The Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Army, 1948-1983: Uncertain Allegiance
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The Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Army, 1948-1983: Uncertain Allegiance
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Originally published in 1985.
The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9780691612034 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | Princeton University Press |
| Publication date: | 07/14/2014 |
| Series: | Princeton Legacy Library , #566 |
| Pages: | 320 |
| Product dimensions: | 6.90(w) x 9.90(h) x 0.80(d) |
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The Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Army, 1948â"1983
Uncertain Allegiance
By Condoleezza Rice
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS
Copyright © 1984 Princeton University PressAll rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-691-06921-0
CHAPTER 1
Party-Military Relations in Eastern Europe
The East European party-military relationship has two central dimensions. There is a domestic context in which the indigenous party and military interact. (See Chart 1.1.) A second dimension emanates from the client status of the East European states. The Soviet Union plays a major role in the region's military policy and development and is, by virtue of that role, an important actor in the East European party-military system. (See Chart 1.2.) A viable framework must be able to monitor the interaction among four actors: the indigenous party and military and the party and military of the Soviet Union. The central hypothesis of this study is that Soviet policy is such a major factor in the relationship between the East European party and military that changes in the nature of Soviet policy will produce a discernible effect upon the party-military interaction.
Not all the actors are unitary. (See Chart 1.3.) There are factions within the Soviet party and military, but it is assumed that for the most part Soviet policies are unified. The various factions and subinstitutions of the indigenous party and military are important and unity of action among them is not assumed.
The First Dimension
The analysis of the first dimension is less complicated than is that of the second. In the domestic context, the East European party-military system shares organizational and ideological features with other communist states, in particular with the Soviet Union. Therefore, the study of the domestic interaction can be structured around features identified throughout the party-military literature. Briefly, the party pursues policies to ensure that the military will be a source of domestic support and external protection, as well as a means of socialization and legitimization. Furthermore, the party is determined to control the political activity of the military. The party, in pursuit of these goals, relies upon coercive, normative, and utilitarian means. The task of research is to show how these means have been employed and how their implementation has changed over time. The following indicators have been used in analyzing the policies of the indigenous Communist party. (See Chart 1.4.)
Additionally, a central issue in the study of any party-military system is the professionalization debate. The origins of the debate are often misunderstood and its importance is underestimated. The concern for a military both "red" and "expert" should be viewed not only as an effort to ensure control of the professional officer corps through a severance of links with the past but also as a desire to make certain that the armed forces are representative of the "socialist" or "workers'" society. The two goals have merged over time, but a full appreciation of the ideological tension between professionalism and politicization is necessary if one is to understand the depth of the Communist party's preoccupation with the question.
The early tensions between the party and the military in the first socialist state, the Soviet Union, were a function of the historical circumstances of the development of the Red Army. Ideologically, the Soviets were more comfortable with a workers' militia and people's army than with standing professional armies. Professional armies were considered anachronistic in a socialist society and potentially dangerous, while a workers' militia was considered representative of the new social system. This explains, in part, the Soviets' haste to draw men of "working-class background" into the officer corps.
But the civil war and a hostile international environment eventually dictated a change in Soviet thinking on "professional standing armies." Gradually, the professionalization of the officer corps took priority over the infusion of workers' blood. In the short term, this meant the recruitment of officers of dubious political loyalties: Former czarist officers, needed for their expertise, were recruited into the officer corps. The presence of officers of suspect loyalty exacerbated the ideological discomfort with standing armies and produced the elaborate efforts, characteristic of the Soviet army, to monitor and politicize military professionals.
When the East European armed forces were formed, the reliance on officers from prerevolutionary armed forces was also necessary. The professionalization debate that followed was extremely important in the development of these militaries. The search for an officer corps both red and expert continues to be a critical issue for the party-military interaction in Eastern Europe.
The Second Dimension
The study of the East European party-military interaction in isolation will not explain the way in which the system functions. Neither the party nor the military is an independent actor in East Europe. Soviet influence and interference in East European security affairs are established facts. But, curiously, the sparse literature on the East European militaries underestimates the impact of this factor on the internal civil-military interaction.
In part, this is a reflection of the failure to examine systematically the impact of Soviet power on East European institutional development. Soviet influence within East European institutions has received little attention, while the relationship at the national level is incessantly examined. The intense interest in the larger relationship has unfortunately obscured and often confused the discussion of the interaction below the national level. The confusion stems from a failure to examine critically three important elements: (1) the nature of the Soviet influence in Eastern Europe; (2) the locus of Soviet influence; and (3) the instruments of that influence.
