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Goldie and Spicer's introductory chapter sets out the key themes of the ensuing chapters: surveying contemporary philosophical thinking about the emotions, and raising challenges to a number of prejudices that are sometimes brought to the topic from elsewhere in the philosophy of mind and moral philosophy. Brewer, Hutto, Goldie and Smith explore the conceptual and epistemological problems of other minds that the emotions raise, and how the emotions can be a source of knowledge of the world around us. The chapters by Stocker, Blackburn and Morton are broadly concerned with issues in morality: Stocker argues for the traditional Aristotelian view that emotions reveal value and are constitutive of value; Blackburn, from a more Augustinian perspective, argues that the virtuous person, like the rest of us, will be emotional but he or she will have the right emotions towards the right objects; Morton cautions against the idea of emotions and narrative as sources of self-understanding. An extensive bibliography completes the book.
Drawing together the arguments of leading contemporary philosophers, focusing on issues in the philosophy of mind, epistemology and moral philosophy, this book offers a wide and deep understanding of the emotions, and will be of interest across the philosophical spectrum to students and researchers of this fascinating and important topic.
|List of Contributors|
|2||Emotion and Other Minds||23|
|3||The World is not Enough: Shared Emotions and Other Minds||37|
|4||Beware Stories: Emotions and Virtues||55|
|5||Some Ways to Value Emotions||65|
|6||How Emotional is the Virtuous Person?||81|
|7||Emotion, Personality and Simulation||97|
|8||Keeping Emotions in Mind||111|