The Supply Side of Security conceptualizes military alliances as contracts for exchanging goods and services. At the international level, the market for these contracts is shaped by how many countries can supply security.
Tongfi Kim identifies the supply of policy concessions and military commitments as the main factors that explain the bargaining power of a state in a potential or existing alliance. Additionally, three variables of a state's domestic politics significantly affect its negotiating power: whether there is strong domestic opposition to the alliance, whether the state's leader is pro-alliance, and whether that leader is vulnerable. Kim then looks beyond existing alliance literature, which focuses on threats, to produce a deductive theory based on analysis of how the global power structure and domestic politics affect alliances. As China becomes stronger and the U.S. military budget shrinks, The Supply Side of Security shows that these countries should be understood not just as competing threats, but as competing security suppliers.
The Supply Side of Security conceptualizes military alliances as contracts for exchanging goods and services. At the international level, the market for these contracts is shaped by how many countries can supply security.
Tongfi Kim identifies the supply of policy concessions and military commitments as the main factors that explain the bargaining power of a state in a potential or existing alliance. Additionally, three variables of a state's domestic politics significantly affect its negotiating power: whether there is strong domestic opposition to the alliance, whether the state's leader is pro-alliance, and whether that leader is vulnerable. Kim then looks beyond existing alliance literature, which focuses on threats, to produce a deductive theory based on analysis of how the global power structure and domestic politics affect alliances. As China becomes stronger and the U.S. military budget shrinks, The Supply Side of Security shows that these countries should be understood not just as competing threats, but as competing security suppliers.
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Overview
The Supply Side of Security conceptualizes military alliances as contracts for exchanging goods and services. At the international level, the market for these contracts is shaped by how many countries can supply security.
Tongfi Kim identifies the supply of policy concessions and military commitments as the main factors that explain the bargaining power of a state in a potential or existing alliance. Additionally, three variables of a state's domestic politics significantly affect its negotiating power: whether there is strong domestic opposition to the alliance, whether the state's leader is pro-alliance, and whether that leader is vulnerable. Kim then looks beyond existing alliance literature, which focuses on threats, to produce a deductive theory based on analysis of how the global power structure and domestic politics affect alliances. As China becomes stronger and the U.S. military budget shrinks, The Supply Side of Security shows that these countries should be understood not just as competing threats, but as competing security suppliers.
Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9780804798594 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | Stanford University Press |
| Publication date: | 04/13/2016 |
| Series: | Studies in Asian Security |
| Sold by: | Barnes & Noble |
| Format: | eBook |
| Pages: | 256 |
| File size: | 3 MB |
About the Author
Read an Excerpt
The Supply Side of Security
A Market Theory of Military Alliances
By Tongfi Kim
STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
Copyright © 2016 the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior UniversityAll rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-8047-9859-4
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
What are the factors that explain the bargaining power of a state in a potential or existing alliance? This book offers answers to the question by explaining how systemic polarity and domestic politics affect the supply of military commitments (that is, the quantity of military commitments the sellers are willing to provide at various prices) and other concessions through alliances. Looking beyond existing alliance literature that pays attention predominantly to the demand side of the dynamics, this study demonstrates that both demand and supply of military commitments are important in the alliance market and influence the bargaining power of states.
As the alliance literature demonstrates, military threats, both external and internal, create demand for protection through alliances (Liska 1962; Walt 1987; Barnett and Levy 1991; David 1991; Snyder 1997). If no actor faced threats (and there was no demand for military commitment), there would be no military alliance. Military threats have therefore been the central variable in alliance literature. At the same time, however, if no actor was willing and capable of providing military commitment (meaning that there was no supply), there would also be no military alliance. This book sheds light on the supply side of the alliance market by explaining how the structure of the international system and the domestic politics of allies systematically affect the willingness of states to make commitments and concessions to their military allies. Including analysis of the supply side enables a more comprehensive understanding of the relationship between allies and explains recent developments that traditional notions of military alliances cannot adequately explain.
