The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism

by Terence Cuneo

Overview

Antirealist views about morality claim that moral facts or truths do not exist. Do these views imply that other types of normative facts, such as epistemic ones, do not exist? The Normative Web develops a positive answer to this question. Terence Cuneo argues that the similarities between moral and epistemic facts provide excellent reason to believe that, if moral facts do not exist, then epistemic facts do not exist. But epistemic facts, it is argued, do exist: to deny their existence would commit us to an extreme version of epistemological skepticism. Therefore, Cuneo concludes, moral facts exist. And if moral facts exist, then moral realism is true. In so arguing, Cuneo provides not simply a defense of moral realism, but a positive argument for it. Moreover, this argument engages with a wide range of antirealist positions in epistemology such as error theories, expressivist views, and reductionist views of epistemic reasons. If the central argument of The Normative Web is correct, antirealist positions of these varieties come at a very high cost. Given their cost, Cuneo contends, we should find realism about both epistemic and moral facts highly attractive.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780191614811
Publisher:	Oxford University Press
Publication date:	03/04/2010
Sold by:	Barnes & Noble
Format:	eBook
File size:	3 MB

About the Author

Terence Cuneo is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Vermont.

Table of Contents

Introduction1. Moral Realism of a Paradigmatic Sort2. Defending the Parallel3. The Parity Premise4. Epistemic Nihilism5. Epistemic Expressivism: Traditional Views6. Epistemic Expressivism: Nontraditional Views7. Epistemic Reductionism8. Three Objections to the Core ArgumentBibliography

Editorial Reviews

"Terence Cuneo has written a powerful defense of moral realism.... This is a great idea for a book and Cuneo does it justice: it ought to be ready by anyone concerned with metaethics or with issues regarding normativity in general. The structure of the argument is clear, the methodology is straightforward, and each premise has a prima facie plausibility that only deepens as the book progresses. The bar that must be reached for those who wish to reject moral realism has been raised.... Metaethicists of all stripes, moral realists and nonrealists alike, have good reason to spend time with Cuneo's work. The realist will basically find solace in it, everyone else will find it very challenging indeed."—Paul Bloomfield, Social Theory and Practice

From the Publisher