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The Soviet High Command, 1967â"1989
Personalities and Politics
By Dale R. Herspring PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS
Copyright © 1990 Princeton University Press
All rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-691-07844-1
CHAPTER 1
The Methodological Framework
In the short time he has been in office, Mikhail Gorbachev has made clear that he intends to effect major changes in the Soviet political system. Perestroika, glasnost', and demokratizatsiia, his codewords for the reform of the country's morbid economic and political system, are said to be the order of the day. While the jury is still out deliberating on how effective he will be in implementing his policies in the long run, he has already had a major impact. This is particularly evident in his relations with the Soviet high command.
Since he took over as general secretary, Gorbachev has sacked the country's defense minister and commander of air defense forces; warned the marshals they will have to do more with less; down-graded the symbolic importance of the armed forces; provided a major impetus to arms control agreements; announced unilateral reductions in the country's armed forces; and is now presiding over the introduction of what the Kremlin calls a policy of "military sufficiency."
At first glance, all these actions would appear to run counter to the interests of the Soviet military. Indeed, even before Gorbachev had become a major figure, Jeremy Azrael was arguing that because of a number of factors — the cutbacks in the rate of military expenditures, the appointment of Ustinov as defense minister, Brezhnev's comments on the unwinnability of nuclear war, the ousting of Marshal Ogarkov, and the failure of the political leadership to get the country's economic house in order — the military had become deeply concerned over the direction in which politicians were taking the country. More recently, several Western writers have suggested that the military leadership does not fully support the changes in security policy that Gorbachev has introduced. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, for example, argues that the new approach advocated by Gorbachev marks such a major break with past Soviet military thinking, that "the rejection of Clausewitz's axiom" — i.e., that war is the continuation of politics by other means — "is far from being accepted by the military." Similarly, Seweryn Bialer has suggested that the Soviet military does not fully accept some of the premises upon which Gorbachev's "national security" is based, and Robert Legvold sees potential disagreement between civilian and military officials over how to interpret and implement these new concepts.
It has now been more than ten years since a major study has been done in the West of the role played by senior military officers in the Soviet Union. As a result, "Western analysts have generally been forced to rely either on secondary sources or, at best, on a cursory review of the relevant literature.
This study attempts to fill the gap by providing the first in-depth analysis of the evolution of the Soviet high command over the past twenty years. In the process, I argue that while some of the things Gorbachev is doing are a source of resentment and even hostility on the part of the officer corps, at the highest level there is more support than opposition to most of what he is proposing. Indeed, it is the thesis of this book that beginning with the appointment of Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov as chief of the General Staff in 1977, the high command has shown an increasingly sophisticated understanding of the various components of Soviet national security; it has been prepared to work closely with the political leadership to enhance the country's security, whether this means new weapons or the negotiation of an arms control agreement. In fact, Ogarkov emerges as one of the most important figures in the Soviet military of the past twenty years primarily because he was the first senior military officer to recognize both the value of arms control to the Soviet military and the importance, when dealing with politicians, of making short-term sacrifices in favor of longer-term gains.
However, Ogarkov's attempt to work closely with the Brezhnev leadership was unsuccessful. The continuing decay of the country's economy, the absence of strong and decisive political leadership, the deterioration of East-West relations, and the weapons buildup by the Reagan administration — especially in strategic nuclear programs — all combined to convince Ogarkov that there was little to be gained from a cooperative relationship with the Brezhnev leadership. As a consequence, Ogarkov went into opposition, working — quite openly, by Soviet standards — to undercut many of the general secretary's main security-related policies.
The situation facing Sergei Akhromeyev when he took over as chief of the General Staff in 1984 was in many ways very similar to that which had confronted Ogarkov. He, too, recognized the value of arms control agreements to Soviet military security, was deeply concerned over the country's failing economy, and, like Ogarkov, believed that the future of military competition lay in the area of high-technology conventional weapons. He, too, had to make a decision on whether or not to work closely with the country's general secretary.