Although I attempt to develop a general theory of military alliances in this study, I am most interested in the theory's implications for the U.S. alliances with Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK/South Korea). These alliances have been important throughout the Cold War and post–Cold War eras, and their significance will not diminish in "America's Pacific Century" (Clinton 2011). These alliances face not only North Korea, which itself is a major security threat, but also China, the most important rival of the United States in the foreseeable future. Although North Korea's provocative behavior and the rise of China have drawn attention to the role of military threats (a demand-side factor), this study will shed light on the supply side, to gain a more complete picture of the relationship between allies.
U.S. Alliances in East Asia and Beyond
On April 29, 2015, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (2006–2007, 2012–, Liberal Democratic Party) became the first Japanese leader to address a joint session of the U.S. Congress. Calling the U.S.–Japan alliance "an alliance of hope," Abe declared that his government would achieve sweeping reforms in security affairs by the coming summer. Two days before Abe's speech, the two governments had revealed new "Guidelines for U.S.–Japan Defense Cooperation," which were originally approved in 1978 and revised in 1997. As an anonymous senior U.S. defense official commented, the new agreement "loosens the restriction on what Japan can do" militarily, and the United States and Japan will "be able to do a lot of things globally" that in the past they could do only in the defense of Japan. As with Abe's reinterpretation of Japan's pacifist constitution in 2014 and new security laws introduced in 2015, these policy changes are interpreted by many as reflections of Japan's increased need for U.S. military protection, due to the rising external threats from countries such as China and North Korea.
The increased demand for U.S. military protection, however, is only part of the big picture for the U.S.–Japan alliance. In terms of intra-alliance bargaining, Japan has been working harder to accommodate this powerful ally since the end of the Cold War, when military threats decreased considerably. In the 1990s, Russian power significantly declined, and threats posed by North Korea and China were much lower than their current level. Yet, Japan contributed US$13.5 billion to the U.S. efforts in the Persian Gulf War (1990–1991) and also began to increase its military commitment to the United States (Nishihara and Tsuchiyama 1998; Sotooka, Honda, and Miura 2001; Akiyama 2002; Okamoto 2002). By 1996, the U.S.–Japan alliance was announced as "redefined" (Cronin 1996). The early post–Cold War origin of the alliance transformation is puzzling from the perspective of traditional alliance theories that focus on threats.
Japanese experts on the alliance whom I interviewed generally agree that Japan now has to work harder to maintain the decades-old alliance. As they explain, Japan has to cooperate with the United States in global security issues such as the Iraq War and the War on Terror in exchange for American support in regional security issues, such as the North Korean threat and the rising power of China. Before the Iraq War began in March 2003, for example, then Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi (2001–2006) expressed unequivocal support for U.S. policy, stating that it was not in Japan's national interests to hurt the credibility of the U.S.–Japan alliance. This reasoning is based on a demand for U.S. protection.
More important from my perspective, Japanese experts also point out that American interests at the global and regional levels were better aligned with those of Japan during the Cold War, and Japan could take U.S. cooperation for granted at the regional level. This close alignment of interests, experts argue, changed after the end of the Cold War. I theorize this change as a shift in the supply of U.S. military protection. Analyses based on national interests of allies implicitly touch on both demand and supply sides of the alliance market, but they obscure the difference between demand and supply. Convergence and divergence of national interests are certainly important, but they vary by issue and fluctuate frequently. This book instead focuses on shifts of bargaining power that are caused by factors beyond mere changes in particulars, namely, systemic polarity and certain elements of domestic politics.
Post–Cold War developments in the U.S. alliances need to be understood in the context of both global trends and links between domestic politics and foreign policy. In South Korea, conservative and supposedly pro-American Park Geun-hye assumed the presidential office in February 2013, succeeding another pro-American president, Lee Myung-bak (2008–2013). As a U.S. analyst put it, "One could almost hear a sigh of relief from Washington," because many "U.S. Korea experts were concerned about a progressive victory" (Revere 2012).
