

Egypt's Difficult Transition: Options for the International Community

Hafez Ghanem

Change is under way in Egypt. But, its end is not clear and the road ahead is likely to be long and difficult.

— Bruce K. Rutherford, Princeton University

On June 30, 2013, millions of Egyptians took to the streets demanding that their first democratically elected president, Mohamed Morsi, of the Muslim Brotherhood, step down and calling for new elections. Three days later, on July 3, the minister of defense — surrounded by the country's leading secular politicians, Salafist leaders, and the heads of Al-Azhar (the highest Islamic authority in Egypt) and of the Coptic Orthodox Christian Church — announced the president's ouster. The announcement sparked notably different responses around the country. Tahrir Square was filled with cheering crowds happy to be rid of what they considered to be an Islamist dictatorship. In other parts of Cairo, Nasr City and Ennahda Square, Brotherhood supporters started sit-ins to call for the return of the man they deemed their legitimate president.

On August 14, 2013, security forces moved to break up the Brotherhood sit-ins. Hundreds were killed. Armed clashes occurred all across the country, with more victims. Coptic churches, Christian schools, police stations, and government offices were attacked, apparently by angry Brotherhood sympathizers. At the same time, other citizens, exasperated by the Brotherhood, joined the security forces in attacking them. The new interim government closed Islamist television stations and jailed Brotherhood leaders. It also passed a stringent law governing demonstrations and even jailed some secular activists who opposed this new limitation on political freedom. Yet the violence continued. Pro-Brotherhood demonstrations did not stop, nor did police repression of the demonstrators. Moreover, antigovernment groups escalated armed attacks against police and military targets, leaving many victims. The Brotherhood denied any role in those attacks and insisted that it had given up violence and was only protesting through peaceful means. Nevertheless, the interim authorities reacted to the attacks by declaring the Brotherhood a "terrorist organization," effectively criminalizing all its members.

The youth who led the January 25 revolution demanded liberty, prosperity, and social justice. In the three years following the revolution very little has been done to meet those demands. What went wrong? Is the hope for democracy in Egypt dead? What can the international community do? Those are the three questions that I address in this chapter.

All major political actors in Egypt made mistakes that contributed to the present situation. However, the hope for democracy, while fading, is not dead yet, and the international community should remain engaged in Egypt. The youth who sparked the January 25 revolution will continue pushing for democracy, and they have learned how to use "people power." They used it twice in three years: first against Mubarak and then against Morsi. On the other hand, all parties need to understand that it will take many years (maybe even decades) for Egypt to build a stable democratic system, and there will probably be more setbacks along the way. Egyptian democrats, and their international partners, should work to ensure that clear steps are taken toward establishing a true democracy, focusing initially on building institutions, and changing the political culture. This needs to be undergirded by a growing economy with a much fairer distribution of income.

Historical Perspective: Is National Reconciliation a Realistic Goal in the Short Run?

Immediately following the fall of Morsi, many observers, including me, believed that national reconciliation was possible. However, both sides in the current political struggle in Egypt have toughened their positions and seem prepared for a long existential struggle. Can history shed some light on why dialogue and compromise appear virtually impossible at the moment?

Egypt's political scene is similar to that of most countries with a conservative right wing, a liberal-nationalist center, and a socialist-leaning left wing. Nevertheless, it is important to review modern Egyptian political history (starting in the late nineteenth century) to understand the roots of the different political currents in Egypt and the ongoing struggle over the country's identity and to appreciate the critical role that the military has played in Egyptian political life over the past 130 years.

