The Economics of Information: Lying and Cheating in Markets and Organizations / Edition 1by Ian Molho, Molho
Pub. Date: 11/10/1997
Knowledge is a vital resource which confers strategic advantages on those that possess it, and provides the possibility of misuse and abuse with increasingly dangerous economic consequences.
- Publication date:
- Edition description:
- New Edition
- Product dimensions:
- 9.00(w) x 6.00(h) x 0.62(d)
Table of ContentsList of Figures.
List of Tables.
1. Introduction: Private Information and Hidden Action.
Part I: Adverse Selection: The Market for Lemons. .
2. Quality Uncertainty and the Market for Lemons.
3. Adverse Selection: The Wilson Model.
4. Lemons Problems: Experimental Evidence.
Part II: Signalling.
5. Job Market Signalling.
6. Screening: A Self-Selection Mechanism.
7. Further Literature on Signalling Theory.
8. Signalling/Screening Behaviour: Experimental Evidence.
Part III: Moral Hazard.
9. Moral Hazard: Shareholder/Management Relations.
10. Moral Hazard: A Principal-Agent Model.
11. Further Literature on Moral Hazard and Agency Theory.
12. Moral Hazard: Experimental Evidence.
Part IV: Mechanism Design: Applications to Bargaining and Auctions. .
13. Mechanism Design and the Revelation Principle: A Bargaining Example.
14. Auction Design: Theory.
15. Auction Design: Experimental Evidence.
16. Concluding Comments.
Appendix: Brief Notes on Probability Distributions, Baye's Rule, Expected Utility Theory and Game Theory.
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