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"Exhaustively researched and compellingly readable. . . . Stunning. . . . A resounding success."
"Truly impressive. . . . Woodworth has described with clarity and vigor the tactical actions in such battles as Shiloh, Champion Hill and Atlanta."
"Well written and highly illuminating . . . not only an incisive study of military command but a penetrating psychological analysis of Davis, Lee, and other key figures of the Confederacy."
"Well written and highly illuminating . . . not only an incisive study of military command but a penetrating psychological analysis of Davis, Lee, and other key figures of the Confederacy.
SLAVERY IN AMERICA DURING THE COLONIAL ERA AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
Long before the April night when a Confederate artillerist in Charleston, South Carolina, jerked the lanyard of a heavy cannon and fired the opening shot of the Civil War, the seeds of the dispute that would send millions of Americans into battle against each other in what still stands as the republic's deadliest war had already taken deep root in American culture. That dispute was about slavery. Slavery's beginnings in America lay far back in colonial times long before the four score and some odd years the United States had been in existence on that April night in 1861 when the shooting finally started in earnest.
When the first Englishmen had come to the New World almost three centuries before, they had prided themselves that their laws, unlike those of already established colonial power Spain, knew no such thing as a slave. Over the next century, however, that was to change. Englishmen in their country's first permanent settlement in what was to become the United States, Jamestown, found their economic fortune in the cultivation of the tobacco plant. Tobacco was a labor-intensive crop. With land abundant in colonial Virginia, the only practical limit on how much a man could grow and, therefore, how much money he could earn, was how much labor he could command. Hired labor was out of the question. Any potential hired man could readily obtain his own land and enjoy all the fruits of his own labor rather than only part of them as an employee. So the only way a large landowner could work his acres was with nonfree labor.
At first the solution Englishmen chose was that of indentured servitude. An indentured servant was a poor Englishman who could not afford passage to America but still wanted to take his shot at making his fortune in the New World. In order to do so, he would sign a contract, called an indenture, binding him to service for a certain specified period of years, usually seven, in exchange for the cost of his transportation to the colony. Indentured servants were the most common form of nonfree labor in Virginia during the colony's first half century. They could be male or, relatively rarely, female; could be bought and sold; and were sometimes mistreated, and their terms of service could be legally extended for various infractions, such as, in the case of a female servant, giving birth to a child. However, the child in that case was free, not the property of the master, who, under English law, owned the indentured servant's labor but not his or her person. As long as mortality remained extremely high in early colonial Virginia, reliance on indentured servants, rather than actual slaves, was not only familiar but also economically sensible since both the indentured servant and the more expensive lifetime slave were statistically likely to be dead before seven years were up.
The shift from indentured servitude to race-based slavery was gradual. Life spans slowly increased, making lifetime slaves a better investment. The Spanish in the Caribbean, Central America, and South America were already using slavery on a vast scale and had been doing so for over a century. A well-developed transatlantic slave trade, carried in Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, and English ships, served the constant demand of Latin American colonial economies for ever more bondsmen. It was easy enough for Englishmen in the North American colonies of Virginia and its junior partner on the Chesapeake Bay, Maryland, to begin importing slaves when the stream of indentured servants failed to meet demand or when a longer-term investment seemed appealing. It remains unclear what, if any, additional factors drove the shift toward slavery, and historians have long argued as to whether racism caused slavery or was caused by it. In any case, by the 1660s, the economies of both Virginia and Maryland had shifted overwhelmingly to the use of slaves rather than indentured servants, though a few of the latter continued to be present in the colonies for several decades more. By that time, the law codes of these two colonies fully recognized and protected the institution of slavery.
During that same decade, other Englishmen established the Carolinas as colonies just south of Virginia. South Carolina in particular quickly adopted a slave culture and economy, not, like those of its neighbors to the north, by developing it internally but rather by importing a complete and operating slave economy and culture from the British-owned sugarcane plantation island of Barbados, where indentured servitude had given way to slavery even more quickly than it had in the Chesapeake colonies amid the brutal, killing labor and conditions of sugar cultivation. Barbados planters seeking to expand or younger sons of such planters seeking establishments of their own migrated to the new colony of South Carolina and brought their slaves and the associated culture and laws with them. Though South Carolina planters came to grow rice and indigo rather than tobacco or sugar, their economy, like that of the Chesapeake colonies and Barbados, rested on the foundation of staple-crop agriculture, well suited for cultivation by large gangs of fairly unskilled and unmotivated workers. By about 1715 South Carolina had become the only one of the colonies in which slaves made up a majority of the population. North Carolina, though with a somewhat more diverse economy, followed the cultures of its neighbors to the north and south. Georgia's founders, James Oglethorpe and his philanthropic fellow proprietors, never intended their experiment in enlightened reform to include slavery, but the colonists eventually managed to introduce the institution there as well.
