Treachery: Betrayals, Blunders, and Cover-ups: Six Decades of Espionage Against America and Great Britain [NOOK Book]

Overview

From noted intelligence authority and author Chapman Pincher comes an utterly riveting book that reveals in startling detail sixty years of Soviet spying against Great Britain and the United States. Using a huge cache of recently released documents and exclusive interviews, Pincher makes a compelling new case that–as he has long believed–the head of Britain’s own counterintelligence and security agency was himself a double agent, acting to undermine and imperil the U.K. and America. Written with the power of a ...
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Treachery: Betrayals, Blunders, and Cover-ups: Six Decades of Espionage Against America and Great Britain

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Overview

From noted intelligence authority and author Chapman Pincher comes an utterly riveting book that reveals in startling detail sixty years of Soviet spying against Great Britain and the United States. Using a huge cache of recently released documents and exclusive interviews, Pincher makes a compelling new case that–as he has long believed–the head of Britain’s own counterintelligence and security agency was himself a double agent, acting to undermine and imperil the U.K. and America. Written with the power of a heart-pounding thriller, Treachery pulls the mask from intelligence leader Roger Hollis. As a result, years of traitorous action and inaction on his watch come tumbling down.

Pincher reveals Hollis’s early years, when he was schooled at Oxford, which “educated” many agents, and worked in 1930s Shanghai, a hotbed of soon-to-be spies and Soviet recruiters. Hired by MI5–at a time when there was virtually no vetting of employees–he was a gray presence who rose in the ranks over twenty-seven years while, Pincher suspects, he was allowing the most notorious Soviet spies of the century to flourish.

Myriad fascinating case histories are portrayed here, including that of Lt. Igor Gouzenko, a Red Army cipher clerk who said cryptically in 1945 that there was a mole in MI5 with access to important files. Pincher also provides exciting new perspectives on the most infamous operatives of our time, including Kim Philby and Klaus Fuchs. Perhaps most explosively, Pincher posits that long after Hollis stepped down, a cover-up was perpetrated at the highest levels, and that Margaret Thatcher was induced to mislead Parliament to prevent the truth from coming out.

An essential volume for a world potentially facing a new cold war as Russia dangerously flexes its military and espionage muscles once again, Treachery warns us to protect our society and institutions from enemy infiltration in the future. This is a revelatory work that puts twentieth-century politics and war into stunning new relief.


From the Hardcover edition.
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Editorial Reviews

Publishers Weekly

It is no longer a secret that not only Britain's defense plans but also top-secret information provided by the U.S. were systematically pipelined from London to Moscow. The Soviets' consistent success in the intelligence war has usually been seen as a combination of skill and luck. In this history of 60 years of espionage, Pincher, a highly regarded British expert on intelligence and espionage, makes convincing use of recently released Soviet records to assert that British counterintelligence failed through the work of a "supermole": Roger Hollis, MI5's director from 1956 to 1965. The accusation is four decades old, and conspiracy theories of this kind are notably difficult to substantiate. Pincher comes as close as possible absent complete, systematic access to Russian archives. He establishes credible connections among significant "coincidences, counterproductive actions, and inactions" in Hollis's career, from the failure to expose Soviet agent Kim Philby to systematic discrediting of Soviet defectors. Arguably more valuable is Pincher's account of the longstanding refusal of British intelligence to disturb its inner dynamic by thoroughly investigating the case: "Operation Cover-Up goes on forever." (July 7)Copyright © Reed Business Information, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Library Journal

