The Correspondence Theory of Truth: An Essay on the Metaphysics of Predication

The Correspondence Theory of Truth: An Essay on the Metaphysics of Predication

by Andrew Newman

This work discusses metaphysical issues such as predication, facts and propositions.See more details below


This work discusses metaphysical issues such as predication, facts and propositions.

Product Details

Cambridge University Press
Publication date:
Cambridge Studies in Philosophy Series
Product dimensions:
5.98(w) x 8.98(h) x 0.59(d)

Table of Contents

1Universals, Predication, and Truth10
1.1The Problem of Universals10
1.2Theories of Universals15
1.3Predication, Participation, and Inherence20
1.4Universals, Truth, and Devitt26
2The Univocity of Truth33
2.1Horwich and Deflationary Theories of Truth33
2.2Alston and Minimalist Realism about Truth37
2.3The Problem of the Univocity of Truth42
2.4Reality and the Eleatic Principle47
3The Correspondence Theory for Predicative Sentences53
3.1Difficulties about States of Affairs in the Tractatus53
3.2Truth as Isomorphism between Sentence and State of Affairs58
3.3The Nominalist Account of Atomic Facts61
3.4The Realist Account of Atomic Facts66
3.5Correspondence for Sentences with and without Facts72
3.6The Notion of Content77
3.7Austin's Theory of Truth79
App. 3.1The Role of Mental Sentences in Tractarian Belief83
App. 3.2The Tractatus's Attitude to Truth86
4Russell's Theory of Truth and Its Principal Problems88
4.1The Virtues of Russell's Theory of Truth88
4.2The Variants of Russell's Theory of Truth90
4.3The Major Problems of Russell's Theory96
4.4The Problem of the Twofold Role of the Relation97
4.5The Modes of Composition of Entities102
5How Predicative Beliefs Correspond to the World108
5.1The Objections to Russell's Theory Analysed as Dilemmas108
5.2A Formal Hypothesis in Defence of Russell's Theory111
5.3Informal Justification of the Formal Hypothesis115
5.4Correspondence for Predicative Beliefs117
5.5Criterion of Identity for Russellian Propositions121
5.6Intentional Relations124
5.7Russellian Propositions as Constructions127
5.8The Identity Theory of Truth130
App. 5.1Answers to Other Objections to Russell's Theory132
6The Metaphysics of Facts140
6.1Metaphysical Accounts of the Nature of Facts140
6.2Armstrong and Facts as Truth Makers149
6.3The Linguistic View of Facts and States of Affairs154
6.4Olson's Account of Facts159
6.5The Slingshot and the Great Fact168
7The Metaphysics of Propositions172
7.1Current Theories of Propositions172
7.2Minimalism about Propositions176
7.3The Ontological Case for Platonism about Propositions182
7.4Bealer on Structureless Platonic Propositions185
7.5The Structure of Platonic Propositions190
7.6Immanent Russellian Propositions193
8The Correspondence Theory and Complex Propositions196
8.1Complex Propositions and Compound Propositions196
8.2Propositions as Subjects of Predication200
8.3Conjunction as a Function206
8.4Negation and Positive and Negative Entities207
8.5Negative Predicative Sentences, Their Truth Conditions and Truth Makers211
8.6The Concept of Negation and Negative Propositions213
8.7Universal Sentences216
8.8Negative Existentially Quantified Sentences220
8.9The Problem of Identity Sentences221
App. 8.1Logical Constants as Functions230

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