★ 02/27/2017 In this balanced and timely work, Sunday Times foreign editor Conradi (The Great Survivors) charts the complex and turbulent course of U.S.-Russia relations since the collapse of the U.S.S.R., and investigates how the end of the Cold War failed to result in either conciliation or superpower cooperation. Working from exclusive interviews with principal players and assorted other sources, Conradi details how occasional moments of tentative cooperation—arms control deals, post-9/11 collaboration, the Iran nuclear deal—have masked a relationship fraught with tension, fundamentally different perspectives, and mutual misunderstandings. Russia’s primary sources of concern include NATO’s “relentless march eastward,” the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, perceived American political malfeasance in former Soviet territories, and Washington’s insistence on a U.S.-centered unipolar world order that ignores Russia’s desire to be treated respectfully and “as an equal.” Such factors, Conradi argues, contributed to Russia’s “sense of humiliation and encirclement.” The U.S. has taken issue with Russian President Putin’s growing domestic authoritarianism and “newfound assertiveness” abroad: intervention in Georgia, support for separatists in Ukraine, the annexation of Crimea, and a role in the Syrian Civil War. Conradi blends these developments into a smooth narrative that provides welcome context for Russia’s recent revanchist behavior and insight into prospects for ongoing U.S.-Russian relations. Agent: Andrew Nurnberg, Andrew Nurnberg Associates (U.K.). (Apr.)
‘Clear, thought-provoking, disturbing. Anyone who wants to understand the rise of Vladimir Putin and the resurgence of Russian nationalism should read Peter Conradi’s impeccably researched and impressive book.’
‘Manages to tell a complex story...with a much-needed sense of balance. The author’s skill in seamlessly linking historical events to present-day international relations makes this book an insightful and rewarding read.’
‘Elegantly written, informed...provides many valuable insights into our times.’
‘Fast-moving and utterly compelling and spans the decades revealingly.’
‘Engrossing.’
‘Profoundly important.’
‘Nuanced yet fast-paced, this is the essential guide to our rocky relationship with a country we ignored at our peril. Russia is back at the top of the news: and this book couldn’t be more timely.’
‘How the world careened from one cold war into another with a friendly but all too brief pit stop between them is the subject of this quite wonderful book. Bringing to bear his seven years as a Moscow correspondent, and a gift for clear, sparkling prose, Peter Conradi’s spirited, well-informed narrative brings to life the ups and downs, colourful characters, and turning points that didn’t turn along the way.’
‘The West has always struggled to comprehend the byzantine workings of Russia, not just during the Cold War but even more so in the post-communist era. This important book presents a crucial analysis of the rise of Putin and our continuing inability to read him. Few people are as well placed as Peter Conradi, who witnessed the collapse of Communist Russia 25 years ago first hand as a Moscow correspondent, to present such an important and revealing study as we approach the 100th anniversary of the Russian Revolution. This is a book to which we all need to pay attention.’
‘Peter Conradi is a cool-headed and even-handed guide to the past 25 years of Western-Russian relations...It is refreshing to read so well-written and dispassionate an account.’
‘A timely account of the diplomatic history of what increasingly looks like a new Cold War... Nervous Europeans might like to send Conradi’s book to the White House.’
‘Skilfully constructed.’
‘Authoritative and readable.’
‘As NATO and the West come to terms with a Russia which, in the words of Dmitri Trenin, Director of the Moscow Carnegie Centre, believes it has been at war with the West since 2014, the risks of miscalculation and the potential for catastrophe have not been higher since the end of the Cold War. Who Lost Russia? lays out, with startling clarity and precision, the steps that have led us to the present situation. Understanding is the pre-requisite for the development of strategy. This book provides that essential understanding and should be compulsory reading for our political leadership, and the policymakers who support them, together with the general reader.’
General Sir Richard Shirreff
‘Conradi wisely examines the forest’s contours, avoiding the trees. He writes engagingly and enlivens his smart, balanced analysis with colorful anecdotes.’
New York Times Book Review
‘Seamlessly written...it is fascinating to read the author’s summary of Russia’s actions in Syria in the context of recent events.’
'Essential reading.'
‘To understand what went wrong in Russia over the last few decades and the impact it has had on the world, one can’t find a better guide than this well researched and argued book – a must read for anyone interested in the future of Europe and the world as a whole.’
‘Peter Conradi offers readers an objective and well-informed account of the period from 1989–2022. This is a work of history, insightful geopolitical analysis, and a compelling narrative supported by revealing anecdotes and first-person interviews.’
‘Fast-paced, comprehensive, solidly researched and, most importantly, essential reading for anyone who wants to understand one of the great crises of our times...uncannily up-to-the-minute...this book couldn’t be better timed.’
Literary Review Owen Matthews
‘Peter Conradi takes a calm, considered look at developments in East–West relations that threaten to divide the world. In an era of inflamed partisan debate, he provides the historical context vital for a rational assessment of where we stand and where we are headed.’
‘Authoritative and readable.’
‘A timely account of the diplomatic history of what increasingly looks like a new Cold War... Nervous Europeans might like to send Conradi’s book to the White House.’
‘Seamlessly written...it is fascinating to read the author’s summary of Russia’s actions in Syria in the context of recent events.’
