Theory of Decision under Uncertaintyby Itzhak Gilboa
Pub. Date: 03/16/2009
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
This book describes the classical axiomatic theories of decision under uncertainty, as well as critiques thereof and alternative theories. It focuses on the meaning of probability, discussing some definitions and surveying their scope of applicability. The behavioral definition of subjective probability serves as a way to present the classical theories, culminating in Savage's theorem. The limitations of this result as a definition of probability lead to two directions - first, similar behavioral definitions of more general theories, such as non-additive probabilities and multiple priors, and second, cognitive derivations based on case-based techniques.
Table of Contents1. Preface; 2. Motivating examples; 3. Free will and determinism; 4. The principle of indifference; 5. Relative frequencies; 6. Subjective probabilities; 7. A case study; 8. The role of theories; 9. Von Neumann and Morgenstern's theorem; 10. De Finetti's theorem; 11. Savage's theorem; 12. The definition of states; 13. A critique of Savage; 14. Objectivity and rationality; 15. Anscombe-Aumann's theorem; 16. Choquet expected utility; 17. Prospect theory; 18. Maxmin expected utility; 19. Case-based qualitative beliefs; 20. Frequentism revisited; 21. Future research.
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