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As an insightful amateur historian, he traces the war's roots in prior hostilities between Greece and Persia and examines the relative merits of the Athenian League and the Spartan alliance. Scrupulously impartial and accurate, he presents detailed, knowledgeable accounts of the battles, in addition to dialogues reflecting the political atmosphere. This ancient tale of the rise and fall of a democratic empire bears numerous parallels with modern times. As the author remarked of his work, "I shall be satisfied if it be thought useful by those who wish to know the exact character of events now past which, human nature being what it is, will recur in similar or analogous forms."
The State of Greece from the earliest Times to the Commencement of the Peloponnesian War
THUCYDIDES, an Athenian, wrote the history of the war between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians, beginning at the moment that it broke out, and believing that it would be a great war, and more worthy of relation than any that had preceded it. This belief was not without its grounds. The preparations of both the combatants were in every department in the last state of perfection; and he could see the rest of the Hellenic race taking sides in the quarrel; those who delayed doing so at once having it in contemplation. Indeed this was the greatest movement yet known in history, not only of the Hellenes, but of a large part of the barbarian world—I had almost said of mankind. For though the events of remote antiquity, and even those that more immediately precede the war, could not from lapse of time be clearly ascertained, yet the evidences which an inquiry carried as far back as was practicable leads me to trust, all point to the conclusion that there was nothing on a great scale, either in war or in other matters.
For instance, it is evident that the country now called Hellas had in ancient times no settled population; on the contrary, migrations were of frequent occurrence, the several tribes readily abandoning their homes under the pressure of superior numbers. Without commerce, without freedom of communication either by land or sea, cultivating no more of their territory than the exigencies of life required, destitute of capital, never planting their land (for they could not tell when an invader might not come and take it all away, and when he did come they had no walls to stop him), thinking that the necessities of daily sustenance could be supplied at one place as well as another, they cared little for shifting their habitation, and consequently neither built large cities nor attained to any other form of greatness. The richest soils were always most subject to this change of masters; such as the district now called Thessaly, Botia, most of the Peloponnese, Arcadia excepted, and the most fertile parts of the rest of Hellas. The goodness of the land favoured the aggrandisement of particular individuals, and thus created faction which proved a fertile source of ruin. It also invited invasion. Accordingly Attica, from the poverty of its soil enjoying from a very remote period freedom from faction, never changed its inhabitants. And here is no inconsiderable exemplification of my assertion, that the migrations were the cause of there being no correspondent growth in other parts. The most powerful victims of war or faction from the rest of Hellas took refuge with the Athenians as a safe retreat; and at an early period, becoming naturalised, swelled the already large population of the city to such a height that Attica became at last too small to hold them, and they had to send out colonies to Ionia.
There is also another circumstance that contributes not a little to my conviction of the weakness of ancient times. Before the Trojan war there is no indication of any common action in Hellas, nor indeed of the universal prevalence of the name; on the contrary, before the time of Hellen, son of Deucalion, no such appellation existed, but the country went by the names of the different tribes, in particular of the Pelasgian. It was not till Hellen and his sons grew strong in Phthiotis, and were invited as allies into the other cities, that one by one they gradually acquired from the connexion the name of Hellenes; though a long time elapsed before that name could fasten itself upon all. The best proof of this is furnished by Homer. Born long after the Trojan war, he nowhere calls all of them by that name, nor indeed any of them except the followers of Achilles from Phthiotis, who were the original Hellenes: in his poems they are called Danaans, Argives, and Achæns. He does not even use the term barbarian, probably because the Hellenes had not yet been marked off from the rest of the world by one distinctive appellation. It appears therefore that the several Hellenic communities, comprising not only those who first acquired the name, city by city, as they came to understand each other, but also those who assumed it afterwards as the name of the whole people, were before the Trojan war prevented by their want of strength and the absence of mutual intercourse from displaying any collective action.
Indeed, they could not unite for this expedition till they had gained increased familiarity with the sea. And the first person known to us by tradition as having established a navy is Minos. He made himself master of what is now called the Hellenic sea, and ruled over the Cyclades, into most of which he sent the first colonies, expelling the Carians and appointing his own sons governors; and thus did his best to put down piracy in those waters, a necessary step to secure the revenues for his own use.
For in early times the Hellenes and the barbarians of the coast and islands, as communication by sea became more common, were tempted to turn pirates, under the conduct of their most powerful men; the motives being to serve their own cupidity and to support the needy. They would fall upon a town unprotected by walls, and consisting of a mere collection of villages, and would plunder it; indeed, this came to be the main source of their livelihood, no disgrace being yet attached to such an achievement, but even some glory. An illustration of this is furnished by the honour with which some of the inhabitants of the continent still regard a successful marauder, and by the question we find the old poets everywhere representing the people as asking of voyagers—'Are they pirates?'—as if those who are asked the question would have no idea of disclaiming the imputation, or their interrogators of reproaching them for it. The same rapine prevailed also by land.