Based on the available evidence, Akhromeyev's initial approach to Gorbachev's appointment as general secretary was to wait and see. It was not that he opposed what the new general secretary was proposing. However, he first wanted to be sure that the new political leader was both serious about reforming the country's economy and in a position to implement his policies. While the latter issue still remains in doubt, it was becoming clear by the middle of 1986 that Gorbachev was "for real," that he meant what he said about tackling the country's underlying economic problems. As a consequence, Akhromeyev decided to support Gorbachev's national security policies. In return, he was given considerable latitude in designing arms control policies, in determining the military's response to a tighter budget, and in defining the content of any policy of military sufficiency. Thus, there was a greater symbiosis between the interests of the high command, under Akhromeyev and Yazov, and Gorbachev than has often been assumed. Barring a major change in Gorbachev's approach to dealing with the military, this state of affairs is likely to continue in the future, despite Akhromeyev's retirement in December 1988 and Gorbachev's announcement of unilateral cuts in Soviet forces.
THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
This study will suggest a new variation on an old approach to analyzing Soviet politics. In essence, it maintains that a focus on individual decision makers (in this case high-ranking military officers), their personalities, backgrounds, and relationships, when combined with the traditional focus on specific issues, can provide an added dimension to our understanding of Soviet military politics. Issues are important; indeed, they provide the bases for almost any type of analysis — this study included. However, this study attempts to go beyond issue-oriented analyses by providing a two-dimensional approach: in addition to looking at the key issues, it provides an in-depth analysis of the main decision makers and the role they played in framing and implementing policies in these areas. The result, it is hoped, will be a more comprehensive understanding of both the issues and the individuals who shape them.
There has been a tendency by many in the West to believe that with the exception of top officials such as Gorbachev, Khrushchev, or Stalin, individuals play a peripheral role in Communist political systems. Part of the reason for this belief is the assumption that the actions of such individuals are to a large degree determined by either their institutional affiliation or their party membership — that military officers act in accordance with either the interests of the armed forces or those of the party. While no one would deny the importance of these affiliations, I argue that individuals can have a very important — and in some cases lasting — impact on politics in the Soviet Union. This does not mean that bureaucratic structures do not also have an important impact on decision making. Indeed, decisions are heavily influenced — and sometimes dominated — by the institutional framework within which they are formulated and implemented. Even when the institutional framework plays an important role, however, individuals can make, and have made, a difference. This is true not only in crisis periods, but in the day-to-day life of a bureaucracy. Marshals Grechko, Ogarkov, and Akhromeyev are examples of such individuals. After all, it is these men who were most influential in deciding the military's interests and in overseeing the implementation of policies approved by the political leadership.
It is therefore the thesis of this book that focusing on individual decision makers — in this case in the military — can serve as an important window onto the evolution of Soviet politics. This is particularly true of the armed forces, where important and fundamental changes have been under way for the past twenty years. Indeed, the Soviet military is now undergoing changes that will have major implications for the USSR and the West for years to come.
Focusing on individual decision makers is a way of tracing the evolution of changes not only within the institution itself, but between the institution and the party leadership as well. The historical record is replete with examples of Soviet military officers who have had a major impact both within the armed forces and in the broader political spectrum. For example, in the 1920s and 1930s such Soviet military leaders as Mikhail Frunze, Mikhail Tukhachevskii, and Boris Shaposhnikov all had a major impact on the evolution of the Soviet military and Soviet warfighting doctrine. Indeed, many of the concepts that the Soviet high command uses today are derived from the writings of individuals such as Tukhachevskii. Similarly, Marshal Georgii Zhukov had considerable influence both within the military and on the evolution of Soviet military politics. Rodion Malinovskii, Vasilii Sokolovskii, Matvei Zakharov, Sergei Shtemenko, Pavel Rotmistrov, and other military officers have also left their mark on the evolution of postwar military thinking. More recently, senior officers such as Andrei Grechko, Nikolaii Ogarkov, and Sergei Akhromeyev have played a key role in the development of the Soviet military and its relationship to the political leadership.
