The Theory of Morality

by Alan Donagan

Overview

"Let us . . . nominate this the most important theoretical work on ethical or moral theory since John Rawls's Theory of Justice. If you have philosophical inclinations and want a good workout, this conscientious scrutiny of moral assumptions and expressions will be most rewarding. Donagan explores ways of acting in the Hebrew-Christian context, examines them in the light of natural law and rational theories, and proposes that formal patterns for conduct can emerge. All this is tightly reasoned, the argument is packed, but the language is clear."—Christian Century

"The man value of this book seems to me to be that it shows the force of the Hebrew-Christian moral tradition in the hands of a creative philosopher. Throughout the book, one cannot but feel that a serious philosopher is trying to come to terms with his religious-moral background and to defend it against the prevailing secular utilitarian position which seems to dominate academic philosophy."—Bernard Gert, Journal of Medicine and Philosophy

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780226228419
Publisher:	University of Chicago Press
Publication date:	12/10/2014
Sold by:	Barnes & Noble
Format:	eBook
Pages:	294
File size:	2 MB

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The Theory of Morality

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By Alan Donagan

The University of Chicago Press

Copyright © 1977 The University of Chicago
All rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-226-22841-9

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CHAPTER 1

The Concept of a Theory of Morality

1.1 What a Theory of Morality Is a Theory of

Moral philosophers often find themselves at cross-purposes, because they have made up their minds neither about what a theory of morality is a theory of, nor about what a philosophical theory of it would be.

Morality, in the sense in which it will be investigated here, has to do with mores: that is, with generally accepted norms of individual conduct. There is a usage, advocated by Nietzsche and now standard in sociology, according to which any system of mores is a morality. Nietzsche believed that moralities, so understood, are "symptoms and sign languages which betray the processes of physiological prosperity or failure," towards which an inquirer who had not fallen under the spell of one of them would take the attitude of a psychological diagnostician. At least one of his own diagnostic efforts is well known, namely, his identification of two ideal types of morality: the master moralities, "with which the healthy instinct defends itself against incipient decadence"; and the slave moralities, "with which this very decadence defines and justifies itself."

Unless impartiality too is to be treated diagnostically, it demands that, before following Nietzsche down this all-too-human path, we make some inquiry into what 'morality' meant to moralists. The most superficial investigation shows that it did not mean "system of mores." Rather, it stood for a standard by which systems of mores, actual and possible, were to be judged and by which everybody ought to live, no matter what the mores of his neighbors might be. Whether or not this standard is a chimaera, as Nietzsche persuaded himself that it is, can only be settled by examining it.

In the Western intellectual tradition, the first reasonably clear conception of morality as a standard for judging systems of mores seems to have been formed by the Stoics. The Stoic ideal, as described by Diogenes Laertius, was

to be in accordance with Nature, that is, in accordance with the nature of man and that of the universe, doing nothing which the universal law is wont to forbid, that is, the right reason which pervades all things and is coextensive with Zeus.

Cicero's doctrine that, whether or not there was a written law against rape when Tarquin was king, Tarquin's rape of Lucretia was illegal, as violating eternal law, was thoroughly Stoic. His argument for it even echoes Diogenes Laertius:

[Before there was a written law] reason [ratio] existed, having sprung from the nature of things, impelling [men] to right action, and summoning [them] from wrongdoing. This reason began to be law, not when it was written down, but when it originated; and it originated simultaneously with the divine mind. Hence the true and supreme law having to do with commanding and forbidding is the right reason of Jupiter the highest [Cicero, de Legibus, II, 4, 10].

In Stoic theory, the relation between Nature and reason is hard to disentangle, and Nature is extraordinarily elusive. Hence Nature, as a principle distinct from reason, became less and less important to the later Stoics, and to philosophers influenced by Stoicism. What mattered was that the "true and supreme law" was held to be both willed by the highest of the gods and enjoined by reason. These two characteristics are inseparable, because the divine law expresses the divine mind, which is necessarily rational. Yet, although inseparable, they are distinct; and, from the point of view of moral philosophy, the one that is fundamental is rationality.