And even at the present day many parts of Hellas still follow the old fashion, the Ozolian Locrians for instance, the Ætolians, the Acarnanians, and that region of the continent; and the custom of carrying arms is still kept up among these continentals, from the old piratical habits. The whole of Hellas used once to carry arms, their habitations being unprotected and their communication with each other unsafe; indeed, to wear arms was as much a part of everyday life with them as with the barbarians. And the fact that the people in these parts of Hellas are still living in the old way points to a time when the same mode of life was once equally common to all. The Athenians were the first to lay aside their weapons, and to adopt an easier and more luxurious mode of life; indeed, it is only lately that their rich old men left off the luxury of wearing undergarments of linen, and fastening a knot of their hair with a tie of golden grasshoppers, a fashion which spread to their Ionian kindred, and long prevailed among the old men there. On the contrary a modest style of dressing, more in conformity with modern ideas, was first adopted by the Lacedæmonians, the rich doing their best to assimilate their way of life to that of the common people. They also set the example of contending naked, publicly stripping and anointing themselves with oil in their gymnastic exercises. Formerly, even in the Olympic contests, the athletes who contended wore belts across their middles; and it is but a few years since that the practice ceased. To this day among some of the barbarians, especially in Asia, when prizes for boxing and wrestling are offered, belts are worn by the combatants. And there are many other points in which a likeness might be shown between the life of the Hellenic world of old and the barbarian of to-day.
With respect to their towns, later on, at an era of increased facilities of navigation and a greater supply of capital, we find the shores becoming the site of walled towns, and the isthmuses being occupied for the purposes of commerce, and defence against a neighbour. But the old towns, on account of the great prevalence of piracy, were built away from the sea, whether on the islands or the continent, and still remain in their old sites. For the pirates used to plunder one another, and indeed all coast populations, whether seafaring or not.
The islanders, too, were great pirates. These islanders were Carians and Phnicians, by whom most of the islands were colonised, as was proved by the following fact. During the purification of Delos by Athens in this war all the graves in the island were taken up, and it was found that above half their inmates were Carians: they were identified by the fashion of the arms buried with them, and by the method of interment, which was the same as the Carians still follow. But as soon as Minos had formed his navy, communication by sea became easier, as he colonised most of the islands, and thus expelled the malefactors. The coast population now began to apply themselves more closely to the acquisition of wealth, and their life became more settled; some even began to build themselves walls on the strength of their newly-acquired riches. For the love of gain would reconcile the weaker to the dominion of the stronger, and the possession of capital enabled the more powerful to reduce the smaller towns to subjection. And it was at a somewhat later stage of this development that they went on the expedition against Troy.
What enabled Agamemnon to raise the armament was more, in my opinion, his superiority in strength, than the oaths of Tyndareus, which bound the Suitors to follow him. Indeed, the account given by those Peloponnesians who have been the recipients of the most credible tradition is this. First of all Pelops, arriving among a needy population from Asia with vast wealth, acquired such power that, stranger though he was, the country was called after him; and this power fortune saw fit materially to increase in the hands of his descendants. Eurystheus had been killed in Attica by the Heraclids. Atreus was his mother's brother; and to the hands of his relation, who had left his father on account of the death of Chrysippus, Eurystheus, when he set out on his expedition, had committed Mycenæ and the government. As time went on and Eurystheus did not return, Atreus complied with the wishes of the Mycenæans, who were influenced by fear of the Heraclids,—besides, his power seemed considerable, and he had not neglected to court the favour of the populace,—and assumed the sceptre of Mycenæ and the rest of the dominions of Eurystheus. And so the power of the descendants of Pelops came to be greater than that of the descendants of Perseus. To all this Agamemnon succeeded. He had also a navy far stronger than his contemporaries, so that, in my opinion, fear was quite as strong an element as love in the formation of the confederate expedition. The strength of his navy is shown by the fact that his own was the largest contingent, and that of the Arcadians was furnished by him; this at least is what Homer says, if his testimony is deemed sufficient. Besides, in his account of the transmission of the sceptre, he calls him
'Of many an isle, and of all Argos king.'
Now Agamemnon's was a continental power; and he could not have been master of any except the adjacent islands (and these would not be many), but through the possession of a fleet.
