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Overview
This seventh volume in the epic, multivolume biography of Winston S. Churchill takes up the story of “Churchill’s War” with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and carries it on to the triumph of V-E Day, May 8, 1945, the end of the war in Europe.
Acclaimed historian Martin Gilbert charts Churchill’s course through the storms of Anglo-American and Anglo-Soviet rivalry, and between the conflicting ambitions of other forces embattled against the common enemy: between General de Gaulle, his compatriots in France, and the French Empire; between Tito and other Yugoslav leaders; between the Greek Communists and monarchists; between the Polish government exiled in London and the Soviet-controlled “Lublin” Poles.
Amid all these volatile concerns, Churchill had to find the path of prudence, of British national interest, and, above all, of the earliest possible victory over Nazism. In doing so he was guided by the most secret sources of British Intelligence: the daily interception of the messages of the German High Command. These pages reveal, as never before, the links between this secret information and the resulting moves and successes achieved by the Allies.
“A milestone, a monument, a magisterial achievement . . . rightly regarded as the most comprehensive life ever written of any age.” —Andrew Roberts, historian and author of The Storm of War
“The most scholarly study of Churchill in war and peace ever written.” —Herbert Mitgang, The New York Times
Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9780795344664 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | RosettaBooks |
| Publication date: | 09/01/2018 |
| Series: | Winston S. Churchill Biography , #7 |
| Sold by: | Barnes & Noble |
| Format: | eBook |
| Pages: | 1369 |
| Sales rank: | 33,402 |
| File size: | 6 MB |
About the Author
During forty-eight years of research and writing, Sir Martin published eighty books, including The First World War, The Second World War, and a three-volume History of the Twentieth Century. He also wrote, as part of his series of ten historical atlases, Atlas of the First World War, and, most recently, Atlas of the Second World War.
Sir Martin’s film and television work included a documentary series on the life of Winston Churchill. His other published works include Churchill: A Photographic Portrait, In Search of Churchill, Churchill and America, and the single volume Churchill: A Life.
Read an Excerpt
CHAPTER 1
'Extraordinary Changes'
Immediately he heard of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour on 7 December 1941, Churchill made plans to travel to Washington to see President Roosevelt. His intention was to leave London on December 10, embarking at the Clyde on the following morning. The fullest cypher staff should be taken, he minuted to the head of his Defence Office, General Ismay, on December 8, adding that arrangements should be made 'for keeping informed both ends, especially in regard to Libyan telegrams'.
These Libyan telegrams, sent daily from General Auchinleck, told of the continuing success of the Western Desert offensive, codename 'Crusader', which had been launched on November 18, and was intended not only to drive the German and Italian forces from Libya, but also, by forcing the Germans to keep an embattled military force in the Western Desert, to offer the Red Army a measure of relief on the eastern front. 'Last night Tobruk garrison advanced westward and made good progress,' Auchinleck telegraphed to Churchill on December 8.
During December 8 Churchill also telephoned Anthony Eden, who was then in Scotland on his way to Russia, to propose that Eden should continue to Russia, while he, Churchill, set off across the Atlantic. 'I demurred,' Eden later recalled, 'saying that I did not see how we could both be away at once. He said we could. The emphasis of the war had shifted, what now mattered was the intentions of our two great allies. We must each go to one of them.'
Eden sought to dissuade Churchill from leaving so soon. 'I still rather wish,' he telegraphed on December 9, 'that you could postpone a fortnight till my return.' But at the War Cabinet on December 8, Churchill had obtained his colleagues' approval for his visit to Roosevelt, and he at once wrote to the King, explaining that 'The whole plan of Anglo-American defence and attack has to be concerted in the light of reality. We have also to be careful,' Churchill added, 'that our share of munitions and other aid which we are receiving from the United States does not suffer more than is, I fear, inevitable.'
In a telegram to Roosevelt on December 9, Churchill explained the purpose of his proposed visit: to review 'the whole war plan', and to discuss the problems of production and distribution, problems which were causing him 'concern', and which he felt 'can best be settled on the highest executive level'. For this reason, he would take Lord Beaverbrook with him: Beaverbrook who, as Minister of Supply, was aware of the weaknesses in America's existing production schedules. Churchill ended his telegram to Roosevelt: 'It would also be a very great pleasure to me to meet you again, and the sooner the better.'