At first glance, it would seem that fluctuations in military threats and leaders' ideology explain the ups and downs of the U.S.–South Korea alliance. Under the presidencies of Kim Dae-jung (1998–2003) and Roh Moo-hyun (2003–2008), who each had a leftist political base, South Korean perception of the North Korean threat has significantly declined, and Roh Moo-hyun was criticized for weakening the alliance. In contrast, South Korea under the conservative President Lee Myung-bak (2008–2013) experienced the sinking of the South Korean navy ship Cheonan in March 2010 and North Korea's bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island in South Korea in November 2010; the alliance is said to have then been reinforced against the North Korean threats. It is misleading, however, to explain the alliance politics of the United States and South Korea simply through the threat of North Korea and ideological divides in South Korea.
Since the mid-1990s, South Korea has been wary of becoming entangled in an American conflict with North Korea, although it still fears being abandoned by the United States. Because Seoul's alliance policy is no longer solely characterized by the fear of abandonment, we should expect South Korea to take some distance from the United States. Anti-Americanism in the country reflects this change, but the South Korean elite are nevertheless eager to strengthen the alliance. Former President Roh Moo-hyun, for instance, was widely considered anti-American, but even he made many sacrifices for the alliance. In part, the South Korean government has made concessions to have influence on U.S. policy toward North Korea, thereby reducing the risk of military entanglement. There remains the question, however, of why South Korea's bargaining power seems so limited. Granted, Pyongyang is still unpredictable and bellicose, but South Korea is now clearly less dependent on the United States than it was during the Cold War. The key is to understand the decreased dependence of the United States on its lesser allies.
Despite sharing the conservative and pro-American support base with her predecessor, Park Geun-hye's warm relationship with China so far has made a stunning contrast with that of Lee Myung-bak, who had poor relations with Beijing (Hwang 2014). Personal factors, North Korea's behavior, and even historical disputes with Japan seem to play significant roles. As I explain in Chapters Three, Four, and Seven, however, the possibility of systemic changes due to the rise of China provides an important context. Moreover, my argument and findings in Chapters Five and Six suggest that domestic politics of South Korea, especially whether Park becomes politically vulnerable, will have a large impact on the country's relations with the United States and China.
There is much to be said about the specifics and particulars of East Asian international relations during the Cold War and the post–Cold War era. This book, however, focuses on more general and theoretical topics of military alliances and then uses the findings to explain the past and to predict the future of the region. For instance, how did the shift from Cold War bipolarity to American unipolarity affect the supply of American military protection in the alliance market? Answers to this question can help us address questions about the future, such as how the dynamics of alliance politics might change if the international system develops into a Sino–American bipolarity or a multipolar system with three or more military great powers. On the effects of domestic politics, this book offers a theoretical framework to analyze how domestic opposition to cooperation in a state and the ally's perception of the state's leader systematically affect the ally's willingness to make concessions.
This is a book about bargaining between military allies. For the operational definition of alliances, I use that of the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) dataset: Alliances are "written agreements, signed by official representatives of at least two independent states, that include promises to aid a partner in the event of military conflict, to remain neutral in the event of conflict ... or to consult/cooperate in the event of international crises that create a potential for military conflict" (Leeds et al. 2002, 238). This book does not deal with some relationships that are colloquially referred to as "alliances" because they do not entail any of the obligations previously listed. According to the ATOP dataset, for example, Israel ceased to be a formal ally of the United States on December 26, 1991. Based on the definition of the ATOP dataset, many of the "major non-NATO allies" are not military allies of the United States.
Although military commitment from at least one party is required for a military alliance, functions of alliances have many nonmilitary aspects because they facilitate exchanges of various concessions among states. I conceptualize military alliances as contracts in which states pledge a continuous exchange of goods and services, at least one of which is an obligation to facilitate the military success of the alliance partner(s) in the event of military conflict. It is important to note that such exchanges can involve goods other than military obligations, and not every ally needs to provide military commitment.
Puzzles of Post–Cold War Alliances
The nature of alliance bargaining is influenced by both international and domestic factors, but the initial motivation for my theory of alliances comes from puzzles at the system level. The United States currently dominates world security affairs as the only global military power, but alliances formed after the Cold War have been neither initiated by nor directed against the sole military superpower. Additionally, despite pessimistic predictions by some scholars (for example, Mearsheimer 1990; Waltz 1993), many alliances formed during the Cold War have outlasted bipolarity. Meanwhile, although some scholars predict Sino–American bipolarity (Ross 1999; Dempsey 2012; Yan 2011, 2013, 2014), the Chinese alliance policy has not matched its rising power. China currently has only one alliance agreement with a defense obligation (with North Korea since 1961), and its other two agreements (a bilateral one with Russia and the multilateral Shanghai Cooperation Organization starting in 2001) entail only the obligation of consultation. These developments are puzzling for several reasons.
