Transcendental-phenomenological reflections move us to consider paradoxes of the “transcendental person”. For example, we contend with the unpresentability in the transcendental first-person of our beginning or ending and the undeniable evidence for the beginning and ending of persons in our third-person experience. The basic distinction between oneself as non-sortal and as a person pervaded by properties serves as a hinge for reflecting on “the afterlife”. This transcendental-phenomenological ontology of necessity deals with some themes of the philosophy of religion.
Transcendental-phenomenological reflections move us to consider paradoxes of the “transcendental person”. For example, we contend with the unpresentability in the transcendental first-person of our beginning or ending and the undeniable evidence for the beginning and ending of persons in our third-person experience. The basic distinction between oneself as non-sortal and as a person pervaded by properties serves as a hinge for reflecting on “the afterlife”. This transcendental-phenomenological ontology of necessity deals with some themes of the philosophy of religion.

Who One Is: Book 1: Meontology of the "I": A Transcendental Phenomenology
566
Who One Is: Book 1: Meontology of the "I": A Transcendental Phenomenology
566Paperback(Softcover reprint of hardcover 1st ed. 2009)
Product Details
ISBN-13: | 9789048179909 |
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Publisher: | Springer Netherlands |
Publication date: | 12/14/2010 |
Series: | Phaenomenologica , #189 |
Edition description: | Softcover reprint of hardcover 1st ed. 2009 |
Pages: | 566 |
Product dimensions: | 6.10(w) x 9.25(h) x 0.36(d) |