Contents: There are no ordinary things, Peter Unger; On that which is not, Samuel C. Wheeler; Nostalgia for the ordinary: comments on papers by Unger and Wheeler, David H. Sanford. Sorites, Bertil Rolf; An argument for the vagueness of 'vague', Roy A. Sorensen. Observational Predicates: On the coherence of the vague predicates, Crispin Wright; Phenomenal colors and sorites, C.L. Hardin; Are vague predicates incoherent?, Christopher Peacock. Degrees of Truth: Degrees of belief and degrees of truth, R.M. Sainsbury; Validity, uncertainty and vagueness, Dorothy Edgington. Epistemicism: The sorites paradox, Richmond Campbell; What makes it a heap?, Timothy Williamson; Hat-tricks and heaps, W.D. Hart. Higher-Order Vagueness: Is there a higher-order vagueness?, R.M. Sainsbury; Is higher-order vagueness coherent?, Crispin Wright; Wright and Sainsbury on higher-order vagueness, Dorothy Edgington; A note on the logic of (higher-order) vagueness, Richard G. Heck Jr; On the structure of higher-order vagueness, Timothy Williamson; Why higher-order vagueness is a pseudo-problem, Dominic Hyde; Why the vague need not be higher-order vague, Michael Tye. Contextualism: The paradox of the heap, Hans Kamp; The liar and sorites paradoxes: toward a unified treatment, Jamie Tappenden; Vagueness without paradox, Diana Raffman. Intuitionism: Vagueness and alternative logic, Hilary Putnam; Hairier than Putnam thought, Stephen Read and Crispin Wright; A quick read is a wrong Wright, Hilary Putnam; Putnam on the sorites paradox, Timothy Williamson; Index.
Vaguenessby Timothy Williamson, Delia Graff
Pub. Date: 11/01/2002
Publisher: Ashgate Publishing, Limited
Vagueness provides the first comprehensive examination of a topic of increasing importance in metaphysics and the philosophy of logic and language. Timothy Williamson traces the history of this philosophical problem from discussions of the heap paradox in classical Greece to modern formal approaches such as fuzzy logic. He illustrates the problems with views which have taken the position that standard logic and formal semantics do not apply to vague language, and defends the controversial realistic view that vagueness is a kind of ignorance--that there really is a grain of sand whose removal turns a heap into a non-heap, but we cannot know which one it is.
- Ashgate Publishing, Limited
- Publication date:
- The International Research Library of Philosophy Series
- Product dimensions:
- 6.89(w) x 9.84(h) x 1.77(d)
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