The Rise and Fall of Détente: American Foreign Policy and the Transformation of the Cold War

In keeping with the other titles in Robert J. McMahon’s Issues in the History of American Foreign Relations series, Jussi M. Hanhimäki offers students and scholars a survey of the evolution of American foreign policy during a key period in recent history, the era of superpower détente and global transformation in the 1960s and 1970s. Describing détente as not only an era but also a strategy of waging the Cold War, Hanhimäki examines the reasons that led to the rise of détente, explores the highlights of the era’s reduced East-West tensions, and explains the causes of détente’s demise.

He addresses many questions: What were the long-term and short-term causes of détente? Was it a policy “invented” in the United States or adopted under pressure from abroad? Did it represent a radical break with the past—a move from idealism to realism—or was it simply an attempt to prolong the Cold War bipolarity within the international system? Was détente a policy that grew from weakness and doubt (caused particularly by the Vietnam War)? What were its main achievements and shortcomings? What led to its end? In conclusion, he evaluates the role of détente in the dismantling of the Cold War international system.
1137510905
The Rise and Fall of Détente: American Foreign Policy and the Transformation of the Cold War

In keeping with the other titles in Robert J. McMahon’s Issues in the History of American Foreign Relations series, Jussi M. Hanhimäki offers students and scholars a survey of the evolution of American foreign policy during a key period in recent history, the era of superpower détente and global transformation in the 1960s and 1970s. Describing détente as not only an era but also a strategy of waging the Cold War, Hanhimäki examines the reasons that led to the rise of détente, explores the highlights of the era’s reduced East-West tensions, and explains the causes of détente’s demise.

He addresses many questions: What were the long-term and short-term causes of détente? Was it a policy “invented” in the United States or adopted under pressure from abroad? Did it represent a radical break with the past—a move from idealism to realism—or was it simply an attempt to prolong the Cold War bipolarity within the international system? Was détente a policy that grew from weakness and doubt (caused particularly by the Vietnam War)? What were its main achievements and shortcomings? What led to its end? In conclusion, he evaluates the role of détente in the dismantling of the Cold War international system.
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The Rise and Fall of Détente: American Foreign Policy and the Transformation of the Cold War

The Rise and Fall of Détente: American Foreign Policy and the Transformation of the Cold War

by Jussi M. Hanhimaki
The Rise and Fall of Détente: American Foreign Policy and the Transformation of the Cold War

The Rise and Fall of Détente: American Foreign Policy and the Transformation of the Cold War

by Jussi M. Hanhimaki

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Overview


In keeping with the other titles in Robert J. McMahon’s Issues in the History of American Foreign Relations series, Jussi M. Hanhimäki offers students and scholars a survey of the evolution of American foreign policy during a key period in recent history, the era of superpower détente and global transformation in the 1960s and 1970s. Describing détente as not only an era but also a strategy of waging the Cold War, Hanhimäki examines the reasons that led to the rise of détente, explores the highlights of the era’s reduced East-West tensions, and explains the causes of détente’s demise.

He addresses many questions: What were the long-term and short-term causes of détente? Was it a policy “invented” in the United States or adopted under pressure from abroad? Did it represent a radical break with the past—a move from idealism to realism—or was it simply an attempt to prolong the Cold War bipolarity within the international system? Was détente a policy that grew from weakness and doubt (caused particularly by the Vietnam War)? What were its main achievements and shortcomings? What led to its end? In conclusion, he evaluates the role of détente in the dismantling of the Cold War international system.

Product Details

ISBN-13: 9781597970761
Publisher: Potomac Books
Publication date: 11/01/2012
Series: Issues in the History of American Foreign Relations (Paperback)
Edition description: New Edition
Pages: 296
Product dimensions: 6.00(w) x 8.90(h) x 1.00(d)

About the Author

JUSSI M. HANHIMÄKI is professor of international history at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva, Switzerland. He is a founding editor of the journal Cold War History and the author of several recent books, among them Transatlantic Relations Since 1945: An Introduction (Routledge, 2012, with Benedikt Schoenborn and Barbara Zanchetta) and The Cold War: A History in Documents and Eyewitness Accounts (Oxford University Press, 2004, with Odd Arne Westad). He lives in Geneva, Switzerland.

Robert J. McMahon is the Mershon Distinguished Professor of History at Ohio State University. He is the author of several books on U.S. foreign relations, including The Cold War: A Very Short Introduction, The Limits of Empire: The United States and Southeast Asia Since World War II, and The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan. He served as the president of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations in 2001. He lives in Columbus, Ohio.

Table of Contents

Series Editor's Note ix

Acknowledgments xi

Introduction xiii

Chapter 1 Roots of Détente: Crises, Challenges, and the Quest for Stability 1

Chapter 2 1968: Revolution, War, and the Birth of Détente 25

Chapter 3 "Three for Three": Triangulation 43

Chapter 4 Nixon, Kissinger, and Détente in Europe 61

Chapter 5 Détente Halted: Domestic Critics and Regional Crises 77

Chapter 6 Reason or Morality: Carter, Human Rights, and Nuclear Peace 101

Chapter 7 Crisis and Collapse: Iran, Afghanistan, and the Carter Doctrine 125

Chapter 8 Cold War Transformed: The Paradox of Détente 143

Appendix of Documents 155

1 Khrushchev on the Need for Relaxation of Tensions, October 30, 1962 155

2 President John F. Kennedy's Commencement Address at American University, June 10, 1963 157

3 Memorandum of Understanding between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Direct Communications Link, June 20, 1963 161

4 Test Ban Treaty between the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, August 5, 1963 164

5 Debriefing by the President on His Talks with Chairman Kosygin, June 23, 1967 165

6 Nixon's Address at the Bohemian Club in San Francisco, July 29, 1967 168

7 NATO Council on Future Relations with the Warsaw Pact Members (the Harmel Report), December 13-14, 1967 173

8 Nixon's Inaugural Address, January 20, 1969 176

9 Willy Brandt and Henry Kissinger on West German Ostpolitik, 1969-70 178

10 White House Background Press Briefing by the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), February 16, 1970 181

11 Telegram from Ambassador Dobrynin to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, July 17, 1971 184

12 Basic Principles: The United States and the Soviet Union Agree on the "Rules" of Détente, May 1972 187

13 Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the 1974 Trade Law, January 3, 1975 188

14 Memorandum from the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford, July 1975 (undated) 191

15 Cabinet Meeting, Memorandum of Conversation, August 8, 1975 195

16 Soviet Suppression of Dissidents, 1976 197

17 "To Restore America," Ronald Reagan's Campaign Address, March 31, 1976 198

18 Carter-Ford Debate about Détente, October 6, 1976 201

19 Jimmy Carter's Letter to Leonid Brezhnev, February 15, 1977 206

20 Jimmy Carter's Commencement Address at Notre Dame University, May 22, 1977 208

21 National Security Council Meeting on the Horn of Africa, March 2, 1978 212

22 Brezhnev's Speech to the Politburo on the International Situation, June 8, 1978 215

23 Ambassador Dobrynin on U.S.-Soviet Relations, July 11, 1978 218

24 NATO's Double-Track Decision, December 1979 221

25 Reasons to Invade Afghanistan, December 27, 1979 223

26 Jimmy Carter, Address to the Nation on the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, January 4, 1980 225

27 Soviet Analysis of the Impact of the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan, January 20, 1980 229

28 Reagan's Televised Address, "A Strategy for Peace in the '80s," October 19, 1980 231

29 Ayatollah Khomeini's Message, 1980 233

Notes 237

Selected Bibliography 253

Index 261

About the Author 275

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