Pincher, a veteran investigative writer on British security, is angry about his countrymen who betrayed the UK and angry at Whitehall's efforts to sweep it all under the rug. Most of the stories he recounts here are well known in outline, but Pincher provides additional details. His central theme is that Roger Hollis, who rose through the ranks of the MI5 Security Service to become its head, was a longtime Communist mole and worked to frustrate British counterintelligence operations-allegations Pincher made earlier in Their Trade Is Treachery(1981). Pincher has conducted extensive research in American, British, and Russian archives, but his most valuable information comes from talking with those in the know, the result of years of carefully cultivating personal relationships and taking advantage of upper-crust social get-togethers. Because this may be his last book (he is 94) and because many of his sources have died, Pincher names those who quietly helped him over the years. A disturbing history and a warning about continued Russian espionage and Western weaknesses; of interest to a wide range of readers, though a chronology and photographs would have been useful. (Index not seen.)
—Daniel K. Blewett

Kirkus Reviews
A British military-intelligence specialist exhaustively recounts his country's woeful 60-year record countering Soviet spying. Espionage expert Pincher (The Spycatcher Affair, 1988, etc.) digs deep to prove that Roger Hollis, who served from 1936 to 1965 in Britain's MI-5, was really a Russian agent, code-named "Elli." Drawing on recently opened Soviet archives, the vast literature recounting British counterintelligence failures and a lifetime of high-level sources developed in England and America, Pincher compiles a damning, if circumstantial, dossier against Hollis, whose lengthy career spans a time made notorious by a number of traitorous names. They include the so-called Cambridge Five-Kim Philby, Anthony Blunt, John Cairncross, Donald Maclean and Guy Burgess-atomic spy Klaus Fuchs and disgraced cabinet minister John Profumo, whose liaison with model Christine Keeler brought down Harold Macmillan's government. Pincher also deals with numerous, less well-known characters, notably Ursula Hamburger, or "Sonia," "the most influential female secret agent of all time." The author's surfeit of detail, roll call of shady characters and catalogue of outrageous episodes, misdeeds, deceptions, lies and cover-ups have two effects. First, they underscore Pincher's immense authority and the overwhelming evidence against Hollis; second, they weary all but the most intensely interested readers. Still, the Hollis matter has for the Brits the same fascination-and features the same furious contention-as the Alger Hiss case once held for Americans. After this book, Hollis's defenders will be reduced to ascribing the staggering number of documented failures on his watch "merely" to spectacular negligence.Occasionally tiresome, but Pincher provides a comprehensive, almost irrefutable indictment.
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Product Details

  • ISBN-13: 9781588368591
  • Publisher: Random House Publishing Group
  • Publication date: 7/7/2009
  • Sold by: Random House
  • Format: eBook
  • Pages: 704
  • Sales rank: 1,153,882
  • File size: 3 MB

Meet the Author

Chapman Pincher is the most experienced and perhaps the best-known British espionage writer. Born in India in 1914, he was educated at King’s College London and the Royal Military College of Science. His book Their Trade Is Treachery, which first charged Sir Roger Hollis with being a Soviet agent, was a sensation. For decades he has been the most effective critic of the British security system, and over the years he has broken scores of stories that have created headlines.


From the Hardcover edition.
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Read an Excerpt

Chapter One


A Momentous Message

Late in the year 2000, vladimir putin, president of the Russian Federation, awarded the posthumous title “Superagent of Military Intelligence” to Ursula Beurton, a former British housewife who is better known in the annals of espionage by her Soviet code name, Sonia. It was an unprecedented honor for a woman who had already held two Orders of the Red Banner for her treacherous activities in several countries, especially in Great Britain, where she had been deeply involved in the theft of both British and American atomic bomb secrets during World War II. Shortly after she died, in Berlin in 2000 at the age of ninety-three, some of her other exploits were released from the Moscow archives for publication in Russian books. One of them, which had occurred in Oxford in 1943 under the noses of MI5, then located nearby, involved information so politically explosive that it was regarded by the British prime minister, Winston Churchill, as requiring the utmost secrecy.

