The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis

by Ernest May, Philip D. Zelikow

Overview

The closest most of us will ever come to being inside the Oval Office at a moment of crisis.

For sheer drama, this work of history may never be duplicated. The events of the Cuban Missile Crisis unfold in the actual words of President John F. Kennedy and his top advisers. Now available in a new, concise edition, this book retains its gripping sense of history in the making.

"[A] splendid achievement, as powerful and exciting a book as one is likely to read this year...."—Barry Gewen, New York Times Book Review "Gripping history."—Richard J. Tofel, Wall Street Journal "[M]esmerizing. I was utterly fascinated....the best, fullest account of crisis yet and will remain so for decades to come."—Stephen E. Ambrose "[A]s close as most people will ever get to being a fly on the wall during the discussions of leaders."—Los Angeles Times Sunday Book Review, James G. Blight

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780393322590
Publisher:	Norton, W. W. & Company, Inc.
Publication date:	03/17/2002
Edition description:	Concise Edition
Pages:	572
Sales rank:	521,391
Product dimensions:	6.20(w) x 9.20(h) x 1.00(d)

About the Author

Ernest May is Charles Warren Professor of American History at Harvard University.

Philip D. Zelikow was executive director of the 9/11 Commission. He is the White Burkett Miller Professor of History at the University of Virginia.

Table of Contents

	Preface to the Concise Edition	xi
	A Note on Sources	xv
	Introduction	xvii
	Tuesday, September 4, 1962	3
	12:35 P.M. - Meeting on Soviet Arms Shipments to Cuba	3
	4:00 P.M. - Drafting Meeting on the Press Statement	9
	5:00 P.M. - Meeting with Congressional Leadership	12
	5:55 P.M. - Meeting on the Congressional Resolution	16
	Saturday, September 29, 1962	20
	11:00 A.M. - Meeting on the Soviet Union	20
	Tuesday, October 16, 1962	30
	11:50 A.M. - Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis	32
	6:30 P.M. - Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis	53
	Thursday, October 18, 1962	73
	11:10 A.M. - Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis	73
	Near Midnight. Kennedy Summarizes a Late-Night Meeting	106
	Friday, October 19, 1962	109
	9:45 A.M. - Meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff	109
	Saturday, October 20, 1962	124
	2:30 P.M. - National Security Council Meeting	125
	Monday, October 22, 1962	138
	10:40 A.M. - Conversation with Dwight Eisenhower	142
	11:00 A.M. - Meeting on Diplomatic Plans	146
	11:47 A.M. - Meeting of Berlin Group	149
	3:00 P.M. - National Security Council Meeting	152
	5:30 P.M. - Meeting with the Congressional Leadership	163
	Tuesday, October 23, 1962	194
	10:00 A.M. - Executive Committee Meeting of the National Security Council	194
	12:25 P.M. - Conversation with Lucius Clay	202
	3:52 P.M. - Conversation with Roswell Gilpatric	204
	6:00 P.M. - Executive Committee Meeting of the National Security Council	206
	7:10 P.M. - Discussion between President Kennedy and Robert Kennedy	218
	Wednesday, October 24, 1962	224
	10:00 A.M. - Executive Committee Meeting of the National Security Council	224
	5:05 P.M. - Meetings with Staff and Congressional Leadership	234
	Thursday, October 25, 1962	245
	10:00 A.M. - Executive Committee Meeting of the National Security Council	245
	5:25 P.M. - Executive Committee Meeting of the National Security Council	260
	Friday, October 26, 1962	269
	10:10 A.M. - Executive Committee Meeting of the National Security Council	269
	12:00 P.M. - Meeting with Intelligence Officials	288
	4:30 P.M. - Conversation with Dean Rusk	292
	7:31 P.M. - Conversation with Lincoln White	295
	Saturday, October 27, 1962	301
	10:05 A.M. - Executive Committee Meeting of the National Security Council	301
	4:00 P.M. - Executive Committee Meeting of the National Security Council	324
	9:00 P.M. - Executive Committee Meeting of the National Security Council	391
	Sunday, October 28, 1962	402
	11:05 A.M. - Executive Committee Meeting of the National Security Council	404
	12:08 P.M. - Conversations with Dwight Eisenhower, Harry Truman, and Herbert Hoover	405
	Conclusion	411
	Notes	451
	Index	491

What People are Saying About This

Stephen E. Ambrose

The Kennedy Tapes is mesmerizing. I was utterly fascinated. The book is the best, fullest account of crisis yet and will remain so for decades to come…I can't think of when I've learned more from a single book.

