Thinking about Consciousness / Edition 1

Thinking about Consciousness / Edition 1

by David Papineau
     
 

ISBN-10: 0199271151

ISBN-13: 9780199271153

Pub. Date: 06/10/2004

Publisher: Oxford University Press

The relation between subjective consciousness and the physical brain is widely regarded as the last mystery facing science. Papineau argues that consciousness seems mysterious not because of any hidden essence, but only because we think about it in a special way. He exposes the resulting potential for confusion, and shows that much scientific study of consciousness

…  See more details below

Overview

The relation between subjective consciousness and the physical brain is widely regarded as the last mystery facing science. Papineau argues that consciousness seems mysterious not because of any hidden essence, but only because we think about it in a special way. He exposes the resulting potential for confusion, and shows that much scientific study of consciousness is misconceived.

Product Details

ISBN-13:
9780199271153
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
Publication date:
06/10/2004
Edition description:
New Edition
Pages:
280
Product dimensions:
8.40(w) x 5.40(h) x 0.70(d)

Table of Contents

Introduction1
1Mystery--What Mystery?1
2The Intuition of Distinctness2
3A Need for Therapy3
4Ontological Monism, Conceptual Dualism4
5Understanding the Intuition of Distinctness6
6The Details of Materialism8
7The Plan of the Book9
1The Case for Materialism13
1.1Introduction13
1.2The Causal Argument17
1.3The Ontology of Causes18
1.4Epiphenomenalism and Pre-established Harmony21
1.5Accepting Overdetermination26
1.6Functionalism and Epiphobia28
1.7A Possible Cure for Epiphobia32
1.8Intuition and Supervenience36
1.9An Argument from A Priori Causal Roles38
1.10What is 'Physics'?40
1.11The Completeness of Physics44
2Conceptual Dualism47
2.1Introduction47
2.2Jackson's Knowledge Argument50
2.3Denying Any Difference51
2.4Imaginative Re-creation56
2.5Introspective Classification57
2.6The Ability Hypothesis59
2.7Indexicality and Phenomenal Concepts63
2.8The Contingency of Learning from Experience67
2.9Imagination and Introspection69
2.10Further Issues71
3The Impossibility of Zombies73
3.1Introduction75
3.2Epistemology versus Metaphysics77
3.3The Appearance of Contingency77
3.4Explaining the Appearance of Contingency79
3.5Referring via Contingent Properties81
3.6A Different Explanation85
3.7Thinking Impossible Things88
3.8Conceivability and Possibility91
3.9The Intuition of Distinctness93
4Phenomenal Concepts96
4.1Introduction96
4.2Psychological, Phenomenal, and Everyday Concepts97
4.3Phenomenal Properties Provide their own 'Modes of Presentation'103
4.4World-Directed Perceptual Re-creation and Classification106
4.5Perceptual Concepts108
4.6How Do Perceptual Concepts Refer?110
4.7The Phenomenal Co-option of Perceptual Concepts114
4.8A Quotational Model116
4.9Indexicality and the Quotational Model122
4.10The Causal Basis of Phenomenal Reference125
4.11Phenomenal Concepts and Privacy127
4.12First-Person Incorrigibility133
4.13Third-Person Uses of Phenomenal Concepts139
5The Explanatory Gap141
5.1Introduction141
5.2Mark Twain, Samuel Clemens, and Intuitions of Gaps143
5.3Reduction, Roles, and Explanation147
5.4Does Materialism Require the Physical Truths to Imply all the Truths?150
5.5An Epistemological Gap155
5.6Conclusion160
6The Intuition of Distinctness161
6.1Introduction161
6.2Is an Explanation Already to Hand?162
6.3Does Conceptual Dualism Explain the Intuition of Distinctness?164
6.4Nagel's Footnote167
6.5The Antipathetic Fallacy169
6.6Do Phenomenal Concepts Resemble their Objects?171
7Prospects for the Scientific Study of Phenomenal Consciousness175
7.1Introduction175
7.2The Limitations of Consciousness Research176
7.3Phenomenal and Psychological Research179
7.4Subjects' First-Person Reports181
7.5Consciousness-as-Such184
7.6Methodological Impotence187
7.7Further Alternatives191
7.8Vague Phenomenal Concepts196
7.9Vagueness Defended199
7.10Theories of Consciousness-as-Such202
7.11Actualist HOT Theories204
7.12Attention208
7.13The Dispositional HOT theory210
7.14Methodological Meltdown215
7.15Representational Theories of Consciousness221
7.16Vagueness and Consciousness-as-Such225
7.17Conclusion228
AppendixThe History of The Completeness of Physics232
A.1Introduction232
A.2Descartes and Leibniz234
A.3Newtonian Physics237
A.4The Conservation of Energy243
A.5Conservative Animism249
A.6The Death of Emergentism253
A.7Conclusion255
References257
Index263

Read More

Customer Reviews

Average Review:

Write a Review

and post it to your social network

     

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

See all customer reviews >