The Microsoft Case: Antitrust, High Technology, and Consumer Welfare

The Microsoft Case: Antitrust, High Technology, and Consumer Welfare

The Microsoft Case: Antitrust, High Technology, and Consumer Welfare

The Microsoft Case: Antitrust, High Technology, and Consumer Welfare

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Overview

In 1998 the United States Department of Justice and state antitrust agencies charged that Microsoft was monopolizing the market for personal computer operating systems. More than ten years later, the case is still the defining antitrust litigation of our era. William H. Page and John E. Lopatka's The Microsoft Case contributes to the debate over the future of antitrust policy by examining the implications of the litigation from the perspective of consumer welfare.

Product Details

ISBN-13: 9780226644646
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Publication date: 04/15/2009
Edition description: Reprint
Pages: 368
Sales rank: 963,788
Product dimensions: 6.00(w) x 8.90(h) x 2.80(d)

About the Author

William H. Page is the Marshall M. Criser Eminent Scholar at the University of Florida’s Levin School of Law.

John E. Lopatka is the A. Robert Noll Distinguished Professor of Law at the Pennsylvania State University’s Dickinson School of Law.

Table of Contents

Preface ix

1 Origins 1

Ideological Sources of Antimonopolization Law 2

Microsoft's Predecessors: The Public Monopolization Case 4

Microsoft's Beginnings: A Post-Chicago Convergence 19

2 Decisions 33

Chronology 34

The Liability Decisions 35

The Remedial Decisions 70

The Follow-on Private Litigation 78

The European Commission Decision 80

3 Markets 85

Two Systems of Belief about Operating Systems and Middleware 86

Network Effects and Related Economic Concepts 91

Defining Software Markets 96

4 Practices I: Integration 115

A Preliminary Skirmish 119

Integration on Trial 123

Rethinking and Redefining Integration under Sherman Act Standards 129

5 Practices II: The Market Division Proposal, Exclusive Contracts, and Java 167

The Market Division Proposal 168

The Exclusive Contracts 184

Java 191

6 Remedies 203

The Goals of Antitrust Remedies 204

Structural Remedies 205

Conduct Remedies 212

Damage Remedies 224

Aftermath 243

Notes 249

Index 331

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