The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relationsby Daniel W. Drezner
This 1999 argues that, paradoxically, countries are likely to use sanctions under conditions where they will produce the feeblest results.See more details below
This 1999 argues that, paradoxically, countries are likely to use sanctions under conditions where they will produce the feeblest results.
- Cambridge University Press
- Publication date:
- Cambridge Studies in International Relations Series, #65
- Product dimensions:
- 5.98(w) x 8.98(h) x 0.83(d)
Table of Contents
1. Introduction; Part I. Theory and Data: 2. A model of economic coercion; 3. Plausibility probes; 4. Statistical tests; Part II. Economic Coercion in the Former Soviet Union: 5. Russian power and preferences; 6. The extent of NIS concessions; 7. Evaluating the evidence; Part III. Choosing Between Carrots and Sticks: 8. Economic statecraft and nuclear proliferation on the Korean Peninsula; 9. Conclusions, implications, speculations.
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