“Fascinating.” — Rolling Stone
Ticket Masters: The Rise of the Concert Industry and How the Public Got Scalpedby Dean Budnick, Josh Baron
Your favorite band has just announced their nationwide tour. Should you pay to join their fan club and get in on the pre-sale? No, you decide to wait. But the on-sale date arrives, and the site is jammed. You can’t get on—and the concert is/b>/i>
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“A clear, comprehensive look at a murky business.” —The Wall Street Journal
Your favorite band has just announced their nationwide tour. Should you pay to join their fan club and get in on the pre-sale? No, you decide to wait. But the on-sale date arrives, and the site is jammed. You can’t get on—and the concert is sold out in six minutes. What happened? What now?
Music journalists Dean Budnick and Josh Baron chronicle the behind-the-scenes history of the modern concert industry. Filled with entertaining rock-and-roll anecdotes about The Rolling Stones, The Grateful Dead, Pearl Jam, and more—and charting the emergence of players like Ticketmaster, StubHub, Live Nation, and Outbox—Ticket Masters will transfix every concertgoer who wonders just where the price of admission really goes. This edition has an updated epilogue that covers recent industry developments.
The lively, sprawling chronology of the concert-ticket sales business.
Relix editors Budnick (Jambands: The Complete Guide to the Players, Music, and Scene, 2003, etc.) and Baron begin by recapturing the "eureka moment" of computer moguls Harvey Dubner and partner Jack Quinn in the 1960s. Both men managed to surmount a spectrum of technological kinks to roll out a revolutionary operating system that expanded automated ticketing to encompass not only theater venues, but the lucrative rock music and sporting-event business as well. Dubbed Ticket Reservation Systems, it endured fierce competition and necessary rebranding (Ticketron), while an ingenious startup venture (that would become Ticketmaster) began competing for venue contracts and consumer sales with technology capable of processing increasingly complex ticketing platforms. The authors engagingly trace the industry's evolution through its rapid and profitable growth trends in the '70s and '80s, aided partly by shrewd businessmen like Ticketmaster honcho Fred Rosen, an entrepreneur who savored his company's absorption of rival agent Ticketron in 1991. However, trouble began to mount. Customers revolted over Ticketmaster's excessive, involuntary tiers of "service fees," and allegations of unsavory and overzealous business practices sparked an investigation by the U.S. Department of Justice for antitrust practices. A host of volatile lawsuits followed, though nothing could prevent the highly scrutinized merger with LiveNation in 2010. Budnick and Baron offer information in accessible language fortified with verbatim dialogue from a pantheon of music-industry brass. Classic-rock bands, musicians, managers, concert promoters, radio broadcasters and entertainment attorneys contribute to a spirited forum on how the grinding gears of the evolving (often double-crossing) ticket market has affected their concert tours and business.
An exhaustive, somewhat circuitous literary treatment that favors history over histrionics.
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Read an Excerpt
THE CHAIRMAN HAD SPOKEN
On the evening of August 3, 2010, Irving Azoff, whose role as chief executive officer of Ticketmaster had recently expanded following an industry altering merger that furnished the new title of Live Nation executive chairman, bypassed the company’s publicity firm to offer his first direct message to ticket buyers via the social networking service Twitter.
Azoff’s comments fell in the midst of what looked to be the most miserable U.S. summer concert season on record. Weak ticket sales had forced the cancellation of numerous high–profile performances, starting with a series of stadium shows by Azoff’s longtime management client the Eagles on a bill with country superstars the Dixie Chicks and Keith Urban. In the weeks that followed a number of “recession–proof” acts did the same, as the Jonas Brothers, Rihanna and Lilith Fair all canceled multiple dates. Limp Bizkit scrapped its U.S. amphitheater tour and Christina Aguilera soon followed suit, citing “prior commitments.” Even the annual American Idols Live! outing, which had blown out tickets in prior years, was forced to scale back its itinerary, dropping seven shows and rescheduling many others.
Entertainment reporters and Wall Street pundits alike took particular interest in the flagging amphitheater sales figures since most of these “sheds” were under the control of Live Nation. The summer of 2010 represented the first official go–round for the blended company after the government had approved the union of the world’s largest live event promoter, Live Nation, with the world’s largest ticketing agency, Ticketmaster (which had recently acquired the world’s largest artist management firm, Azoff’s Front Line).
The Department of Justice’s ruling had been preceded by nearly eleven months of inquiry and two congressional hearings. In February 2009, shortly after the corporations announced their intent to unite, Azoff had been summoned to Capitol Hill in a moment that echoed former Ticketmaster CEO Fred Rosen’s 1994 appearance before Congress in the wake of a public dustup with Pearl Jam. However, unlike the earlier inquiry, which in many respects resulted from the fight over a nickel, by 2009 billions of nickels were in play. As a result, both the House Subcommittee on Antitrust and the House Subcommittee on Courts and Competition Policy elected to weigh in on the matter.