The oldest political movement in Egypt is the liberal-nationalist (which could be considered centrist), whose ideas derive from Ahmed Orabi's 1879 revolution against the Ottoman khedive and Saad Zaghloul's 1919 revolution against British occupation. Islamists (mainly the Muslim Brotherhood) lead the conservative right wing. Their ideology is based on the work of Hassan al-Banna, who started the movement in 1928, partly in response to Ataturk's abolition of the caliphate in Turkey. The left wing in Egypt derives its inspiration mainly from the work and ideas of Gamal Abdel Nasser, who led the 1952 revolution that deposed the king and succeeded in obtaining the withdrawal of British troops. The military is the strongest and most popular institution in the country and has played an important political role since the late nineteenth century, supporting and even promoting certain political currents and ideologies at different points in time, while always remaining anchored in a strong nationalist tradition.

The brief history presented below shows how Islamism is based on principles that are in sharp contradiction with liberal-nationalism as well as with Nasserism. In a sense, political Islam could be considered as the antithesis of Egyptian nationalism (whether liberal or left-leaning Nasserist), which may explain the deep polarization in Egyptian society today as it is divided between those two very different views of national identity. The bitter and often bloody struggle between nationalists and Islamists has been going on for more than eighty years, leaving many scars on both sides. That is probably why calls for national reconciliation in Egypt today are not gaining much traction.

Liberal-Nationalism: Can Egyptians Claim the Heritage of the Pharaohs?

Modern liberal-nationalist sentiment in Egypt dates back to the late nineteenth century, when Ahmed Orabi, the head of the Egyptian armed forces, revolted against the khedive, who represented the Ottoman Empire. In response to the khedive's claim that he was the legitimate ruler of Egypt and everybody had to bow to him, Orabi famously replied, "Our mothers bore us free; we were not created as slaves to anybody." All Egyptian children are taught this history and learn these words by heart. Orabi's revolution failed, as the British intervened to support the khedive. Orabi's army was defeated in 1882, Orabi was exiled, and Egypt became a British protectorate.

Nevertheless, Orabi continues to be a revered figure in Egypt. He is the first nationalist leader in modern Egyptian history. He also established two traditions: Egyptian nationalism is in conflict with pan-Islamism, which at the time was represented by the Ottoman Empire, and the Egyptian military is a bastion of nationalist sentiment. That Orabi was Egypt's military leader and also its first modern nationalist is important. He was the son of Egyptian peasants who stood up to the Ottoman khedive. His movement had broad-based popular support, as a statement of indigenous Egyptians' rejection of the hegemony of Ottomans and of European powers. Orabi established a nationalist tradition in the Egyptian military. The military is still perceived by the Egyptian public as the "sons of Egypt," who are committed to safeguarding the nation's interests and its dignity.

Orabi's nationalist mantle was taken over by Saad Zaghloul, a civilian, who started a revolution against British colonial rule in 1919. Zaghloul established the Wafd Party, which continued to be Egypt's largest party, winning 179 parliamentary seats out of 211 in the 1924 elections and 157 seats (with 89 percent of the vote) in 1936, until it was dissolved by Nasser in 1952. Throughout its history the Wafd was in constant conflict with the king and with the British, who effectively ruled Egypt despite its nominal independence in 1922. The party continues to play an important role in Egyptian politics today under the name of the New Wafd.

The Wafd's platform can be summarized as having three prongs: nationalism, secularism, and liberalism. Zaghloul's movement opposed British occupation of Egypt. It developed a view of the Egyptian nation as an old and established civilization with roots going back to the pharaohs, from whom they traced their lineage. Nationalists of the early twentieth century, many of whom had studied in Europe, cultivated Egyptians' pride in their ancient heritage. The idea, therefore, was of an independent Egyptian nation that does not need to be part of a bigger entity formed by pan-Islamism or pan-Arabism.

While the Wafd's nationalism put it on a collision course with the colonial power, its call for a true constitutional democracy put it on a collision course with the king, who saw it as a threat to his prerogatives. Those two conflicts, with the king and the British, actually helped enhance the party's popularity.

