The Escape Artists: How Obama's Team Fumbled the Recovery [NOOK Book]

Overview

FACING THE WORST ECONOMY SINCE THE 1930S, PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA HIRED A CRACK TEAM OF ESCAPE ARTISTS: financial wizards who had pulled off numerous white-knuckle getaways during the Clinton era and who were ready to do it all over again. Three years later, with the economy still in a rut, it’s clear that they fell far short. This is the inside story of what went wrong.

The Escape Artists features previously undisclosed internal documents and...
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The Escape Artists: How Obama's Team Fumbled the Recovery

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Overview

FACING THE WORST ECONOMY SINCE THE 1930S, PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA HIRED A CRACK TEAM OF ESCAPE ARTISTS: financial wizards who had pulled off numerous white-knuckle getaways during the Clinton era and who were ready to do it all over again. Three years later, with the economy still in a rut, it’s clear that they fell far short. This is the inside story of what went wrong.

The Escape Artists features previously undisclosed internal documents and extensive, original reporting from the highest levels of the administration. Star White House journalist Noam Scheiber reveals the mistakes and missed opportunities that kept the president’s pedigreed team from steering the economy in the right direction. He shows what responsibility the president bears for those missteps, what bold actions his brain trust refused to take despite its preternatural confidence, and how the White House was regularly outmaneuvered by Republicans in Congress.

Tracking the administration’s efforts deep into the fall of 2011, The Escape Artists provides a gripping look inside the meeting rooms, in-boxes, and minds of the men who tried to manage the defining crisis of the Obama presidency: how the very qualities that made these men and women escape artists in the 1990s ultimately failed them.



***



THREE YEARS INTO THE OBAMA PRESIDENCY, THE UNEMPLOYMENT RATE WAS PAINFULLY HIGH, THE GAP BETWEEN RICH AND POOR HAD WIDENED, AND THE STIMULUS HAD NOT DONE ENOUGH TO BRING JOBS BACK. WHAT WENT WRONG?

A PRESIDENT WITH OTHER PRIORITIES . . .

Barack Obama hadn’t run for president just so he could clean up someone else’s mess, however urgent the task. He’d run for president to usher in once-in-a-generation achievements like health care reform—“to change the trajectory of America.”

Timothy Geithner remarked to President-elect Obama that “your signature accomplishment is going to be preventing a Great Depression.” Obama’s response was slightly jarring. “That’s not enough for me,” he said. It dawned on Geithner that he and his colleagues were a sideshow rather than the main attraction. “If you don’t do that, nothing else is possible,” Geithner protested. “Yeah,” Obama repeated, “but that’s not enough.”

AN ECONOMIC TEAM RELUCTANT TO TAKE BOLD ACTION . . .

David Axelrod was preparing Christina Romer, Obama’s chief economist, for a Sunday talk show. Many experts were voicing doubts about the size of the original package, and so Axelrod asked, “Was the stimulus big enough?” Without hesitating, Romer responded, “Abso-f---ing-lutely not.” She said it half-jokingly; Axelrod did not seem amused.

AND A BRAIN TRUST THAT BELIEVED IT KNEW BETTER . . .

It was the worst of all worlds for the Obama administration: a country that took one look at the languishing economy and another at the recovery on Wall Street and concluded that its government had put big banks ahead of ordinary people. Generously, the S&P officials didn’t point out any of this. Instead, the leader of the group confessed that the agency was mostly concerned about the prospects for bipartisan compromise.

At this, Geithner became dismissive. His message was unmistakable:

TRUST US, WE’VE DONE THIS BEFORE.
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Editorial Reviews

Michiko Kakutani
This book retraces lots of ground that will be familiar to readers of earlier books and news reports about the Obama administration, but Mr. Scheiber writes with ease and authority about complicated financial matters like the regulation of derivatives and too-big-to-fail banks. What the book adds are more behind-the-scenes details about how the president's economic team handled the fiscal crisis, especially the initial 2009 stimulus. Mr. Scheiber's portraits of team members similarly amplify those laid out in earlier books by Mr. Hirsh and Mr. Suskind, but he proves particularly adept at showing how their personalities, philosophies and previous experiences with one another shaped their interactions and the policy-making process.
—The New York Times
Paul M. Barrett
What Scheiber offers is a judicious, nuanced and…persuasive chronicle of how contentious experts jockeyed to influence a young president stuck with an almost impossible set of chal­lenges. The characters in The Escape Artists are not…resentful con men. As a result, Scheiber's story is less likely to provide the basis for a Hollywood movie script. But maybe that's the strength of this appropriately sober book.
—The New York Times Book Review
From the Publisher
"Assessing President Obama's presidency, New Republic senior editor Scheiber focuses on a single issue: the handling of the economic crisis. This is just in, so I can't tell you more, but it's crucial to take a look." ---Library Journal
Library Journal
Assessing President Obama's presidency, New Republic senior editor Scheiber focuses on a single issue: the handling of the economic crisis. This is just in, so I can't tell you more, but it's crucial to take a look.
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Product Details