While slavery thrived and became the mainstay of the economies of the southern colonies, the northern colonies developed along different lines. Slavery existed there as well but in far smaller numbers. Some of the colonies, such as Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, had originally been born out of religious motivations that were more or less hostile to slavery and at least initially hindered its growth. All the northern colonies developed economies that lent themselves less well to the use of slave labor than did the southern colonies' virtually uniform dependence on staple-crop agriculture. Mixed small manufacturing, small farming, shipping, and fishing in New England; grain cultivation in Pennsylvania; and commerce in port cities such as Philadelphia, New York, and Boston all presented less temptation for the wholesale exploitation of slaves. Thus, conscience and economics combined to limit the total number of bondsmen in the northern colonies to a tiny fraction of those in the South.
The American Revolution turned the colonists' attention to issues of liberty and the rights of man. If indeed "all men are created equal and are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights," then it would be impossible to justify slavery, as the Revolutionaries, including the slaveholders among them, were painfully aware. Patrick Henry, who rhetorically asked if even life itself was worth the price of "chains and slavery" and answered his own question in the negative with his famous demand for liberty or death, was nevertheless a slaveholder. "Would any one believe that I am Master of Slaves of my own purchase!" he asked in another, less well known, rhetorical question. Yet though he called slavery "this Abominable Practice," he could only express the hope that some time, somehow, the opportunity would arrive to abolish it. He was not alone in his conflicted state of mind. The prevailing view in the South was that immediate emancipation would turn loose on society an unrestrained racial underclass and spark the onset of a race war. "We have the wolf by the ears," Henry's fellow Virginia slaveholder Thomas Jefferson would later remark, "and feel the danger of either holding or letting him loose."
In the northern states during the Revolutionary era, the situation was different. Minute slave populations there aroused little worry about the dangers of emancipation. Many northern slaveholders voluntarily freed their slaves, as did some in Virginia, and each of the northern legislatures adopted laws either abolishing or gradually phasing out slavery within the boundaries of its own state. The southern legislatures did not. In short, the Revolutionary era turned American minds to liberty and thereby etched the line between liberty and slavery deeper into the landscape of American culture. On the map that line now became the border where the southernmost original free state, Pennsylvania, met the northernmost original slave state, Maryland, a boundary that took its name from colonial surveyors Charles Mason and Jeremiah Dixon. Thus, the intellectual dichotomy over slavery birthed a tangible geographical division. The Mason-Dixon Line would be the demarcation between bondage and freedom.
The ambivalence of the founding generation toward the institution of slavery left its mark on the new republic's early policies. When in 1787 Jefferson wrote and Congress passed the Northwest Ordinance, that act banned slavery in all of what was to become the states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin. The Ohio River thus became the boundary between slave and free states west of the Appalachians as the Mason-Dixon Line was east of them.
That same year the Philadelphia Convention wrote the new Constitution. The framers carefully avoided using the painful word "slave" in the document, referring instead to "persons bound to servitude." In concessions to the concerns of the slave states, especially South Carolina, the Constitution provided that when such persons escaped from a slave state to a free state, they were to be returned. Congress would have no power to abolish the slave trade until 1808. When slave state delegates proposed that slaves be counted as part of population for the apportionment of representatives in Congress but not for the purposes of direct taxation, northern members of the convention balked. The two sides finally settled on a compromise stipulating that for both purposes each slave should count as three-fifths of a free inhabitant. This was a clear gain for the South since Congress never levied a direct tax, and the three-fifths clause therefore served only to secure the overrepresentation of southern whites in Congress and the Electoral College. Although the founders recognized the contradiction between republican liberty and slavery, they incorrectly concluded that slavery would eventually wither and die. Unfortunately, slavery was not capable of self-correction. This clouded their policymaking and thrust the slave issue onto future generations.
