Timber Booms and Institutional Breakdown in Southeast Asia
In this book, Michael L. Ross explores the breakdown of the institutions that govern natural resource exports in developing states. Using case studies of timber booms in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, he shows that these institutions often break down when states receive positive trade shocks—unanticipated windfalls. Drawing on the theory of rent-seeking, he suggests that these institutions succumb to a problem he calls "rent-seizing"—the predatory behavior of politicians who seek to supply rent to others, and who purposefully dismantle institutions that restrain them.
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Timber Booms and Institutional Breakdown in Southeast Asia
In this book, Michael L. Ross explores the breakdown of the institutions that govern natural resource exports in developing states. Using case studies of timber booms in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, he shows that these institutions often break down when states receive positive trade shocks—unanticipated windfalls. Drawing on the theory of rent-seeking, he suggests that these institutions succumb to a problem he calls "rent-seizing"—the predatory behavior of politicians who seek to supply rent to others, and who purposefully dismantle institutions that restrain them.
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Timber Booms and Institutional Breakdown in Southeast Asia

Timber Booms and Institutional Breakdown in Southeast Asia

by Michael L. Ross
Timber Booms and Institutional Breakdown in Southeast Asia

Timber Booms and Institutional Breakdown in Southeast Asia

by Michael L. Ross

Hardcover(New Edition)

$81.99 
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Overview

In this book, Michael L. Ross explores the breakdown of the institutions that govern natural resource exports in developing states. Using case studies of timber booms in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, he shows that these institutions often break down when states receive positive trade shocks—unanticipated windfalls. Drawing on the theory of rent-seeking, he suggests that these institutions succumb to a problem he calls "rent-seizing"—the predatory behavior of politicians who seek to supply rent to others, and who purposefully dismantle institutions that restrain them.

Product Details

ISBN-13: 9780521791670
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Publication date: 01/08/2001
Series: Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions
Edition description: New Edition
Pages: 256
Product dimensions: 5.98(w) x 9.02(h) x 0.63(d)
Lexile: 1420L (what's this?)

Table of Contents

1. Introduction: three puzzles; 2. The problem of resource booms; 3. Explaining institutional breakdown; 4. The Philippines: the legal slaughter of the forests; 5. Sabah, Malaysia: a new state of affairs; 6. Sarawak, Malaysia: an almost uncontrollable instinct; 7. Indonesia: putting the forests to 'better use'; 8. Conclusion: rent seeking and rent-seizing.
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