Since the Wafd defined Egypt by its history and culture, and not its religion, it was only natural that its platform would be secular and that many Coptic Christians joined the Wafd and reached high leadership positions in it. A rallying cry of the liberal-nationalists of the time was "Religion is for God; the nation is for all." The Wafd Party also had a feminist wing, which was initially led by Zaghloul's wife, Zafiya, who led demonstrations and encouraged Egyptian women to take off the traditional veil.

This does not mean, however, that the liberal-nationalists were opposed to Islam or to Arab unity. Many of their leaders were pious and upheld Islamic traditions. But they considered Islam to be only one of the many variables that define the Egyptian national identity. For them, Egypt as a nation predates Islam. As noted by Rutherford (2008), modern Egyptian liberals are different from those in the West because they accept a role for religion in public life. They support article 2 of the 1971 constitution, which declares that the principles of sharia will be the main source of legislation. Moreover, the Wafd, under the leadership of al-Nahas (Zaghloul's successor), played a key role in the creation of the Arab League.

The Wafd espoused liberal economic policies. It was supported by businessmen and owners of large landholdings, united by the nationalist narrative and a desire to free Egypt from British rule. On the other hand, it did not provide sufficient support to Egypt's nascent labor movement, nor did it focus on raising standards of living of the masses, particularly landless peasants. This left the Wafd open to attacks from both the left wing and the Islamist right wing.

The first half of the twentieth century was also a period of cultural revival in Egypt. This included a literary revival led by writers such as the Nobel laureate Naguib Mahfouz and a musical revival led by artists such as Um Kalthoum. The Cairo opera was active. The Egyptian movie industry and theater became popular all across the Arab world. A new elite, consisting of writers, poets, musicians, actors, and movie producers, appeared in Egypt. Nearly all members of this elite, who played a crucial role in creating national identity, belonged to the liberal- nationalist tradition.

Nasserism: Could Social Justice and Arab Unity Be Achieved?

Nasserism is Egypt's second secular ideology. It is inspired by the thoughts and actions of Gamal Abdel Nasser, who led the 1952 military revolt against King Farouk and who was president of Egypt from 1956 until his death in 1970. Nasser was probably the most popular Arab leader of the twentieth century, with his popularity spreading beyond Egypt to nearly all of the Arab world. He remains an iconic figure even today.

Nasserism is also a nationalist ideology. One of the key objectives of Nasser's Free Officers was to liberate Egypt from British occupation. However, Nasserism differs from the Wafd ideology in that it stresses the importance of pan-Arabism and Arab nationalism. Nasser's aim was the creation of a united Arab nation led by Egypt.

A distinguishing feature of Nasserism is its emphasis on social justice and its adoption of Arab socialism. Nasser implemented land reform in Egypt, confiscating land from feudalists and distributing it to landless peasants. He nationalized all large industries and the entire banking sector. Nasser's government invested heavily in large public sector manufacturing enterprises. One of his objectives was to have Egypt produce everything "from the needle to the rocket." Nasser also introduced free universal education and free health care, as well as large rural water and electrification projects. He introduced an article in the Egyptian constitution that requires that one-half of the members of all elected bodies be either peasants or workers. He also introduced laws guaranteeing a public sector job for all university graduates and put in place a large system of price controls and subsidies to protect low- and middle-income consumers.

The Nasserist political system was not democratic. It was a one-party (Arab Socialist Union) system, and no opposition was allowed. All the political parties that existed before the 1952 revolution were banned. The state controlled all media outlets, and strict censorship was put in place. Nasser's opponents (mostly Islamists and communists) were dealt with harshly through a strong security apparatus. Thus Nasser put in place a system of political repression that was maintained and further developed by his successors — Anwar Sadat, Hosni Mubarak, and, to some extent, Mohamed Morsi.

As a nationalist army officer, Nasser could be considered a successor of Orabi. However, his views differed from mainstream Egyptian liberal-nationalist thought in three important ways: he stressed Egypt's Arab identity over its ancient pharaonic one; he prioritized social justice and implemented socialist economic policies; and he did not support multiparty democracy.