This was more evident to the Stoics, who respected popular polytheism, than it is to strict monotheists, like Jews and Christians, who take all divine commands, whether or not they form part of the supreme divine law, to express divine providence and wisdom. The Stoics, in treating as poetically true such pious tradition as that, after his death, Romulus revealed himself as a god to Proculus Julius and commanded that a temple be dedicated to him, couldhold such commands to express no more than a god's arbitrary pleasure. Nor would it have made any difference if the god had issued a command that was universal: say, that everybody who passed down the street in which his temple was to be erected should perform an act of worship. It is true that it is a genuine divine law that all men should obey the gods; but it no more follows that everything the gods command is divine law than it follows, because it is martial law that every soldier should obey the lawful commands of his superiors, that those commands themselves are martial law.

A divine command expresses divine law if and only if it expresses divine reason. And if it be assumed, as it was by the Stoics, that human reason is in principle adequate for the direction of human life, it follows that, so far as it has to do with the regulation of human life, the content of the divine law can be ascertained by natural human reason, and its force appreciated, without any direct reference to the gods at all. By contrast, divine commands that do not express divine law can only be known by revelation, whether from the mouth of the god himself, or through intermediaries.

Hence it was a mistake for Professor Anscombe to contend that morality can intelligibly be treated as a system of law only by presupposing a divine lawgiver. Her inference was also mistaken that, if those who deny the existence of a divine lawgiver choose to discuss ethical topics, they should follow Aristotle's example, and do it by way of a theory of the virtues.

The conception of morality as virtue is not an alternative to a conception of it as law. Taking virtue, in the usual Aristotelian way, to be a disposition having to do with choice, consisting in a mean determined by a rational principle, namely, the principle by which a man of practical wisdom would determine it, the conception of morality as virtue presupposes that, in situations calling for moral choice, practical wisdom can determine whether or not a given choice accords with a rationally determined mean. With respect to the virtue of justice, Anscombe herself declares that, "in normal circumstances," it is unjust "to deprive people of their ostensible property without legal procedure, not to pay debts, not to keep contracts, and a host of other things of the kind." The inference is irresistible that to each precept of moral virtue of the form, "In normal circumstances, to act in such-and-such a way would be unjust (or contrary to some other specific virtue, such as courage or temperance), "there is a precept of moral law that is its counterpart: namely, "In normal circumstances, to act in such-and-such a way would be morally wrong." And if the former can be arrived at by natural human reason, the latter can too.

The Stoics, rather than Aristotle or Plato, are to be credited with forming the first reasonably clear conception of morality: not because they had a theory of divine law, but because they conceived the divine law as valid for all men in virtue of their common rationality. Had Aristotle thought of 'ethical virtue' as something which all men could share, he would have essentially anticipated the Stoic conception, even though he made little of the connection between virtue and a law of reason. But he did not. Although he acknowledged that artisans, women, children, and slaves each had their appropriate virtues—the dispositions by which each might be good of their kind—he thought of ethical virtue proper as the virtue of a free citizen. The practical wisdom (phronesis) which determines the mean in which ethical virtue consists is directed to the good of the respective cities of which its possessors are citizens. Obviously there is a strong moral element in Aristotle's theory of ethical virtue; but he did not succeed in distinguishing moral virtue as such, the virtue of a man as a man, from political virtue, the virtue of a citizen of a good city. Aristotle did indeed distinguish between a good citizen and a good man; for a good citizen of an oppressive or predatory city will be a bad man. But it did not occur to him that the good to which a man's virtue as a rational being is directed may not be that of his city.

Although it is less obvious in them, both Judaism and Christianity also distinguish between a divine law that is binding upon all men by virtue of their rationality and special divine commandments addressed to particular individuals and groups.

Judaism may be defined as acceptance of the Torah, or teaching of Moses, as declared in the Pentateuch, developed in later scriptures, and interpreted by generations of rabbis. It consists partly of Halachah, or precepts of conduct, and partly of Haggadah, or edifying teachings other than precepts. Although the Torah is held by Jews to contain nothing that is not implicit in the Pentateuch, the task of making implicit Halachah explicit is never complete since new situations continually call for new applications.