In August 1943, Churchill and President Franklin D. Roosevelt, accompanied by senior aides, met in Quebec to decide about the date and details of the invasion of Italy from North Africa and, later, of France from Great Britain. In addition, on August 19, they signed a separate agreement concerning collaboration between Britain and the United States on the production of an atomic bomb. The American atomic proj?ect was progressing so rapidly that Churchill wanted British scientists to join it there, but the U.S. government had objected to such a move. Previously, in June 1942, at a meeting in Washington, D.C., Churchill and Roosevelt had made a loose arrangement to pool atomic information and develop a bomb together, but with the setting up of the vast Manhattan Project, the United States was contributing so much more money and effort that the will to share the proceeds had seriously declined. At Quebec, Churchill was determined to exploit his friendship with Roosevelt to resurrect the partnership and enshrine it in a formal treaty.

The old warrior’s persistence resulted in a separate two-page document, usually referred to as the Quebec Agreement. In it, the two leaders stated that Great Britain and the United States would collaborate to produce an atomic weapon and would never use it against each other or against any other country without mutual consent. It also declared that neither would ever communicate any information about it to any third party without joint consent. There was also agreement about continuing atomic collaboration in the postwar situation.

The Quebec Agreement was an exceptionally sensitive document because the very existence of any work on the bomb was supposedly so secret that it referred to the project only as “Tube Alloys.” Also, Churchill and Roosevelt were most anxious to avoid offending the Soviet leader, Joseph Stalin, by making him aware that he would not be given any information about the new weapon, which could devastatingly weaken the Soviet Union’s military position in the postwar world. Having been forced into becoming allies by Adolf Hitler’s attack on them in 1941, the Russians were bearing the brunt of the fighting.

Churchill therefore kept the Quebec Agreement and its details secret to himself, a few trusted aides, and the Chiefs of Staff of the British Armed Forces. The distribution list—those to whom a copy was sent for information—is therefore likely to have been very restricted indeed. Several documents now in the British National Archives testify to the extraordinary extent of the measures taken to prevent unauthorized persons from having any knowledge of its details. As late as June 1949, the prime minister, then Clement Attlee, expressed his deep concern that details of the Quebec Agreement and subsequent secret accords might be revealed to a U.S. Senate committee, from which they might leak. Even in 1951, both Attlee and President Harry Truman were still insisting that details of the agreement should remain secret. A statement about the Quebec Agreement made in Robert Norris’s heavily researched biography of the American general Leslie Groves, Racing for the Bomb, provides further evidence of the desired secrecy: “Only a few senior officials on each side of the Atlantic knew of the highly secret arrangement. For several years after the war the existence of the agreement was not known either to the American Congress or the British Parliament.”

Yet the Russian archives have now shown that on Saturday, September 4, 1943—only sixteen days after the signing—Sonia, sitting in Oxford, supplied the Red Army Intelligence Center with an account of all the essential aspects of the Quebec Agreement, along with ancillary details, sending them directly to Moscow by radio.

The scene for this astonishing achievement was a cottage, 50a George Street in Oxford’s Summertown district, once occupied by the coachman serving a large house from which it was separated by a stone wall. Having taken her miniature high-tech radio transmitter from a cavity in the wall, in which it was normally hidden, Sonia, then thirty-six, was sitting at a table downstairs. It was late at night, and the obligatory blackout curtains, required to eliminate the smallest chink of light observable by a German bomber, ensured her total privacy. Laboriously, she had already converted the document she had surreptitiously acquired, letter by letter, into a code believed to be unbreakable. Having completed the encoding and rechecked it, she began to tap it out in Morse.

The high aerial she had strung up with the permission of the owner of the big house—ostensibly to service her large conventional radio set—ensured that her efforts reached Red Army intelligence, generally known as the GRU. There, her masters and Stalin himself quickly rated her coup as “of the greatest value” because “for the first time” the military and political leadership of the Soviet Union knew that the United States and Great Britain were creating an atomic military alliance and were going to hide it from its wartime ally. The GRU archives record, “On 19 August 1943, in a secret personal message to Marshal Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill reported about their agreed plans for the surrender of Italy and other matters but there was no word about the fact that they had also made an additional secret agreement about the use of nuclear weapons.”