And from this expedition we may infer the character of earlier enterprises. Now Mycenæ may have been a small place, and many of the towns of that age may appear comparatively insignificant, but no exact observer would therefore feel justified in rejecting the estimate given by the poets and by tradition of the magnitude of the armament. For I suppose if Lacedæmon were to become desolate, and the temples and the foundations of the public buildings were left, that as time went on there would be a strong disposition with posterity to refuse to accept her fame as a true exponent of her power. And yet they occupy two-fifths of Peloponnese and lead the whole, not to speak of their numerous allies without. Still, as the city is neither built in a compact form nor adorned with magnificent temples and public edifices, but composed of villages after the old fashion of Hellas, there would be an impression of inadequacy. Whereas, if Athens were to suffer the same misfortune, I suppose that any inference from the appearance presented to the eye would make her power to have been twice as great as it is. We have therefore no right to be sceptical, nor to content ourselves with an inspection of a town to the exclusion of a consideration of its power; but we may safely conclude that the armament in question surpassed all before it, as it fell short of modern efforts; if we can here also accept the testimony of Homer's poems, in which, without allowing for the exaggeration which a poet would feel himself licensed to employ, we can see that it was far from equalling ours. He has represented it as consisting of twelve hundred vessels; the Botian complement of each ship being a hundred and twenty men, that of the ships of Philoctetes fifty. By this, I conceive, he meant to convey the maximum and the minimum complement: at any rate he does not specify the amount of any others in his catalogue of the ships. That they were all rowers as well as warriors we see from his account of the ships of Philoctetes, in which all the men at the oar are bowmen. Now it is improbable that many supernumeraries sailed if we except the kings and high officers; especially as they had to cross the open sea with munitions of war, in ships, moreover, that had no decks, but were equipped in the old piratical fashion. So that if we strike the average of the largest and smallest ships, the number of those who sailed will appear inconsiderable, representing, as they did, the whole force of Hellas. And this was due not so much to scarcity of men as of money. Difficulty of subsistence made the invaders reduce the numbers of the army to a point at which it might live on the country during the prosecution of the war. Even after the victory they obtained on their arrival—and a victory there must have been, or the fortifications of the naval camp could never have been built—there is no indication of their whole force having been employed; on the contrary, they seem to have turned to cultivation of the Chersonese and to piracy from want of supplies. This was what really enabled the Trojans to keep the field for ten years against them; the dispersion of the enemy making them always a match for the detachment left behind. If they had brought plenty of supplies with them, and had persevered in the war without scattering for piracy and agriculture, they would have easily defeated the Trojans in the field; since they could hold their own against them with the division on service. In short, if they had stuck to the siege, the capture of Troy would have cost them less time and less trouble. But as want of money proved the weakness of earlier expeditions, so from the same cause even the one in question, more famous than its predecessors, may be pronounced on the evidence of what it effected to have been inferior to its renown and to the current opinion about it formed under the tuition of the poets.
Even after the Trojan war Hellas was still engaged in removing and settling, and thus could not attain to the quiet which must precede growth. The late return of the Hellenes from Ilium caused many revolutions, and factions ensued almost everywhere; and it was the citizens thus driven into exile who founded the cities. Sixty years after the capture of Ilium the modern Botians were driven out of Arne by the Thessalians, and settled in the present Botia, the former Cadmeis; though there was a division of them there before, some of whom joined the expedition to Ilium. Twenty years later the Dorians and the Heraclids became masters of Peloponnese; so that much had to be done and many years had to elapse before Hellas could attain to a durable tranquillity undisturbed by removals, and could begin to send out colonies, as Athens did to Ionia and most of the islands, and the Peloponnesians to most of Italy and Sicily and some places in the rest of Hellas. All these places were founded subsequently to the war with Troy.
Excerpted from History of the Peloponnesian War by Thucydides, Richard Crawley. Copyright © 2004 Dover Publications, Inc.. Excerpted by permission of Dover Publications, Inc..
