THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States (Special Nook Edition) NOOKbook

THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States (Special Nook Edition) NOOKbook

by Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission
     
 
The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission was created to "examine the causes, domestic and global, of the current financial and economic crisis in the United States." The Commission was established as part of the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act (Public Law 111-21) passed by Congress and signed by the President in May 2009. This independent, 10-member panel was

Overview

The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission was created to "examine the causes, domestic and global, of the current financial and economic crisis in the United States." The Commission was established as part of the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act (Public Law 111-21) passed by Congress and signed by the President in May 2009. This independent, 10-member panel was composed of private citizens with experience in areas such as housing, economics, finance, market regulation, banking and consumer protection. Six members of the Commission were appointed by the Democratic leadership of Congress and four by the Republican leadership. The Commission’s statutory instructions set out 22 specific topics for inquiry and called for the examination of the collapse of major financial institutions that failed or would have failed if not for exceptional assistance from the government. These include:

- fraud and abuse in the financial sector, including fraud and abuse toward consumers in the mortgage sector;
- Federal and State financial regulators, including the extent to which they enforced, or failed to enforce statutory, regulatory, or supervisory requirements;
- the global imbalance of savings, international capital flows, and fiscal imbalances of various governments;
- monetary policy and the availability and terms of credit;
- accounting practices, including, mark-to-market and fair value rules, and treatment of off-balance sheet vehicles;
- tax treatment of financial products and investments;
- capital requirements and regulations on leverage and liquidity, including the capital structures of regulated and non-regulated financial entities;
- credit rating agencies in the financial system, including, reliance on credit ratings by financial institutions and Federal financial regulators, the use of credit ratings in financial regulation, and the use of credit ratings in the securitization markets;
- lending practices and securitization, including the originate-to-distribute model for extending credit and transferring risk;
- affiliations between insured depository institutions and securities, insurance, and other types of nonbanking companies;
- the concept that certain institutions are 'too-big-to-fail' and its impact on market expectations;
- corporate governance, including the impact of company conversions from partnerships to corporations;
- compensation structures;
- changes in compensation for employees of financial companies, as compared to compensation for others with similar skill sets in the labor market;
- the legal and regulatory structure of the United States housing market;
derivatives and unregulated financial products and practices, including credit default swaps;
- short-selling;
- financial institution reliance on numerical models, including risk models and credit ratings;
- the legal and regulatory structure governing financial institutions, including the extent to which the structure creates the opportunity for financial institutions to engage in regulatory arbitrage;
- the legal and regulatory structure governing investor and mortgagor protection;
financial institutions and government-sponsored enterprises;
- and the quality of due diligence undertaken by financial institutions;

On January 27, 2011 the Commission delivered its report to the President, Congress and the American people.

THIS SPECIAL NOOK EDITION CONTAINS THE FULL UNABRIDGED COMMISSION REPORT SPECIALLY FORMATTED FOR THE NOOK DEVICE

Editorial Reviews

Susanne Craig
The Congressional commission’s scathing account of the financial crisis casts regulators in a rather unflattering light, as the sheriff who didn’t stop Wall Street from becoming the Wild West.

In its exhaustive report released on Thursday, the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission lambastes an alphabet soup of federal regulatory agencies – including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve.
Dominic Rushe
Goldman Sachs collected nearly $3bn (£1.9bn) from bailed-out US insurer American International Group (AIG) as a payout on bets it placed on its own account – with the bulk coming directly from taxpayers after AIG's rescue. The revelation was made in the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) report into 2008's financial meltdown.
Nick Timiraos
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac received $20.9 billion over about three years from U.S. banks it forced to buy back shoddy mortgages, according to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission.

The commission's report, released Thursday, provides the most detailed public accounting to date of the efforts by the government-controlled mortgage-finance giants to recoup losses by forcing banks to buy back loans that don't meet the company's underwriting guidelines.

Product Details

ISBN-13:
2940012102492
Publisher:
The Congressional Financial Crisis Inquiry Report
Publication date:
01/25/2011
Series:
Congressional Financial Crisis Inquiry , #1
Sold by:
Barnes & Noble
Format:
NOOK Book
Sales rank:
1,089,226
File size:
2 MB

Related Subjects

Meet the Author

Phil Angelides
Chairman
Hon. Bill Thomas
Vice Chairman
Brooksley Born
Commissioner
Byron S. Georgiou
Commissioner
Bob Graham
Commissioner
Keith Hennessey
Commissioner
Douglas Holtz-Eakin
Commissioner
Heather H. Murren, CFA
Commissioner
John W. Thompson
Commissioner
Peter J. Wallison
Commissioner

n the course of its research and investigation, the Commission reviewed millions of pages of documents, interviewed more than 700 witnesses, and held 19 days of public hearings in New York, Washington, D.C., and communities across the country that were hard hit by the crisis. The Commission also drew from a large body of existing work about the crisis developed by congressional committees, government agencies, academics, journalists, legal investigators, and many others.

The Commission conducted research into broad and sometimes arcane subjects, such as mortgage lending and securitization, derivatives, corporate governance, and risk management. To bring these subjects out of the realm of the abstract, it conducted case study investigations of specific financial firms—and in many cases specific facets of these institutions—that played pivotal roles. Those institutions included American International Group (AIG), Bear Stearns, Citigroup, Countrywide Financial, Fannie Mae, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Moody’s, and Wachovia. The Commission also looked more generally at the roles and actions of scores of other companies.

The Commission also studied relevant policies put in place by successive Congresses and administrations. It also examined the roles of policy makers and regulators, including at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Reserve, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (and its successor, the Federal Housing Finance Agency), the Office of Thrift Supervision, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Treasury Department.

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