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The Homevoter Hypothesis: How Home Values Influence Local Government Taxation, School Finance, and Land-Use Policies / Edition 1
     

The Homevoter Hypothesis: How Home Values Influence Local Government Taxation, School Finance, and Land-Use Policies / Edition 1

by William A. Fischel
 

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ISBN-10: 0674015959

ISBN-13: 9780674015951

Pub. Date: 02/01/2005

Publisher: Harvard

Just as investors want the companies they hold equity in to do well, homeowners have a financial interest in the success of their communities. If neighborhood schools are good, if property taxes and crime rates are low, then the value of the homeowner’s principal asset—his home—will rise. Thus, as William Fischel shows, homeowners become watchful

Overview

Just as investors want the companies they hold equity in to do well, homeowners have a financial interest in the success of their communities. If neighborhood schools are good, if property taxes and crime rates are low, then the value of the homeowner’s principal asset—his home—will rise. Thus, as William Fischel shows, homeowners become watchful citizens of local government, not merely to improve their quality of life, but also to counteract the risk to their largest asset, a risk that cannot be diversified. Meanwhile, their vigilance promotes a municipal governance that provides services more efficiently than do the state or national government.

Fischel has coined the portmanteau word “homevoter” to crystallize the connection between homeownership and political involvement. The link neatly explains several vexing puzzles, such as why displacement of local taxation by state funds reduces school quality and why local governments are more likely to be efficient providers of environmental amenities. The Homevoter Hypothesis thereby makes a strong case for decentralization of the fiscal and regulatory functions of government.

Product Details

ISBN-13:
9780674015951
Publisher:
Harvard
Publication date:
02/01/2005
Edition description:
New Edition
Pages:
344
Sales rank:
1,201,409
Product dimensions:
5.75(w) x (h) x (d)

Table of Contents

Preface

1 An Asset-Market Approach to Local Government

2 Local Government's Corporate Form

3 Capitalization, Zoning, and the Tiebout Hypothesis

4 The Median Voter in Local Government Politics

5 Serrano and the California Tax Revolt

6 The Fruits of School-Finance Centralization

7 The Race to the Top in Environmental Protection

8 "Beggar Thy Neighbor" and Land fill Location

9 How Homevoters Remade Metropolitan Areas

10 Sprawl, Metropolitanism, and Local Control

11 Reforming and Reaffirming Local Government

Case References

General References

Index

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