The Nature of Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe
The interaction between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is a power relationship. Power can be defined as possession of control, authority, and influence over another and a consequent ability to produce a discernible effect. Clearly, unequal status between the Soviets and East Europeans means that the relationship is asymmetrical. By all "measures" of power, the Soviets are the dominant actor in the relationship. They are able to "force adaptation through control of the environment." And in a classical definition of power they are able to impose costs on others in ways that weaker states do not and cannot. Power can be manifested and maintained through legal or official authority, through physical might, or through unspoken but effective political, economic, and cultural influence. All of these factors operate in the Soviet-East European relationship.
Three explanations of the nature of the power relationship between the Soviet Union and East Europe are prevalent in the literature, and these are imperialism, patron-client, and alliance. The explanations address the issue of benefit — whether the relationship is exploitative or beneficial — and the problem of the maintenance of the asymmetry.
The first, imperialism, is the oldest explanation and is still apparent in the literature. The assumption that the region is held "captive" by the USSR is implicit in many analyses of East European development. Images of "imperial Russia" exploiting the region economically, politically, and culturally still abound. The relationship is viewed not only as wholly exploitative but also as wholly coercive. Solicitation of compliance and obedience are assumed to be through brute force and coercion. Another very important assumption of the imperialist explanation is that the East European leaders are extensions of Soviet power, imposing unpopular "foreign" policies upon an unwilling population. There is a kind of political division of labor: The Soviets produce policy and the East Europeans produce obedience. Both the East European leaders and the decisions they implement are viewed as illegitimate in the eyes of the domestic constituency, and it is assumed that leaders and their decisions are tolerated only because of possible coercion and terror and the lack of a political alternative. The elites themselves are — as extensions of Soviet power — interested only in their own maintenance, out of touch with their people, and held in power by the threat of Soviet force.
Although this description of Soviet power holds some relevance for Stalin's era, it does little to explain changes in the Soviet–East European relationship over time. It cannot explain, for example, why conflicts have occurred between the Soviets and East European leaders over issues of national reform. The communist leaders of the region do seek national answers to national problems — some more effectively than others — and it is this quest that often leads them into conflict with the Soviet Union. Consequently, the importance of intraparty struggles and of changes in leadership is often underestimated until major crises explode within the parties of the region. Moreover, the approach obscures differences that culture, history, and idiosyncratic factors play in determining political development. There are differences in culture and history within the Eastern bloc and these differences drive client rulers to seek various kinds of accommodation with their domestic constituencies and with the Soviet Union. National leadership and national interest have not disappeared in relations between the Soviet Union and East Europe.
A final critical shortcoming of the approach lies in its concentration on just one element of the relationship — exploitation. This concentration actually serves to underestimate Soviet influence in the region. It is difficult to imagine a relationship that is wholly exploitative without being wholly coercive, and the relationship between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe that has evolved over thirty-seven years does not seem to rely exclusively on coercion. In any case, exploitation should not be assumed and the possibility of benefit for the East Europeans must be entertained.
A second approach, the patron-client explanation, is implicit in some analyses of the relationship, but is seldom applied rigorously or explicitly. The explanation is attractive because it can accommodate the power asymmetry, the possibility of mutual benefit, and the use of bargaining and compromise in maintaining the relationship. Initially produced in the study of rural, traditional relationships, it seeks to explain the phenomenon in which the wealthy "patron" adopts and assumes responsibility for and protects a less fortunate client. The patron assumes the burden for some aspect of well-being of the client. The relationship is reciprocal, involving an exchange of favors. Since the client has little of material value that the patron needs, the client more often than not exchanges such intangibles as loyalty, respect, and a promise to aid the patron against enemies in time of need. Often the client also supports the patron in societal and political institutions. There is often bargaining, with the expectation that the patron will try to maximize the return from the client while minimizing his own investment. Conversely, the client attempts to minimize his contribution and maximize the favors received.
There are obvious parallels between the patron-client relationship and the relationship between the East Europeans and the Soviet Union. In the military sphere, the allies "exchange" loyalty, political support, and a promise to defend the western frontiers for political support, prestige, arms, and ultimately armed assistance from the USSR. This aspect of the relationship is being noted when analysts refer to Soviet client states and, particularly, Soviet client militaries. The notion of reciprocity is important and useful, but the concepts of patron and client taken alone mask central features of the interaction. First, the paradigm — developed in the study of relationships between individuals — reduces the interaction and assumes unity of action and interests of the institutions of Eastern Europe. Bargains made by the Communist party on behalf of the military — or vice versa — may not serve both interests equally. There are many clients within each client state of Eastern Europe and an explanation that portrays a single actor assessing interest and then bargaining for better terms of exchange is misleading. Second, while the relationship is not wholly exploitative, as imperialism suggests, neither is it entirely of mutual benefit. There is considerable exploitation, with the interests of the Soviet Union dominating by virtue of Soviet power. Neither are there alternative "patrons" for the East Europeans. The costs of disengagement are prohibitive and, consequently, the room for maneuver in bargaining is limited. In short, the patron-client paradigm imputes a voluntary quality and a freedom of action to a unitary client that is not present. The broad basis of Soviet power is underestimated here too.