Editorial Reviews

"Enlightening."

Dallas Morning News - Alan Peppard

Enlightening.--Alan Peppard "Dallas Morning News"

From the Publisher

[A]s close as most people will ever get to being a fly on the wall during the discussions of leaders. —Los Angeles Times Sunday Book Review

James G. Blight

Gripping history. —Wall Street Journal

Richard J. Tofel

[M]esmerizing. I was utterly fascinated....the best, fullest account of crisis yet and will remain so for decades to come.

Stephen E. Ambrose

[A] splendid achievement, as powerful and exciting a book as one is likely to read this year.... —New York Times Book Review

Barry Gewen

Riveting. . . The Kennedy Tapes. . . [is] a suspenseful, self-contained narrative of a single intense episode. . . which in retrospect stands out as the most dangerous moment of the Cold War. -- New Yorker

Hendrik Hertzberg

[The Kennedy Tapes] is 700 pages of terror and drama.
—Bruce W. Melan Time

Bruce Melan

The transcripts…capture the power and drama of the moment. They show just how raw things were in the White House. They let readers hear leaders thinking out loud about what to do to force the Soviets to withdraw the missile. The raise ideas about nuclear weapons, political power and civilian control of the military that remain vital today…The tapes show men mulling over a global chess game in which the wrong move kills millions…The words are a record of decision-making in a nuclear crisis that has no equal.
—Kim Weiner New York Times

Kim Weiner

The Kennedy Tapes will fascinate anyone interested in history and anyone interested in how the American government works when its citizens most depend on it.
—Newsweek

Philip Seib

To read [The Kennedy Tapes] is to be in the White House in those fateful days of October, 1962…This immediacy is new, and it is endlessly fascinating…The Kennedy Tapes is a must-read, not only for the student of history or international affairs, but for citizens of any country who hold out the hope that the Earth will never face such a crisis again.
—(James Baker, former Secretary of State Observer (London))

James Baker

The glimpse we get into the making of U.S. policy in a crisis—in this case the Cuban missile crisis—is unique and, in light of the historical and legal problems of the taping of White House conversations by presidents, may well remain so.

Which is a great pity, for despite the apparently poor quality of the tapes and various unresolved questions relating to them, the picture of U.S officials dealing with the most serious crisis of the Cold War is memorable. Although the editors, both scholars at Harvard, rightly remark on the "inherently disorderly character" of such meetings, the quality of understanding and analysis the participants brought to the task was high. There are some exceptions: The lack of esteem felt by Kennedy for the Joint Chiefs of Staff seems justified by their performance (General LeMay openly equated Kennedy's actions with "the appeasement at Munich"); the congressional group brought in to advise was less than helpful, Senator Fulbright, ironically, calling for an immediate all-out invasion. Kennedy privately chews Secretary Rusk out for failing to do contingency planning on the U.S. missiles in Turkey. But the praise given by the editors to Kennedy seems justified, not only for his clear recognition of the awesome responsibilities of his actions, but for asking questions that his advisors had neglected. The editors write of his "cold analytical mind," and indeed he alone notes that U.S. allies think that on the subject of Cuba "we're slightly demented"; if anything, he tends to be pessimistic ("He'll grab Berlin, of course," he says of Khrushchev). But it is particularly impressive when contrasted with the idiosyncratic, unsystematic, and uninformed policymaking of Khrushchev.

A remarkable and truly historic record, well analyzed and put in context by May and Zelikow.

Kirkus Reviews