What Stalin regarded as his allies’ perfidy inevitably affected his attitude when, on November 28, he met Churchill and Roosevelt in Tehran to discuss both the war and the postwar situation. The Western leaders were hoping to establish better relations with the Soviet dicta- tor, who, according to newspapers, had arrived in a “prickly, suspi- cious mood.” Historians may wonder to what extent his suspicion was fortified—and his later behavior conditioned—by deep resentment generated by his knowledge that his country had just been secretly excluded from a project likely to change the military parameters forever, as he already knew from his atomic spies. Did Stalin interpret his exclusion as the first icy gust of the cold war to come? To this day, Russian writers regard it as an inexcusable British-American “dirty trick” on a gallant ally that had absorbed the impact of the German savagery with tremendous losses.

In 2006, the release of the private papers of Vyacheslav Molotov, Stalin’s most trusted deputy, revealed that on October 15, 1943, a British spy had also supplied details of the early plans for Operation Overlord, the Anglo-American assault on Normandy. These, too, had been agreed upon at Quebec. Stalin’s array of British traitors, serving both the GRU and the other arm of Soviet intelligence, most commonly known as the KGB, had been instructed to seek out the secret results of the conference. One of them—described in a GRU report to Molotov as “our source of trusted credibility”—had quickly responded with plans and maps of landing beaches. They included the estimate that this “second front,” which should reduce German pressure on the Soviet forces, was unlikely to be attempted before the spring of 1944. Small wonder that Stalin was “prickly and suspicious” at Tehran.

There were potentially more dangerous consequences. Once the plans for Overlord were in Soviet hands, there was always the risk that they might leak to Germany, through a spy in the Kremlin, a defector, or a captured Russian general. In view of Stalin’s dream of a totally Communist Europe, there was even the possibility that if, by the spring of 1944, the German forces were in full retreat out of the Soviet Union, it might suit him to leak the plans deliberately.

Whether Sonia appreciated the scale of her achievement is unknown because she never mentioned it to anyone and, probably on Soviet orders, withheld it from her memoirs. Her son Michael Hamburger, with whom I am in regular contact, was astonished when I told him about it in 2003. That she experienced a glow of satisfaction cannot be doubted, because in the previous month, after managing to make an espionage assignment in London in a violent storm, she had received special praise from her Moscow chief in a message stating that if he had more Sonias, the war would be over much sooner. Her Quebec coup was extraordinary for another reason: She was so heavily pregnant that she gave birth only four days later. In a letter to her mother written on September 8, she announced the birth of her second son.

The GRU archives show that Sonia also included the fact that some senior Americans, both military and scientific, had reservations about any atomic partnership with Britain. So she had clearly been given a summary of all the atomic aspects of the Quebec Agreement, which had been circulated in secrecy in some British government department and abstracted by some high-level traitor.

How did this diminutive woman obtain this so secret document so soon? As Sonia was already the mother of two children, it is unlikely that she would have strayed far from her cottage so shortly before going into labor, especially as she had booked a private room in a nursing home nearby. It is also clear from her letters that she had not visited London since mid-August. While she had continued to shop locally and might have risked a short train journey, it is unlikely that she would have visited any distant hiding place to pick up a document concealed there, especially if it involved a bicycle ride. She had no automobile.

Because of rigid Soviet espionage rules and the risk of wartime letter censorship, such precious and sensitive information would not have been sent to her by mail. Nor, for security’s sake, was any additional courier likely to have been involved. So whoever gave her the details of the Quebec Agreement delivered them either to her home or to a nearby hiding place that Sonia monitored and emptied. It seems certain that the information was delivered to her in documentary form rather than verbally, because on September 4 she also transmitted a complete list of the fifteen British scientists who had already been selected to move to America.