Ultimately though, it fell to the Obama White House and his Department of Justice to determine whether to block the merger as an illegal restraint of trade. The federal government eventually granted its permission over the strident objections of opponents, who charged that the mega–company would raise prices and inhibit the development of new musical artists. By August 2010 a growing segment of the financial community began offering its own criticism, as initial optimism regarding the prospects of Live Nation Entertainment was falling in tandem with the rate of ticket sales.
Over the course of the summer the company had taken a series of increasingly desperate measures to draw audiences into its amphitheaters. Package deals that offered coupons for a free soda and a hot dog gave way to mid– June’s “No Services Fees” promotion, which proclaimed, “Your summer concert tickets at Live Nation amphitheaters now have No Service Fees” (even as an asterisk qualified, “Parking, shipping and other non ‘service fee’ costs may apply”).
In late July the company instituted a $10 ticket program, which dropped prices even lower, scrambling to achieve a short–term financial benefit that led some prior ticket holders to grouse about their decision to purchase seats during initial sales at much greater expense.
When the expected windfall wasn’t realized, Live Nation then outfitted employees with sandwich boards and paraded them through its venues, tickets in hand, hawking the cheap seats for future shows. Yet despite all of this, sales figures remained low as audiences were uncomfortable with the overall price structure of the concert experience.
In the face of these events, at 10:53 p.m. on August 3, Executive Chairman Azoff shared his sentiments with the public via the immediacy of Twitter.
“So if you want ticket prices to go down stop stealing music.”
Seemingly absolving his company of responsibility, Azoff placed the burden squarely on the overburdened shoulders of consumers. This wasn’t the first time he had conveyed such a message. A few weeks earlier, at Fortune magazine’s Brainstorm Tech conference in Aspen, he had shared similar thoughts about his customer base with the magazine’s managing editor: “If they could figure out a way to steal the tickets they would, just like they steal movies and music. But so far they haven’t figured out how to do that.”
The declining sales of recorded music held deep significance for Azoff, who in addition to running Front Line Management had previously headed both MCA and Giant Records. Still, few concertgoers appreciated his sentiment, flustered and frustrated as they were by parking costs, concession prices, $5 add–ons for the “luxury” of a short, ordered line into the venue, as well as the very price of tickets themselves, with their vexing array of fees. Consumers pointed, for instance, to Lady Gaga’s Monster Ball tour, in which a single $20 lawn ticket could cost nearly $50 after a “facility charge” ($12), “convenience charge” ($10.05), “order processing fee” ($5.20) and “TicketFast Delivery,” i.e., print–at–home ticketing ($2.50).
The sheer magnitude of it all had led one would–be concertgoer to profess in an online forum, with equal measures of humor and irritation, “Screw Live Nation, I’m grabbing these tix after the show.”
Other music fans were baffled by their attempts to ascertain the fundamentals of concert ticket pricing. What is included in a service fee, they wondered, and why does the cost of that service vary with the price of a ticket? Who profits from these extra charges? Why are tickets sold online with impunity for five times their face value? Aren’t there laws to protect consumers? Are musicians really scalping their best seats? And what’s up with these VIP packages? Where do they find those front row tickets, and who reaps the benefits? Just what is a facility fee, and if the public is paying for renovations of some sort, shouldn’t all the amphitheaters be recast in platinum by now? And just how did ticket prices get so high anyhow?
What People are saying about this
"[A] lively, sprawling chronology of the concert-ticket sales business . . . Budnick and Baron offer information in accessible language fortified with verbatim dialogue from a pantheon of music-industry brass." Kirkus Reviews (April 15, 2011)
"In other hands, this book could have been dull and academic, but it reads like an adventure story, full of colorful characters, shady transactions, and surprising twists and turns. For everyone who has been dumbstruck by the extra fees added to the price of admission, this book is just the ticket. Highly recommended for eventgoers everywhere." Library Journal (May 1, 2011)
"A clear, comprehensive look at a murky business, the book is also an encyclopedia of information about the rise, decline and rebirth of the live music industry." Wall Street Journal (May 28, 2011)
"Fascinating. . . . [The authors] delve deep into every aspect of the tour biz, from the rise of computerized ticketing to the consolidation of concert promoters." Rolling Stone (June 9, 2011)
"A fascinating insider's portrait of the music business once all of the pulsing lights, fog machines and sound equipment have been turned off." Maclean's (June 27, 2011)
"Budnick and Baron did a tremendous job in chronicling the history of the U.S. and Canadian concert business and how the business models have changed. . . . Ticket Masters is an excellent book for music historians and business geeks alike." www.boomerocity.com
Meet the Author
Dean Budnick is the executive editor of Relix magazine and the founder of Jambands.com. He holds a Ph.D. from Harvard and a J.D. from Columbia Law School.
Josh Baron is the editor in chief of Relix magazine and contributes to a variety of media outlets including New York City–based radio station WPUV, where he serves as a music reviewer.
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