A third explanation, alliance, is often used, since the relationship between the Soviet Union and East Europe is formalized in a series of multilateral organizations (COMECON in 1947 and the Warsaw Pact in 1955). The problem is that the alliance explanation, that is, treating the Soviets and East Europeans as sovereigns bound together by a formal structure, masks the scope of Soviet power and the constraints on the East Europeans. This system exhibits features that make it a peculiar alliance. The degree to which membership is voluntary is highly questionable. There are prohibitively high costs for unilateral withdrawal, and coercion plays an indeterminable role in the cohesion of the alliance. Furthermore, the bargaining power of the small states is arguably minimized rather than enhanced, as alliance explanations would suggest. Some students of the Warsaw Pact argue that multilateralism is really a means by which the Soviets use pliable allies to overwhelm the interests of dissident members of the Pact, thereby undermining small state bargaining power. Therefore, the most important factor in holding the alliance together may be the absence of alternatives and the prohibitive costs for withdrawal. Here a critical flaw of the alliance approach is its assumption that the East European states are completely integrated sovereignties whose leaders bargain within the alliance to secure their national interests. On the other hand, if one argues that the small states use the Warsaw Pact to enhance their limited bargaining power, it is hard to imagine that the Soviets would concentrate their efforts to exercise power within a difficult multilateral alliance. In either case, the full scope of Soviet power is underestimated.
This asymmetrical relationship between the Soviets and the East Europeans has come to resemble one of "dependence," a concept employed most often in the study of the effect of external state relations upon internal political development. Students of dependence describe a pattern of external reliance by weak, but integrated, states on a far more powerful state. Dependence is measured in terms of the size of one state's reliance upon another, the importance attached to the "goods" involved, and the possibilities for substitution. Dependence is not the absence of autonomy, but a relationship can be so asymmetrical that constraints of the environment completely condition the behavior of the less powerful actor. The costs of testing the more powerful actor may be so great that the small state does not test the limits of autonomy.
The Soviet–East European case is an excellent example of this phenomenon. The dependence of the East Europeans on the Soviet Union is obviously extensive. The regimes rely upon the Soviets for a variety of "goods." The list is complete, running the gamut from political support and military guarantees to trade relations. In fact at times some East European leaders have been dependent on Moscow for their political lives. The power that accrues to the Soviet Union under these circumstances is obviously great. Moreover, because of Soviet dominance, some perception of mutual benefit, and the threat of coercion, the alternatives are few and the costs for substitution very high. The highly asymmetrical dependence is self-reinforcing.
The importance of this concept for the present study is that while the East Europeans are, in theory, autonomous states, their dependence on the Soviet Union is great enough to dictate the policies of East European leaders at the domestic level. But this explanation also captures the potential conflict between dependence on the Soviet Union and the need to undertake policies to solve national problems. Open splits in the relationship occur when the East Europeans test the limits of their autonomy, in spite of the tremendous dependence on the Soviets. But these open breaks are fairly rare and some delicate balance operates most of the time.
(Continues...)
Excerpted from The Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Army, 1948â"1983 by Condoleezza Rice. Copyright © 1984 Princeton University Press. Excerpted by permission of PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS.
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Table of Contents
- FrontMatter, pg. i
- Contents, pg. vii
- List of Charts, pg. ix
- Preface, pg. xi
- Acknowledgments, pg. xiii
- Introduction, pg. 1
- Chapter One. Party-Military Relations in Eastern Europe, pg. 7
- Chapter Two. The Historical Foundations of the Relationship Between the Party and Military in Czechoslovakia, pg. 31
- Chapter Three. The Formation of the Army of the Socialist Type, 1948-1956, pg. 58
- Chapter Four. The Czechoslovak People's Army After De-Stalinization, 1956-1967, pg. 85
- Chapter Five. The Military in the Period of Liberalization, January to August 1968, pg. 111
- Chapter Six. Invasion and Normalization, August 1968-1975, pg. 157
- Chapter Seven. The Czechoslovak People's Army Since 1975, pg. 197
- Chapter Eight. Party-Military Relations in Eastern Europe: The Impact of Soviet Power, pg. 218
- Notes, pg. 247
- Selected Bibliography, pg. 279
- Index, pg. 293