The Costs of Coalition
The Costs of Coalition tackles big questions of enduring interest in real-world politics and in political science. The substantive aim of the book is to understand and explain who governs, and for how long, under the institutions of parliamentary democracy. Its epistemological purpose is to investigate the nature of political scientists' knowledge of coalitional behavior and how to advance it.

The book starts from the well-known fact that governments in postwar Italy are extremely short-lived, and identifies a puzzle about coalition politics posed by the Italian experience. In postwar Italy until 1992, cabinets fell frequently but the same parties returned to office again and again. This book focuses on that stability—the perpetual incumbency of the Christian Democrats and the limited degree to which parties alternated between government and opposition in Italy. It probes how stability was tied to instability in Italian governments. It also compares Italian coalitions with those in nine other parliamentary democracies: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden.

The author argues that the costs and benefits of building and breaking coalitions vary in systematic ways. The variations arise in part from parties' deliberate efforts to redefine payoffs in coalition politics, and they also reflect the constraints and opportunities created by the institutions of parliamentary democracy and the configuration of the party system. Under some conditions, such as those in Italy, coalitions are cheap, and politicians can easily make coalitions cheaper.

The picture of strategic behavior drawn in the book illuminates Italy's extremes and the degrees of stability found in other parliamentary democracies. In addition, the book advocates and embodies a rethinking of the relationship between game-theory literature in political science and empirical research on political institutions.

1101797298
The Costs of Coalition
The Costs of Coalition tackles big questions of enduring interest in real-world politics and in political science. The substantive aim of the book is to understand and explain who governs, and for how long, under the institutions of parliamentary democracy. Its epistemological purpose is to investigate the nature of political scientists' knowledge of coalitional behavior and how to advance it.

The book starts from the well-known fact that governments in postwar Italy are extremely short-lived, and identifies a puzzle about coalition politics posed by the Italian experience. In postwar Italy until 1992, cabinets fell frequently but the same parties returned to office again and again. This book focuses on that stability—the perpetual incumbency of the Christian Democrats and the limited degree to which parties alternated between government and opposition in Italy. It probes how stability was tied to instability in Italian governments. It also compares Italian coalitions with those in nine other parliamentary democracies: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden.

The author argues that the costs and benefits of building and breaking coalitions vary in systematic ways. The variations arise in part from parties' deliberate efforts to redefine payoffs in coalition politics, and they also reflect the constraints and opportunities created by the institutions of parliamentary democracy and the configuration of the party system. Under some conditions, such as those in Italy, coalitions are cheap, and politicians can easily make coalitions cheaper.

The picture of strategic behavior drawn in the book illuminates Italy's extremes and the degrees of stability found in other parliamentary democracies. In addition, the book advocates and embodies a rethinking of the relationship between game-theory literature in political science and empirical research on political institutions.

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The Costs of Coalition

The Costs of Coalition

by Carol Mershon
The Costs of Coalition

The Costs of Coalition

by Carol Mershon

Overview

The Costs of Coalition tackles big questions of enduring interest in real-world politics and in political science. The substantive aim of the book is to understand and explain who governs, and for how long, under the institutions of parliamentary democracy. Its epistemological purpose is to investigate the nature of political scientists' knowledge of coalitional behavior and how to advance it.

The book starts from the well-known fact that governments in postwar Italy are extremely short-lived, and identifies a puzzle about coalition politics posed by the Italian experience. In postwar Italy until 1992, cabinets fell frequently but the same parties returned to office again and again. This book focuses on that stability—the perpetual incumbency of the Christian Democrats and the limited degree to which parties alternated between government and opposition in Italy. It probes how stability was tied to instability in Italian governments. It also compares Italian coalitions with those in nine other parliamentary democracies: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden.

The author argues that the costs and benefits of building and breaking coalitions vary in systematic ways. The variations arise in part from parties' deliberate efforts to redefine payoffs in coalition politics, and they also reflect the constraints and opportunities created by the institutions of parliamentary democracy and the configuration of the party system. Under some conditions, such as those in Italy, coalitions are cheap, and politicians can easily make coalitions cheaper.

The picture of strategic behavior drawn in the book illuminates Italy's extremes and the degrees of stability found in other parliamentary democracies. In addition, the book advocates and embodies a rethinking of the relationship between game-theory literature in political science and empirical research on political institutions.

Product Details

ISBN-13: 9780804740838
Publisher: Stanford University Press
Publication date: 04/17/2002
Edition description: 1
Pages: 328
Product dimensions: 6.12(w) x 9.25(h) x (d)

About the Author

Carol Mershon is Associate Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia. She is the co-editor of Italian Politics: Ending the First Republic.

Table of Contents

List of Tables and Figuresix
Prefacexiii
Part 1.The Puzzle, Its Pieces, and a Solution
1.How Can Governments Fall at Low Cost?1
2.Costs in Coalition Theories8
3.Explaining Variations in the Costs of Coalition21
Part 2.Within-Nation Comparisons: The Italian Anomaly
4.The Pursuit of Cost-Reduction Strategies33
5.Costs and Outcomes in Italian Coalition Politics56
Part 3.Cross-National Comparisons
6.The Bases for Comparison: Variations in Institutions and Policy Space91
7.The Costs of Building Coalitions99
8.The Costs of Breaking Coalitions143
9.Conclusions173
Appendix A.Abbreviations191
Appendix B.Scope of Data Sets in Coalition Studies197
Appendix C.Governments Included in This Study201
Appendix D.Data Sources217
Appendix E.Subsets of Data in This Database221
Appendix F.Evidence on Feedback Effects223
Glossary229
Notes237
References261
Index291
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