"A systematic account of Russia's emergence from the wreckage of the Soviet Union with a renewed sense of authoritarian mission.There isn't really anybody to blame for "losing" Russia except for "its own creators." In this painstaking account, Sunday Times foreign editor Conradi (The Great Survivors: How Monarchy Made It into the Twenty-First Century, 2012, etc.) meticulously lays out the record, from Mikhail Gorbachev to Vladimir Putin. The author emphasizes that with the fall of the Soviet Union, the Russians were more preoccupied with their own economic viability than with political woesa fair assessment considering the sudden collapse of price controls in the early 1990s and rise of hyperinflation. As privatization was carried out painfully in Russia under Boris Yeltsin, the West did not lend its aid in a gushing "new Marshall Plan." The minority countries formerly behind the Iron Curtain moved for independence, prompting military action in 1994 against Chechnya and a conflicted reaction by the Russian people and consternation by the Bill Clinton administration. The enlargement of NATO delighted the U.S. but alarmed the Russians, while the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia and loss of Ukraine compounded Russia's isolation. Conradi notes that all Russia needed, at the end of Yeltsin's regime, was "a figure able to harness this sense of grievance and thirst for revenge," and Yeltsin handpicked his successor in former KGB officer Putin in late 1999. After assuming power, Putin gradually slid into old Soviet-style authoritarianisme.g., the arrest and Siberian exile of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, head of the oil giant Yukos; the Russian storming of the school taken hostage in Beslan, North Ossetia, in September 2004; and the resistance to the detaching of Ukraine from Russia's orbit and invasion of Crimea in 2014, among other developments. Despite the "reset" button pushed by President Barack Obama and his Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Putin has continued to show a desire to re-create the lost Soviet empire. A cold-eyed examination of recent Russian history that seems to show that there was never a solid plan to integrate Russia into the West." Kirkus Reviews "In this balanced and timely work, Sunday Times foreign editor Conradi ( The Great Survivors ) charts the complex and turbulent course of U.S.-Russia relations since the collapse of the U.S.S.R., and investigates how the end of the Cold War failed to result in either conciliation or superpower cooperation. Working from exclusive interviews with principal players and assorted other sources, Conradi details how occasional moments of tentative cooperationarms control deals, post-9/11 collaboration, the Iran nuclear dealhave masked a relationship fraught with tension, fundamentally different perspectives, and mutual misunderstandings. Russia’s primary sources of concern include NATO’s “relentless march eastward,” the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, perceived American political malfeasance in former Soviet territories, and Washington’s insistence on a U.S.-centered unipolar world order that ignores Russia’s desire to be treated respectfully and “as an equal.” Such factors, Conradi argues, contributed to Russia’s “sense of humiliation and encirclement.” The U.S. has taken issue with Russian President Putin’s growing domestic authoritarianism and “newfound assertiveness” abroad: intervention in Georgia, support for separatists in Ukraine, the annexation of Crimea, and a role in the Syrian Civil War. Conradi blends these developments into a smooth narrative that provides welcome context for Russia’s recent revanchist behavior and insight into prospects for ongoing U.S.-Russian relations. " ★ Publishers Weeky, Starred Review
04/01/2017 Journalist Conradi (foreign editor, Sunday Times) has authored a fine narrative of postcommunist Russia's relations with the United States and Europe. Its subtitle implies comparisons with relations to the former Soviet Union, and surely they emerge. The geography of conflict still includes NATO, the Middle East, and Yugoslavia's successors. Russian President Vladimir Putin's foreign policy decisions seem no less challenged than those of Joseph Stalin, and Putin's legitimizing doctrine of "Eurasianism" packs the same anti-Western punch as communism once did. Conversely, the former organizing role of nuclear deterrence has diminished. The practice of summitry languishes, as successive U.S. administrations find thwarted initial attempts at better communications with the Kremlin. However, Conradi does not spare criticism of Western policy. Some readers might dispute his assertion that the "main reason" for Russia's Crimean annexation emerged from "fear" that NATO would expel Russia's Black Sea Fleet from Sevastopol should Ukraine join the alliance. VERDICT While a balanced, detailed, and workman-like account of international politics over the last quarter century, this book is unlikely to be the last word on "the new cold war."—Zachary Irwin, Behrend Coll., Pennsylvania State Erie
2017-02-02 A systematic account of Russia's emergence from the wreckage of the Soviet Union with a renewed sense of authoritarian mission.There isn't really anybody to blame for "losing" Russia except for "its own creators." In this painstaking account, Sunday Times foreign editor Conradi (The Great Survivors: How Monarchy Made It into the Twenty-First Century, 2012, etc.) meticulously lays out the record, from Mikhail Gorbachev to Vladimir Putin. The author emphasizes that with the fall of the Soviet Union, the Russians were more preoccupied with their own economic viability than with political woes—a fair assessment considering the sudden collapse of price controls in the early 1990s and rise of hyperinflation. As privatization was carried out painfully in Russia under Boris Yeltsin, the West did not lend its aid in a gushing "new Marshall Plan." The minority countries formerly behind the Iron Curtain moved for independence, prompting military action in 1994 against Chechnya and a conflicted reaction by the Russian people and consternation by the Bill Clinton administration. The enlargement of NATO delighted the U.S. but alarmed the Russians, while the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia and loss of Ukraine compounded Russia's isolation. Conradi notes that all Russia needed, at the end of Yeltsin's regime, was "a figure able to harness this sense of grievance and thirst for revenge," and Yeltsin handpicked his successor in former KGB officer Putin in late 1999. After assuming power, Putin gradually slid into old Soviet-style authoritarianism—e.g., the arrest and Siberian exile of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, head of the oil giant Yukos; the Russian storming of the school taken hostage in Beslan, North Ossetia, in September 2004; and the resistance to the detaching of Ukraine from Russia's orbit and invasion of Crimea in 2014, among other developments. Despite the "reset" button pushed by President Barack Obama and his Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Putin has continued to show a desire to re-create the lost Soviet empire. A cold-eyed examination of recent Russian history that seems to show that there was never a solid plan to integrate Russia into the West.