While the whole Torah does not purport to be binding upon all mankind, part of it does. Even in biblical times, the Jews had come to distinguish from mere heathens those gentiles who recognized that part of the Mosaic Halachah which applies to gentiles and Jews alike. As interpreted by Maimonides, rabbinic teaching about this universal law is that it consists of seven 'Noachite' precepts. Six of them were given to Adam: the prohibitions of idolatry, of blasphemy, of murder, of adultery, and of robbery, and the command to establish courts of justice. The seventh was given to Noah: the prohibition of eating a limb from a living animal.

That all the righteous men of the nations of the world have a share in the world to come is received Jewish doctrine; and the balance of authority takes the righteous men of the nations to be all who observe the Noachite precepts, whether as divinely revealed or as inherently reasonable. It is true that Maimonides, apparently because of his philosophical doctrine that natural human reason does not suffice to establish the Noachite precepts, maintained that those who observe them upon any ground other than that they are laid down in the Torah as holding for all Noah's progeny, must do so for mistaken or inadequate reasons, and so cannot be truly righteous. But because such a position would exclude from a share in the world to come most of Noah's descendants, who have never heard of the Torah, and because it lacks either scriptural or Talmudic authority, the preponderant Jewish opinion has rejected not only it, but also the philosophical premise upon which Maimonides advanced it, that natural human reason does not suffice to establish the Noachite precepts.

Christian authority agrees with Jewish. St. Paul taught that, although only Jews can break the law of Moses, because only they know it, gentiles nevertheless find "in their own natures a rule to guide them, in default of any other rule"—a law "written in their hearts"—and they break that. The dismal counterpart of universal knowledge of divine law is universal guilt.

Christian moralists have been divided about the sense in which the universal part of the Mosaic law is written in the hearts of all men. The stricter opinion was that the bulk of the Ten Commandments are written in every heart, in the sense that nobody can be ignorant of them except through some wilful misuse of his mind, and that, consequently, ignorance of the law is always culpable. Anthropological knowledge of the varieties of human mores has made such a view incredible; but it has not touched the less strict opinion that certain common conceptions underlying the Torah are accessible to everybody, although, since even these may be obscured and distorted by the bad mores of the society in which he is brought up, a man's education will limit how much of the universal part of the Mosaic law he can discover for himself. On this view, a normal adult in a reasonably decent society may be ignorant of parts of morality that are relatively obvious, but he cannot be utterly ignorant of the conceptions that underlie it; and these conceptions provide him with a rule, however rudimentary, by which he can guide his conduct.

Stoic, Jewish, and Christian thought are therefore substantially agreed in this: that there is a set of rules or precepts of conduct, constituting a divine law, which is binding upon all rational creatures as such, and which in principle can be ascertained by human reason. This universal or common code is what Jews and Christians came to refer to as "morality" or "the moral law" (lex moralis). They also called it "the law of nature" (lex naturae) and "natural law" (lex naturalis), because they believed that the moral law applies to man by virtue of his nature as a rational being, and is known to him primarily by the exercise of natural human reason.

Aquinas described the natural law as a certain "participation in the eternal law by rational creatures" (participatio legis aeternae in rationali creatura), and observed, a propos the Mosaic law or Lex Vetus, that "since moral precepts have to do with what pertains to good mores, which is what conforms with reason, and since every judgement of human reason derives in some way from natural reason, it is necessary that all moral precepts belong to the law of nature." This conception of the moral law is not sectarian. If it was held by Aquinas, it was also held by the Reformer John Calvin, who, although he made more than Aquinas did of a point on which they were agreed, that because of his "dullness and obstinacy" a man needs a written law "to declare with greater certainty what in the law of nature is too obscure," nevertheless did not question that the moral law is the law of nature.