First, they contradict the core predictions of the two classic theories of international relations, hegemonic stability, and balance of power. According to hegemonic stability theory (Kindleberger 1973; Gilpin 1981; Keohane 1984), the hegemon maintains global peace and prosperity by providing public goods that sustain a stable international economic and security environment. Chief among these public goods are security guarantees in the form of bilateral or multilateral alliances with the hegemon. Therefore, the theory predicts either: (1) a decrease in alliances because hegemonic peace and global governance make them unnecessary; or, conversely, (2) if we observe a high rate of alliance formation, a significant proportion of the new alliances should be initiated by the hegemon to promote systemwide and regional stability. Yet neither of these predictions has come true. A large number of alliances have been formed since the end of the Cold War. Not one of these new alliances was with the United States, although the United States enlarged the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
Balance of power theory fares no better. Its core claim is that states form alliances to prevent or check preponderance, such that none among them can coerce all the rest put together. For this to happen, states must align against threatening accumulations of power. Accordingly, if alliances emerge under unipolarity, we would expect some if not most would be directed against the unipole. Yet, there has been little evidence of external balancing against the United States. Those alleging that balancing against the United States is taking place have resorted to the concept of "soft" balancing, conceding that "hard" balancing against the unipole has not occurred to this point.
Second, many Cold War alliances persist more than twenty years after the Soviet collapse, violating the corollary "balancing" proposition that alliances break apart when the threat disappears. According to the ATOP dataset (version 3.0), of the 95 Cold War alliances that were active into the 1980s, 24 ended due to the passing of the Soviet Union, East Germany, and the former North and South Yemen. Of the remaining alliances, more than half (36 of 71) were still active as of December 31, 2003. So much for the dictum that "success is the greatest enemy of alliances." Moreover, if one considers the number of alliances terminated for each active alliance in a given year, the end of the Cold War did not have much impact on alliance termination (Figure 1.1).
Third, the dramatic increase in alliance formation also contradicts common expectations about the post–Cold War era. Out of the 538 alliances formed in the period between 1815 and 2003, 163 were formed between 1990 and 2003 (Figure 1.2). Indeed, the rate of alliance formation remains at one of the highest levels in history, even when controlling for the substantial increase in the number of states and politically relevant dyads (Figure 1.3). Again, if alliances are responses to military threats, then the relatively peaceful post–Cold War environment should have led to a decrease in alliances. Even at the subsystemic level, where the concerns of many states may be related only to their close neighbors, the capability aggregation model at the core of balance-of-power or balance-of-threat logic does not explain the surge in alliance formation. After all, threats of interstate wars are declining in most regions of the world (Mueller 2004). These trends simply do not square with the traditional view of military alliances as a method of power aggregation to balance and deter the enemy or, if that fails, to fight and defeat it on the battlefield.
Fourth, these anomalous empirical patterns are further complicated by an important and conspicuous exception to the current U.S. trend of "no new" alliances: NATO has not only survived but expanded, admitting twelve Central and Eastern European states after German reunification in 1990 and the end of the Cold War. Although the new members bring some military power and strategic bases to the alliance, this scarcely offsets the significant costs imposed on the old members by these new military commitments. As Michael Altfeld points out, "Some alliances will add nothing at all to a nation's security or even reduce its security by placing it in a more vulnerable position than it was in before it chose to join the alliance" (1984, 525).
(Continues...)
Excerpted from The Supply Side of Security by Tongfi Kim. Copyright © 2016 the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University. Excerpted by permission of STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction2. A Market Theory of Alliances
3. A Systemic Theory of the Alliance Market
4. Alliance Politics and Polarity
5. A Domestic Theory of Intra-Alliance Bargaining
6. Case Studies of Domestic Politics and Alliances
7. Conclusion