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|I.||The State of Greece from the earliest Times to the Commencement of the Peloponnesian War||1|
|II.||Causes of the War--The Affair of Epidamnus--The Affair of Potidaea||11|
|III.||Congress of the Peloponnesian Confederacy at Lacedaemon||28|
|IV.||From the end of the Persian to the beginning of the Peloponnesian War--The Progress from Supremacy to Empire||39|
|V.||Second Congress at Lacedaemon--Preparations for War and Diplomatic Skirmishes--Cylon--Pausanias--Themistocles||50|
|VI.||Beginning of the Peloponnesian War--First Invasion of Attica--Funeral Oration of Pericles||67|
|VII.||Second Year of the War--The Plague of Athens--Position and Policy of Pericles--Fall of Potidaea||87|
|VIII.||Third Year of the War--Investment of Plataea--Naval Victories of Phormio--Thracian Irruption into Macedonia under Sitalces||99|
|IX.||Fourth and Fifth Years of the War--Revolt of Mitylene||119|
|X.||Fifth Year of the War--Trial and Execution of the Plataeans--Corcyraean Revolution||140|
|XI.||Sixth Year of the War--Campaigns of Demosthenes in Western Greece--Ruin of Ambracia||155|
|XII.||Seventh Year of the War--Occupation of Pylos--Surrender of the Spartan Army in Sphacteria||169|
|XIII.||Seventh and Eighth Years of the War--End of Corcyraean Revolution--Peace of Gela--Capture of Nisaea||187|
|XIV.||Eighth and Ninth Years of the War--Invasion of Boeotia--Fall of Amphipolis--Brilliant Successes of Brasidas||200|
|XV.||Tenth Year of the War--Death of Cleon and Brasidas--Peace of Nicias||229|
|XVI.||Feeling against Sparta in Peloponnese--League of the Mantineans, Eleans, Argives, and Athenians--Battle of Mantinea and Breaking up of the League||240|
|XVII.||Sixteenth Year of the War--The Melian Conference--Fate of Melos||267|
|XVIII.||Seventeenth Year of the War--The Sicilian Campaign--Affair of the Hermae--Departure of the Expedition||275|
|XIX.||Seventeenth Year of the War--Parties at Syracuse--Story of Harmodius and Aristogiton--Disgrace of Alcibiades||290|
|XX.||Seventeenth and Eighteenth Years of the War--Inaction of the Athenian Army--Alcibiades at Sparta--Investment of Syracuse||303|
|XXI.||Eighteenth and Nineteenth Years of the War--Arrival of Gylippus at Syracuse--Fortification of Decelea--Successes of the Syracusans||325|
|XXII.||Nineteenth Year of the War--Arrival of Demosthenes--Defeat of the Athenians at Epipolae--Folly and Obstinacy of Nicias||344|
|XXIII.||Nineteenth Year of the War--Battles in the Great Harbour--Retreat and Annihilation of the Athenian Army||349|
|XXIV.||Nineteenth and Twentieth Years of the War--Revolt of Ionia--Intervention of Persia--The War in Ionia||369|
|XXV.||Twentieth and Twenty-first Years of the War--Intrigues of Alcibiades--Withdrawal of the Persian Subsidies--Oligarchical Coup d'Etat at Athens--Patriotism of the Army at Samos||387|
|XXVI.||Twenty-first Year of the War--Recall of Alcibiades to Samos--Revolt of Euboea and Downfall of the Four Hundred--Battle of Cynossema||403|
Posted May 7, 2008
I read this book while studying greek history. It was hard for me to understand at first but i got the hang of it after a while. It was an amazing first hand account of everything that went on during the war and it is loaded with history. I learned a lot from it about the governments of Athens and Sparta and loads of other places and people in ancient greece along with battle tactics and such. Even though it was a dificult read I am amazed at how much i learned and i don't know how any study of ancient greece could do without it. I would not suggest it for anyone younger than twelve which was how old i was when i read it but like i said it was dificult for me at that age and is not really the kind of book that will keep you on the edge of your seat the whole time. I would encourage everyone to read it, it is a great book and a definate classic.
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Posted March 23, 2011
The conflict of the Second or Great Peloponnesian War lasted from 431-404 BCE. It was a fratricidal war that divided the Grecian city-states into the two spheres of the Lacedaemonian Confederation and the Athenian Hegemony. The Delian League that was to act as a defensive perimeter of the Grecians and stave off future Persian invasions transformed into a power that was dominated by a single hegemonic state: the Athenian polis. The period of the First Athenian Hegemony lasted from 478-404 BCE and it was essentially a thalassocracy. A thalassocracy is a political entity whose sole basis for its supremacy or even its very existence depends on the mastery of the seas and the dominance of its navies. As soon as the Athenians were defeated at the naval engagement at Aegospotami in 405 BCE, the Athenian port of Piraeus was blockaded and with the destruction of its naval forces and the loss of its former maritime supremacy, the Athenian Hegemony collapsed. The Athenian response to the Lacedaemonian threat was the Periclean Strategy which was divided into three main strategic points: 1. Offensive assaults by sea [For the constant harassment of Lacedaemonian and Lacedaemonian allied coastal cities and for the seizure of poorly defended regions that were accessible by sea], 2. A defensive stance on land; a policy of containment [The Athenians would allow the Lacedaemonians to ravage the adjacent lands and the surrounding countryside in Attica while Athens itself and the port of Piraeus were well-defended with the Long Walls, and 3. The maintenance of foreign trade [While the Athenians formed a stranglehold on its inveterate foes through the might of its formidable fleets, Athens would enrich itself with trade maintained with foreign states].
1 out of 2 people found this review helpful.Was this review helpful? Yes NoThank you for your feedback. Report this reviewThank you, this review has been flagged.
Posted December 25, 2009
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