Today's Nasserists continue to prioritize pan-Arabism and social justice. However, they now espouse multiparty democracy.

The Muslim Brotherhood: Can Egypt Become Part of an Islamic Caliphate?

While Egypt has always been a deeply religious country, modern political Islam only appeared on the national scene in 1928 with the creation of the Muslim Brotherhood by Hassan al-Banna. The Brotherhood was created as a pan-Islamic social and political movement, partly in response to the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the abolition of the caliphate in Turkey by Mustapha Kemal Ataturk. This abolition was seen as an important setback by many pious Muslims, including al-Banna, who considered the caliphate to be a necessity in Islam. This put the Brotherhood in direct confrontation with Egyptian nationalists.

The Brotherhood was based on two important principles. The first was the adoption of sharia law as the basis for conducting the affairs of state and society. For the Brotherhood, "Islam is a state as well as a religion." This is sometimes understood to imply that secular ideas are inherently un-Islamic and therefore Muslims who call for a secular state could be considered nonbelievers. The Brotherhood holds conservative views on gender equality and the role of women in society. They argue for a "modest" dress for women and the separation of the sexes at schools and workplaces. They also believe that cultural products should reflect the Islamic nature of society and have called for censorship of books and movies that they consider un-Islamic. Thus the Brotherhood has always been at odds with Egypt's cultural and artistic elite.

The second principle is to unify Islamic states and free them from foreign imperialism. The Brotherhood considers Egypt to be just one small part of a large Islamic empire (or caliphate) stretching from Spain to Indonesia. A previous general guide (chairman) of the Brotherhood, Mohamed Akef, generated an outcry when he commented in one of his interviews "to hell with Egypt." Of course he meant to emphasize the pan-Islamic ambitions of his organization, but his statement was interpreted by nationalists as indicating that the Brotherhood does not care for Egypt.

The Brotherhood has not presented a detailed economic program. But one can deduce from its pronouncements on economic policies that it would not be much different from that of the liberal-nationalists. The Brotherhood believes in a market economy with social protection and safety nets for the poor. It also emphasizes the fight against corruption.

(Continues...)

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Excerpted from The Arab Spring Five Years Later by Hafez Ghanem. Copyright © 2016 THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION. Excerpted by permission of Brookings Institution Press.
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Table of Contents

Contents

Preface, vii,
Acknowledgments, xiii,
1 Egypt's Difficult Transition: Options for the International Community Hafez Ghanem, 1,
2 Introducing Inclusive Planning in Egypt Kei Sakamoto, 48,
3 Establishing Good Governance in Fragile States through Reconstruction Projects: Lessons from Iraq Seiki Tanaka and Masanori Yoshikawa, 82,
4 How to Fill the Implementation Gap for Inclusive Growth: Case Studies Covering Urban Transportation Sector Development in Egypt Hideki Matsunaga and Mayada Magdy, 106,
5 Youth Employment and Economic Transition in Tunisia Mongi Boughzala, 153,
6 The Role of Micro and Small Enterprises in Egypt's Economic Transition Hafez Ghanem, 177,
7 Jordan: The Geopolitical Service Provider Emmanuel Comolet, 207,
8 The Opportunities for and Challenges to Female Labor Force Participation in Morocco Yuko Morikawa, 240,
9 Designing Youth Employment Policies in Egypt Akira Murata, 286,
10 Improving Regional and Rural Development for Inclusive Growth in Egypt Hafez Ghanem, 313,
11 Promoting Inclusive Growth in Arab Countries: Rural and Regional Development and Inequality in Tunisia Mongi Boughzala and Mohamed Tlili Hamdi, 333,
12 Agriculture and Rural Development for Inclusive Growth and Food Security in Morocco Hafez Ghanem, 371,
13 Improving the Quality of Basic Education in Yemen for Youth in the Future Takako Yuki and Yuriko Kameyama, 395,
Contributors, 429,
Index, 431,