SLAVERY IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC
What from a modern perspective may seem the founders' inexplicable complacence about slavery's existence as a blatant contradiction of their ideals within their system of ordered liberty rested partially on the belief that the institution was in fact in the process of dying out. That belief in turn stemmed in part from wishful thinking and in part from certain economic and agricultural developments of the mid-eighteenth century. As soil in Virginia lost its fertility for further profitable cultivation of tobacco, farmers and planters had shifted increasingly to wheat, a much less labor-intensive crop. A plantation that converted from tobacco to wheat would at once find itself with a large surplus of labor, and slaveholders could readily imagine strong economic motivations for eventual manumission (voluntary freeing) of their slaves, provided that the problem of free blacks within white society could be solved.
All of this changed when in 1793 Connecticut Yankee Eli Whitney, while serving as a tutor on a Georgia plantation, invented a practical cotton gin—a device that would separate the seeds of the cotton plant from its white fibers. The cotton gin revolutionized the southern economy, making possible the profitable cultivation of cotton throughout the Deep South. The favorable treaties made with southern Indian tribes at the close of the War of 1812 opened vast expanses of land that was ideal for cotton farming. Textile mills in Britain, built to process wool, provided a ready market for American cotton, which soon became one of the country's most valuable exports. Cotton was a labor-intensive crop, requiring many pickers during the harvest season. The plantations and farms of Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana became a market for the surplus slaves of Virginia and other Upper South states. The spread of cotton as a cash crop during the generation after the writing of the Constitution meant that whereas economic forces had previously pressured slaveholders to free their bondsmen, those same forces now encouraged the profit-minded planter to hang on to his slaves or sell them to the Deep South for substantial sums. Thus, cotton engrained slavery even more deeply into southern culture and economics.
The new economic conditions slowly, almost imperceptibly at first, fostered new attitudes in the South regarding slavery. With cordial southern support, Congress banned the slave trade in 1808 as soon as constitutionally permitted, but the support of southerners came in part from representatives and senators from the Upper South, a region whose chief crop for export to the other states, surplus slaves, would become much more valuable if the flow of imported slaves were cut off. Indeed, slave prices rose steadily decade after decade. Slaves became one of the favorite and most lucrative investments in the South.
Then in 1819 the Missouri Territory petitioned for admission to the Union as a slave state. This alarmed some northern congressmen. Louisiana, the first state to be formed from the territory acquired by the Louisiana Purchase, had entered the Union as a slave state in 1812, but geography had assuaged northern concerns about the spread of slavery. Louisiana lay farther south than any other American state at that time, and slavery had existed there under French and Spanish rule before America acquired the territory. It appeared only natural that the Pelican State would bring slavery along with statehood. Missouri was different. It lay directly west of Illinois, where Jefferson's own Northwest Ordinance had banned slavery. If admitted, it would become the northernmost slave state. Worse, the land that made up the would-be state of Missouri had known no slavery under French or Spanish rule. The implication of admitting Missouri as a slave state was that slavery was the natural and normal arrangement in all future American territories—slavery followed the flag.
This was exactly the reverse of how some northern congressmen wished to view their flag and country, and so one of them, New York Representative James Tallmadge Jr., introduced an amendment to the Missouri statehood act, stipulating that slavery was to be phased out in the state over the next generation. Southern representatives and senators reacted with startling ferocity. Despite their vociferous opposition, the amendment passed in the House, where northern representatives outnumbered southern, but the Senate, where slave and free states were evenly balanced, rejected it.
Into this heated impasse stepped Henry Clay, with the first of several compromises he would sponsor during his long congressional career. Under the terms of his proposal, which Congress finally adopted after lengthy wrangling, Missouri would enter the Union as a slave state, and Maine, hitherto part of Massachusetts, would enter as a free state, thus preserving the balance in the Senate. The line that formed most of the southern boundary of Missouri, latitude thirty-six degrees, thirty minutes, would be extended all the way across the remainder of the land acquired in the Louisiana Purchase. All lands south of the line would be reserved for future slave states, while all lands north of it, with the exception of Missouri itself, would be forever closed to slavery. At the time, southerners thought it no bad bargain, for although the lands north of thirty-six thirty were far more extensive than those south of it, the prevailing belief at the time was that persons of African descent—and therefore the institution of slavery—could not thrive in those northerly regions.