Sonia’s historic achievement is tantalizing proof that she had some prime, high-level British source whose name has still been withheld by the Russian authorities. When her coup was made public in 2002, in a GRU-sponsored book, The GRU and the Atomic Bomb, GRU colonel general Alexander Pavlov, who vouched for its authenticity in a foreword, was at pains to point out that “the time has not yet arrived when still unsuspected or unproven wartime sources can safely be named.”

Had Churchill, a supreme patriot and the son of an American mother, ever known about this historic betrayal, his anger and amazement that any Briton could have behaved so treacherously, not only to his own country, but to the ally he had pressured into the agreement only through joint goodwill, may be imagined. The first hard evidence regarding the possible identity of the traitor who had purloined the information and somehow transferred it to Sonia surfaced almost exactly two years after the event—on September 5, 1945—in faraway Ottawa, so widely flung was the network of Soviet espionage.


From the Hardcover edition.
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Table of Contents

Introduction Admission xi

1 A Momentous Message 3

2 Duplicity Exposed 9

3 A Spy Called Elli 16

4 Inauspicious Start 23

5 Cosmopolitan Comrades 33

6 Strange Interlude 42

7 Someone for Tennis 50

8 Inside MI5 58

9 The Krivitsky "Coincidence" 67

10 Toxic Troika 77

11 Traitors to Order 84

12 In Charge of "Soviet Espionage" 93

13 Secrets by the Bagful 99

14 Enter Sonia 106

15 Another Insidious Immigrant 115

16 "Signing On" 124

17 Calling Moscow 131

18 An Enlightening Book 138

19 In The City 146

20 Flagrant "Divergence" 154

21 Two-Headed Colossus 160

22 Red Light from Green 170

23 A High-Level Culprit 176

24 Calamitous Clearance 183

25 An Enlightening Letter 188

26 First Atomic Spy? 193

27 Enormoz 198

28 The Strange Behavior of Roger Hollis 204

29 In a New World 214

30 A Mystery Resolved 223

31 Blind Eye to Elli 232

32 The Denigration of Igor Gouzenko 237

33 Long Shot Shot Down 244

34 Protective Perfidy 249

35 Back in Full Flood 258

36 Another Gru Defector 263

37 The Firs Fiasco 268

38 Australian Assignment 277

39 Betraying the Superbomb 283

40 A Brilliant Break 288

41 Confessions-of a Kind 295

42 Misleading the Attorney General 302

43 Misleading the Prime Minister 308

44 Alienating the Americans 314

45 Unhampered Escape 320

46 Volume of Deception 328

47 Hollis at Bay 337

48 Italian Fiasco 342

49 Another Volume of Deception 351

50 Betrayal Beyond Belief 359

51 Rigorous Scrutiny-For Some 365

52 Escape at the Double 369

53 A More Credible Scenario? 378

54 A List of Nine 386

55 Reluctant Riddance 394

56 Suspicious Aftermaths 400

57 Pamphlet of Deception 405

58 A Ruthless Defamation414

59 Master of Minimalism 424

60 A Warning from Hoover 430

61 Master of Disaster 437

62 Another Spy in MI6 444

63 The Penkovsky Problem 450

64 Another Enlightening Case 460

65 Another Naval Spy 465

66 The Strange Escape of an Archtraitor 471

67 "The Year that the Roof Fell in" 482

68 Portentous Liaison 489

69 The Fall of Supermac 495

70 Irish Interlude 504

71 A Sordid Deal 508

72 Playing The Royal Card 513

73 Still More Cover-Ups 521

74 Suspect Finish 530

75 Kid-Glove Showdown 538

76 Overdue Cull 549

77 A Crucial Call 553

78 Two Turncoats 564

79 Brush with the Police 572

80 Missing Link? 579

81 Sonia Resurgent 587

82 The Sanden Saga, Part 1 595

83 The Sanden Saga, Part 2 600

84 Censure Deferred 605

85 Conclusion 608

Acknowledgments 615

Appendix: The Scroll of Anomalies 617

Note on the Sources 623

Archival Sources 637

Bibliography 643

Index 651

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