  • ISBN-13: 9781439172421
  • Publisher: Simon & Schuster
  • Publication date: 2/28/2012
  • Sold by: SIMON & SCHUSTER
  • Format: eBook
  • Pages: 368
  • File size: 2 MB

Meet the Author

Noam Scheiber is a senior editor at The New Republic, writing about politics and Obama administration economic policy. He has written for the New York Times, The Washington Post, New York magazine, and Slate and has appeared on CNN, CNBC, MSNBC, and NPR. He lives in Washington, D.C.
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Read an Excerpt


PROLOGUE

Shortly after four o’clock on the afternoon of Wednesday, April 13, 2011, U.S. Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner walked down the hall from his office toward a large conference room facing the building’s interior. He was surrounded by a retinue of counselors and aides. When they arrived in the room—known around Treasury simply as “the large”—four people were seated at a long walnut table on the side near the door. Geithner and his entourage greeted them, then walked around to the far side and took their seats.

At first glance, Geithner gave the impression of the former Wall Street banker many Americans assumed him to be. He wore elegant suits and alpha-male ties. His spread collars suggested a Savile Row provenance. But, given a moment to focus, the eye noticed hints of something else. His shoes were a bit shabby. On his wrist he wore an old digital watch. The suit, upon closer inspection, was Brooks Brothers—off the rack. It had only seemed nattier because he was well-proportioned and boyishly trim. Geithner wasn’t an ex-banker after all. He was a lifelong bureaucrat.

This status gave him a measure of independence of which he was rightly proud. While friends and former co-workers moved seamlessly from government to business and back, Geithner had resisted the easy payday time and time again. “I never worked on Wall Street,” he told a group of congressional Democrats in early 2009. “I’ve worked in public service my whole life.” Where others might be cowed in the presence of bankers, knowing they might soon petition the lords of finance for a sinecure, Geithner could have fun at their expense. As an assistant secretary in the late 1990s, he had once met a delegation from Goldman Sachs to discuss an obscure business matter. “Well, this is a fucking ugly issue, isn’t it?” he said, before anyone else had uttered a word. The Goldman men laughed nervously.

But if Geithner’s actions were independent, his mind was perhaps less so. As a government official, Geithner cared deeply about the constituents he consulted with, be they Wall Street big shots, financial technocrats, or market pundits. They were the people with whom a successful bureaucrat must have credibility, and there were few thoughts more mortifying to Geithner than looking unsophisticated in their eyes. He labored over draft after draft of his speeches and parsed every word of his op-eds. Back in December 2008, while Geithner was preparing for his Senate confirmation hearing, an aide asked if his family would attend. “Money will not be daunted by that,” he said, waving off the suggestion. “Money” was an allusion to Wall Street and the people whose judgments Wall Street respected. He was keen to make a good impression.

By contrast, Geithner was decidedly less taken with those whose views he considered naive. And this explained his impatience with the group he was meeting today. The four visitors hailed from Standard & Poor’s, the credit rating agency. They had come to voice their concern about the U.S. budget deficit, which was darkening their mood about the creditworthiness of the United States.

It turned out that S&P and its ilk were a species that “money” held in exceedingly low regard. Long before the financial crisis of 2008, Wall Street had derided the rating agencies as hubs for intellectual mediocrities—the clock punchers that banks and hedge funds had passed over. Then, in the bubble years, the big banks’ financial engineers became expert at duping the agencies into blessing their dodgy mortgage securities, mostly by burying the agencies’ leaden-eyed analysts in self-justifying math.1 After the securities turned toxic and the agencies were justly vilified, their pleas of ignorance sounded all too plausible. Many of the S&P analysts weren’t even based in New York. One of the men tasked with rating the trillions of dollars in U.S. government debt worked from an office in . . . Toronto.