Southern reaction to Tallmadge's relatively mild proposal provided a stark revelation of the change in attitudes over the preceding generation. Even Jefferson, who had once favored the limitation of slavery's spread and written that limitation into the Northwest Ordinance, now saw in any attempt to place a boundary on slavery the potential doom of the Union. "This momentous question," he wrote,
like a fire bell in the night, awakened and filled me with terror. I considered it at once as the knell of the Union. It is hushed indeed for the moment, but this is a reprieve only, not a final sentence. A geographical line, coinciding with a marked principle, moral and political, once conceived and held up to the angry passions of men, will never be obliterated; and every new irritation will mark it deeper and deeper.
The Missouri Compromise quieted the clamor over slavery in the national political arena, and it soon came to be viewed with a feeling akin to reverence by the American people. Yet the fundamental contradiction that slavery posed in the midst of a society dedicated to freedom remained a continued source of periodic irritation, much as Jefferson had predicted.
Throughout the 1820s and 1830s those irritations remained small but occurred with disturbing regularity. In 1822 South Carolina slaveholders purported to have uncovered an elaborate conspiracy of slaves bent on revolt and subsequent mayhem. They blamed the ferment on the widely publicized Missouri Compromise debates, which, they said, had introduced evil ideas of freedom into the minds of their otherwise contented slaves. Some modern scholars suspect the slaveholders may have fabricated the entire story in order to justify a more strident defense of slavery.
Excerpted from THIS GREAT STRUGGLE by STEVEN E. WOODWORTH Copyright © 2011 by Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.. Excerpted by permission of ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD PUBLISHERS, INC.. All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.
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Posted May 24, 2011
Write a one-volume history of the American Civil War. Be sure to consider the politics on both sides, the home fronts, personalities and objectives. Do not forget to include Great Britain, the blockade-runners and the rams. We want you to include chapters on Reconstruction and on causes too. This must be a military history that covers all the major campaigns and make sure to mention the more important secondary campaigns. Oh, by the way, the text must be under 400 pages, we need about 40 pages for the index, sources and notes. Most authors would have tried to nicely say, "This is impossible!" so as to not upset the publisher. The excellent social history "Battle Cry of Freedom" is 952 pages while the best military history "The Longest Night" is 992 pages. This book cannot offer the depth of information found in those book BUT it provides an intelligent overview of the subjects.
Woodworth manages an inclusive narrative that is well paced and constantly moving. We effortlessly move from theater to theater, from war to politics to social issues and back to war throughout the book. The organization is so logical that each move seems natural and necessary. We receive enough information to attain a basic understanding of a subject and place it in the overall context of the war. This is a history of American Civil War from the 1850s through the 1870s. The design is to be inclusive but not detailed. A detailed book like this would run thousands of pages and require a body builder to carry it.
Woodworth stays with the modern interpretation of the Civil War history placing slavery as the central theme. He is honest enough to fairly note different interpretations and not be dismissive of them. This is a stalemate in the East, victory on the Mississippi and cautious advance in Tennessee military history. The treatment of the personalities is fair and no one walks on water. This is not a story of heroes and villains but of people at war. Leaders make mistakes and fail throughout the book. The Trans-Mississippi is important in 1861 and early 1862. After the Battle of Pea Ridge, very little happens that changes the course of the war. The book reflects this by looking at what is important and what is not.
Is this book worth reading? YES! For those new to the Civil War, this is the best general history of its' size. For the experienced reader, this book is an enjoyable review. It puts the vital, very important, important and not important events into place and keeps this perspective. One of the best things is Woodworth's ability as a writer. His prose is clean, direct and very intelligent. He can lecture while seeming to talk and make anyone enjoy history.
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Posted August 29, 2011
Steven Woodworth does a very good job of writing an engrossing and surprisingly complete one volume history of the Civil War. He focuses clearly on the salient historical events and their significance and has a good ability to sift through the hero worship and controversy surrounding many of the figures of the time to put their actions into a proper perspective.Was this review helpful? Yes NoThank you for your feedback. Report this reviewThank you, this review has been flagged.
Posted January 19, 2014
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Posted July 25, 2011
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