Because of the nature of its data — the lack of access to key decision makers until quite recently — this study proceeds from the assumption that it will not be possible to differentiate among an individual's ideas, perceptions, and policy choices. It also assumes that it is possible to detect major debates between individual political and military leaders by using the Soviet press. Even in the worst of times, the press is the key arena in which differences of opinion have been expressed.
Top-level military decision makers operate within the confines of an institutional framework — in particular, the General Staff. The Soviet General Staff was established by Frunze in 1924 when it was called the Staff of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. In 1935 it was renamed the General Staff, and in 1936 the General Staff Academy was opened. During the Second World War the General Staff functioned as an executive agency for the Supreme High Command. In this context, the General Staff was responsible for coordinating actions in areas such as operations, intelligence, transportation, logistics, and communications. In effect, it was the "brain of the army," to use Shaposhnikov's phrase.
While a detailed description of the postwar General Staff is not available, it appears to be charged with strategic planning for all of the military services. Officers from the various branches are assigned to the General Staff — a much sought-after assignment that is considered to enhance one's career. According to a Soviet source, the primary function of the General Staff is "the coordination of actions of the main staffs of the services of the Armed Forces, the staff of the Rear Services, the staff of Civil Defense, the main and central administrations of the Ministry of Defense, the staffs of military districts, groups abroad, air defense districts, and fleets." In short, the General Staff is the most important military structure in the Soviet Union. It is far more powerful than its American equivalent — the Joint Chiefs of Staff — which in comparison with the Soviet General Staff has very limited powers. Most observers agree that during a war the General Staff would play a central role in the command of Soviet forces. As a consequence of its independence from the various services, the General Staff has been spared some of the service parochialism that pervades many Western political systems. However, it too has experienced its share of problems. It has its own biases and has often found it difficult to impose its will on independent-minded services — for example, during most of the 1970s, when Admiral Gorshkov was arguing for an independent naval strategy.
To a large degree, the influence the General Staff is able to exert over the other services derives from the personal standing of each particular chief of staff. If he is a weak individual and faces strong service chiefs with solid political support, his influence will be limited. But if he is not supported by an equally strong defense minister and general secretary, even a strong chief of the General Staff will have only limited influence. This is particularly true if the chief of the General Staff intends to bring about major changes in the operations of the military: the chief of the General Staff can obviously order those below him to modify their behavior, for example, by paying greater attention to technical qualifications in personnel appointments. But if he is not supported by his defense minister or the political-military leadership in general, he is likely to have only moderate success.
The ability of the chief of the General Staff to bring about change is even more restricted when the changes he seeks go against the grain of prevailing attitudes or policies in society at large. During his time on the General Staff, Ogarkov, for example, was a strong proponent of what is now called perestroika in the personnel area (i.e., greater emphasis on personal responsibility, technical expertise, initiative, and creativity). His ability to bring about change, however, was severely limited as this policy was not being pushed by the political leadership throughout Soviet society in general. Gorbachev's strong support makes Yazov's task of restructuring the military much easier.
The defense minister's ability to influence events within the armed forces is more circumscribed than is often assumed. Although he is clearly the country's top military officer, not only must he go through the General Staff for information, but the General Staff retains primary responsibility for the implementation of defense policies. This puts a premium on the personal relationship between the chief of staff and the defense minister. If there is discord, the defense minister can expect problems in having his way within the armed forces. This can be particularly difficult when the defense minister is a civilian: he is then often perceived as an "outsider" and generally lacks either the technical or the bureaucratic expertise necessary to keep the General Staff in line.
Under most circumstances, the defense minister is the primary interface between civilians and the military. He represents the interests of the high command to the political leadership and in turn ensures that decisions by the political leadership are effectively implemented. While this is the way the relationship is supposed to work, in practice this has not always been the case. If the chief of the General Staff disagrees strongly with the views and policies of the political leadership, and the latter is not strong enough to enforce them, a situation might develop similar to that of the early 1980s, when Ogarkov openly disputed with the political leadership over the nature of East-West relations.
(Continues...)
Excerpted from The Soviet High Command, 1967â"1989 by Dale R. Herspring. Copyright © 1990 Princeton University Press. Excerpted by permission of PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS.
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