Now Geithner spoke to the credit raters with thinly concealed skepticism. A few days before the meeting, S&P had warned Treasury it intended to downgrade its “outlook” on U.S. bonds, the first step toward withdrawing the triple-A status that stamped the bonds as essentially riskless. Geithner made clear he wasn’t begging S&P to change its mind. The feeling inside Treasury was that, if S&P moved ahead with this decision, the company would embarrass only itself and not the U.S. government. In this vein, Geithner simply informed the visitors that his country’s economic performance had exceeded expectations on almost every measure S&P claimed to care about. As for the one where it lagged—the deficit—Geithner pointed out that the president had proposed cutting this by $4 trillion that very morning.

Truth be told, Geithner might have offered these comments a bit more humbly. While the economy had indeed outperformed S&P’s most recent predictions, it was still far from healthy. Some 14 million Americans were out of work, and the unemployment rate hovered above 9 percent. Millions had seen their homes foreclosed on or were in danger of defaulting on their mortgages. This was no doubt the work of the worst financial crisis in eighty years. But it was also the result of throwing too few resources at the problem. The administration’s $800 billion stimulus package, while critical, had been too small to lift the economy out of its rut. Struggling homeowners never got the help they needed to crawl out from under mounds of debt. At the moment Geithner spoke, the economy was close to stalling, with growth puttering along at a mere 1 percent. About the only part of the economy that resembled its former self was the financial sector, where the traders and bankers were approaching their precrisis-level bonuses.2 There had been plenty of resources for them.

The combination of these factors had arguably produced the worst of all worlds for the Obama administration: a country that took one look at the languishing economy and another at the recovery on Wall Street and concluded that its government had put big banks ahead of ordinary workers and homeowners. And so, a populist backlash that had initially targeted Wall Street increasingly took aim at Obama.

Generously, the S&P officials didn’t point any of this out. Instead, the de facto spokesman for the group, a mustachioed fellow named David Beers, confessed that the agency was mostly concerned about the prospects for bipartisan compromise. Beers and his colleagues didn’t think Republicans would take seriously the president’s plan for shrinking the deficit by raising taxes and scaling back programs like Medicare and Medicaid, whatever the theoretical overlap between the two parties.

At this, Geithner became somewhat dismissive. He asked how S&P could handicap a political debate in Washington. It was a rating agency, after all, not a polling firm. It’s not your “comparative advantage,” the secretary said. Then he gestured toward the Obama officials seated on either side of him—Jack Lew, the White House budget director; Neal Wolin, the deputy Treasury secretary; Bruce Reed, the vice president’s chief of staff—and explained that all of them had been top aides to Bill Clinton during the last stand-off between a Democratic president and a Republican Congress. “We said, ‘This is the way it worked in the nineties,’” recalled one administration official. “‘After a big election, when you have divided government, you fight a bit, then find a middle ground.’”3 Another recalled arguing, “When both sides had firmly committed to a goal and the public was in support of it, it eventually had to happen.”4

The message was unmistakable: Trust us, we’ve done this before. It was, in many ways, the message the Obama economic team had been conveying to skeptics and outsiders since its earliest days in office. Now the same sentiment underlay its decision to put aside the task of creating jobs for much of 2011 and seek a grand bargain with the GOP on the deficit.

But Beers wasn’t biting. Perhaps it was because he didn’t work in Washington. Perhaps it was that his grasp of congressional budgeting was weak. Or that his knowledge of public opinion was crude. Whatever the case, he couldn’t suppress his disbelief that a major deficit deal would be forthcoming. “We think the differences are too big,” he said. “You won’t be able to do it.” He proved to be the wise one in the room.

© 2011 Noam Scheiber

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Table of Contents

Prologue ix

1 The Reunion 1

2 The Big Ideas Project 13

3 "People Will Think We Don't Get It"-Larry Summers 24

4 The Operator 43

5 Wildebeests and Cheetahs 63

6 The Succession Fight 81

7 The Fallacy 95

8 Bait and Switch 112

9 The Big Diversion 134

10 The Purist 149

11 The Rogue 170

12 A Case of Clientitis 192

13 The Surrender 212

14 Underwater 231

15 Snookered 247

16 The Wrong War 262

Epilogue 283

Acknowledgments 295

Author's Note on Sources 299

Notes 303

Index 333

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