The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy by Jussi M. Hanhimaki, Stanley Wells, Gary Taylor, John Jowett | | NOOK Book (eBook) | Barnes & Noble
The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy

The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy

by Jussi M. Hanhimaki, Stanley Wells, Gary Taylor, John Jowett
     
 

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Henry Kissinger dominated American foreign relations like no other figure in recent history. He negotiated an end to American involvement in the Vietnam War, opened relations with Communist China, and orchestrated detente with the Soviet Union. Yet he is also the man behind the secret bombing of Cambodia and policies leading to the overthrow of Chile's President

Overview

Henry Kissinger dominated American foreign relations like no other figure in recent history. He negotiated an end to American involvement in the Vietnam War, opened relations with Communist China, and orchestrated detente with the Soviet Union. Yet he is also the man behind the secret bombing of Cambodia and policies leading to the overthrow of Chile's President Salvador Allende. Which is more accurate, the picture of Kissinger the skilled diplomat or Kissinger the war criminal?
In The Flawed Architect, the first major reassessment of Kissinger in over a decade, historian Jussi Hanhimaki paints a subtle, carefully composed portrait of America's most famous and infamous statesman. Drawing on extensive research from newly declassified files, the author follows Kissinger from his beginnings in the Nixon administration up to the current controversy fed by Christopher Hitchens over whether Kissinger is a war criminal. Hanhimaki guides the reader through White House power struggles and debates behind the Cambodia and Laos invasions, the search for a strategy in Vietnam, the breakthrough with China, and the unfolding of Soviet-American detente. Here, too, are many other international crises of the period--the Indo-Pakistani War, the Yom Kippur War, the Angolan civil war--all set against the backdrop of Watergate. Along the way, Hanhimaki sheds light on Kissinger's personal flaws--he was obsessed with secrecy and bureaucratic infighting in an administration that self-destructed in its abuse of power--as well as his great strengths as a diplomat. We see Kissinger negotiating, threatening and joking with virtually all of the key foreign leaders of the 1970s, from Mao to Brezhnev and Anwar Sadat to Golda Meir.
This well researched account brings to life the complex nature of American foreign policymaking during the Kissinger years. It will be the standard work on Kissinger for years to come.

Editorial Reviews

Publishers Weekly
Hanhimaki is one of the most persuasive of the many detractors of Henry Kissinger, President Nixon's national security adviser and eventually secretary of state. Kissinger's penchant for covert action to undermine governments the administration saw as enemies, such as Chile and Angola, and his employment of secret back channels rather than open diplomacy, were, the author contends, hallmarks of his foreign policy. Hanhimaki, an editor of the journal Cold War History, calls Kissinger's "unapologetic realpolitik" approach to the Soviet Union, China and North Vietnam "morally questionable," though he asserts that Kissinger was not a war criminal. He was, rather, "disappointing" in his short-sightedness, never anticipating the long-term consequences of deals with adversaries, acquiescing, for example, in Indonesia's genocidal takeover of East Timor to placate an anticommunist regime. Although Kissinger had insisted, "The U.S. will not negotiate a surrender of South Vietnam," in effect he did precisely that, winning a shared Nobel Peace Prize. The subsequent bloodbath led to a rare concession from a man who, according to Hanhimaki, valued his credibility above all: ruefully, he offered to return the Peace Prize, but was told he had to keep it ("Rules were rules"). Hanhimaki offers a striking indictment, so it is unfortunate that the many repetitions make his book sometimes tedious and frustrating to read. (Sept.) Copyright 2004 Reed Business Information.
Foreign Affairs
Hundreds of thousands of words have been written about Henry Kissinger, including many by the great man himself, so what is the justification for yet another volume? Hanhimäki's case is that the existing literature is polarized between celebrants and detractors, and that a large amount of new archive material makes possible a more balanced and informed analysis of Kissinger's performance as national security adviser and then secretary of state during the 1970s. This is a useful if at times dense analysis of the available material, which is now considerable, on this critical period in international history, covering détente and arms control, China and Vietnam, the Middle East and Chile. It is to Hanhimäki's credit that, although critical, he has avoided an overheated polemic. The "flawed architect" title comes from Hanhimäki's view that Kissinger's basic failure was his inability "to build a sustainable foreign policy structure." But however distasteful Kissinger's realpolitik and his bureaucratic methods could be, this charge may underestimate the lasting impact, for better or for worse, of this period in American diplomacy.
Library Journal
Henry Kissinger served concurrently as national security adviser and secretary of state during the Nixon and Ford administrations (1969-1977). He practiced a realist approach to all contemporary issues, including the Vietnam War and the problems of the Middle East, framing them in terms of the triangular tension he perceived among the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. At first, that approach produced significant results, especially the initial opening to China. In later conflicts and those in Third World countries, that same analysis led to unsuccessful strategies. Hanhimaki (Graduate Inst. of International Affairs, Switzerland) has drawn extensively on recently declassified documents to write this complement to Kissinger's three volumes of memoirs. The author's interpretations of events frequently differ from those of his subject. But though the tone is critical, it is not at all polemical. Hanhimaki gives Kissinger due credit for his very real accomplishments while not concealing unpleasant facts, placing this work midway between Seymour Hersh's Price of Power and Marvin and Bernard Kalb's more admiring Kissinger. Recommended, especially for academic libraries. Marcia L. Sprules, Council on Foreign Relations Lib., New York Copyright 2004 Reed Business Information.

Product Details

ISBN-13:
9780199924042
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
Publication date:
09/09/2004
Sold by:
Barnes & Noble
Format:
NOOK Book
File size:
4 MB

Meet the Author

Jussi Hanhimaki is Professor of International History and Politics at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, Switzerland. An editor of the journal Cold War History, he is the author or co-author of five books, and won the 2002 Bernath Prize from the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations.

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