The conception of morality as a law common to all rational creatures by virtue of their rationality, although endorsed by the Stoic, Jewish, and Christian religious traditions, is not itself religious. Except with regard to divine worship, neither Stoics, Jews, nor Christians found it necessary to resort to premises about the existence and nature of God in stating the reasons for the various provisions of the moral law. All three, it is true, believed that what is grounded on those reasons is part of the universal divine law, because they believed that finite human reason participates in the infinite divine reason. In consequence, they thought that common morality is upheld by God, and so has a religious sanction as well as the purely moral one that violating it violates human rationality.

In revealed religions like Judaism and Christianity, which teach ways of life that include but go beyond common morality, the boundaries in those ways of life between what is common morality and what is not are easily lost sight of. To Jews endeavoring to live a full Jewish life, and to Christians endeavoring to live a full Christian life, it is of little moment whether or not something required of them as Jews or Christians is also required of them merely as rational creatures. Anybody who thinks of a religious way of life as a seamless whole, in which common morality is comprehended and sanctified, will come to find it as natural to fulfil the obligations peculiar to his religious faith as to fulfil those that are not. Such a person will be constantly tempted to mistake commandments binding upon him by virtue of what he takes to be religious truth for moral laws binding upon human beings as rational, even though his own religious doctrine condemns his error.

How else can the Jewish conviction be accounted for that the seventh Noachite commandment is part of common morality? It does not appear to be contrary to our nature as rational creatures to eat a part cut from a living animal, for example, to eat a live oyster, unless it involves cruelty. And how else can the Christian conviction be accounted for that Jesus' severer pronouncements on divorce are morally definitive? It is not absurd to maintain that the Christian conception of marriage as monogamous and indissoluble is a higher and better one than any other; but that is not to declare it binding upon all human beings as rational.

Judaism and Christianity have nevertheless bequeathed us a definite general conception of what the theory of morality is a theory of: it is a theory of a system of laws or precepts, binding upon rational creatures as such, the content of which is ascertainable by human reason. Jews and Christians not only affirm the existence of such a system, they also identify it with part of the code of conduct they take to be binding on themselves by virtue of religious truth. These doctrines raise two philosophical questions, which a theory of morality must answer. First, is there such a system of laws or precepts, or is it a chimaera? And second, if there is such a system, is it the one with which Judaism and Christianity identify it, or some other?

(Continues...)

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Table of Contents

Preface
1. The Concept of a Theory of Morality
1.1. What a Theory of Morality Is a Theory of
1.2. Morality as a Disposition of Affection and Conduct
1.3. Intuitionism: Old and New
1.4. The Philosophical Interest of the Hebrew-Christian Moral Tradition
1.5. The Investigation Proposed
2. Presuppositions and Principles
2.1. Human Beings and Their World
2.2. Actions, Circumstances, and Consequences
2.3. First-Order and Second-Order Moral Questions
2.4. The Fundamental Principle
2.5. The Structure of the First-Order System
3. First-Order Precepts
3.1. The Classification of First-Order Precepts
3.2. Duties of Human Beings to Themselves
3.3. Noninstitutional Duties to Others
3.4. Contracts
3.5. Property
3.6. The Family
3.7. Civil Society
4. Second-Order Precepts
4.1. Voluntariness and Moral Responsibility
4.2. Intention and Purpose
4.3. Ignorance: Culpable and Inculpable
4.4. Conscience and Conscientiousness
4.5. The Corruption of Consciousness
5. Consistency
5.1. Moral Perplexity
5.2. Doing Evil
That Good May Come
5.3. The Theory of the Double Effect
5.4. Malthusian Problems
6. Consequentialism
6.1. Cases of Necessity
6.2. The Problem of Dirty Hands
6.3. Consequentialist Theories
6.4. Utilitarianism
6.5. The Factor of Ignorance
7. The Foundation of Common Morality
7.1. Can Reason Be Practical?
7.2. Interlude: Universal Prescribers, Ideal Observers, and Rational Contractors
7.3. The Limits of Purpose
7.4. The Theory of the End-in-Itself
7.5. Respect for Rational Nature as a Condition of Self-Respect
7.6. The Limits of Practical Reason
Notes
Select Bibliography
Index