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Contrary to what many believe, argues Kohn (A Reason for Everything: Natural Selection and the English Imagination), trust does not depend on favorable feelings toward others. For example, he points out that during World War I, agreements based on trust sometimes developed among enemy soldiers. These agreements, as well as trust in general, often depend on the efficacy of signaling, and Kohn discusses the evolutionary origins of this behavior. He explains how game theory has been influential in accounting for trust and offers an illuminating account of Robert Axelrod's work on Prisoner's Dilemma. People often trust those close to them rather than the community at large-for this, too, there is an evolutionary explanation-and Kohn considers how trust might be extended. Trust is involved when we rely not only on the behavior of others but also on their authority. In this wide-ranging book, he addresses religious, scientific, and political claims of authority, contrasting communist countries, which distrust the people, with liberal democracies, based on mistrust of the government. This excellent book is highly recommended for philosophy and social science collections.