In response to Churchill's suggestion, Roosevelt told the British Ambassador to Washington, Lord Halifax, that 'on security grounds' as regards Churchill's return voyage, he did not 'at all like the idea' of Churchill's visit. He would prefer a meeting in Bermuda, 'which would be secret' and would 'save' Churchill's time. The first possible date for a meeting, Roosevelt added, would be January 7. 'We do not think there is any serious danger about the return journey,' Churchill replied. 'There is however great danger in our not having a full discussion on the highest level about the extreme gravity of the naval position, as well as upon all the production and allocation issues involved.' He had hoped, Churchill added, 'to start tomorrow night', but would now postpone his sailing until he received details of the rendezvous from Roosevelt. 'I never felt so sure about final victory,' Churchill added, 'but only concerted action will achieve it.'
Further messages from Roosevelt fixed the date of their meeting for just before Christmas, and in Washington as Churchill had wished. Before leaving, he opposed a suggestion at the War Cabinet that Britain should urge Stalin to declare war on Japan. In view of 'the enormous service' which Russia was giving 'by hammering the German Army on her Western front', he told his colleagues on December 10, he did not wish to ask Russia to declare war on Japan: to do so, he explained, 'would make it impossible for Russia to bring divisions from Siberia which might be of incalculable value on her western front'. Churchill also pointed out that, as a result of Japan's attack on British possessions in the Far East, 'he could not now offer the Russians' the ten squadrons of aircraft promised for their southern front. In view of the 'evident strong wish of the United States, China and I expect Australia', Churchill told Eden, 'that Russia should come in against Japan, you should not do anything to discourage a favourable movement if Stalin feels strong enough to do so'. 'All I meant,' Churchill went on to explain, 'was that we should not put undue pressure upon him considering how little we have been able to contribute.'
The telegrams from Auchinleck continued to bring Churchill encouraging news. 'Consider tide turned' was the message on December 9. This was followed by a second telegram that day, from Advanced Headquarters, Eighth Army: 'We made good progress yesterday, though enemy is still fighting stubborn delaying action.' On December 10 Auchinleck informed Churchill: 'Enemy is apparently in full retreat but his remaining tanks are still covering his withdrawal. El Adem is in our hands; South African and Indian troops joined hands with British troops from Tobruk, and I think it is now permissible to claim that siege of Tobruk has been raised.' On December 11 Auchinleck telegraphed in triumph: 'We are pressing our pursuit vigorously.'
On December 11 Germany and Italy declared war on the United States. By this declaration, Hitler and Mussolini brought the United States into the war in Europe. On the Moscow front, the Red Army had halted the German advance. In North Africa, British troops continued to drive the Germans and Italians westward across the Libyan desert. During December 11 Churchill gave the House of Commons a survey of the war, broadcast that same night, and using, as he later wrote, 'the coldest form of factual narration'. Of the slow progress of General Auchinleck's advance in the western desert since November 18, Churchill commented: 'Victory is traditionally elusive. Accidents happen. Mistakes are made. Sometimes right things turn out wrong and wrong things turn out right. War is very difficult, especially to those who are taking part in it or conducting it.'
Churchill was confident, however, that Auchinleck would, in the end, destroy the entire German and Italian armed forces in Cyrenaica, as he had set out to do, sustained, as he was, by 'an absolutely unrelenting spirit of the offensive', not only in his generals, 'but in the troops and in every man'.
At sea, the loss of British merchant shipping had been substantially reduced, and a 'great recovery' was in progress in Britain's shipping capacity. 'These,' Churchill said, 'are the foundations upon which we live and carry forward our cause.' In the east, there had been a 'striking change'. Moscow, Leningrad and the oilfields of Baku had all remained under Soviet control, as the Russian armies had resisted the onslaught with 'glorious steadfastness and energy', halted the German advance, and forced the German armies back, 'inspired by the feeling of advance after long retreat and of vengeance after monstrous injury'.
A week earlier, Churchill pointed out, 'the three great spheres' of Libya, the Atlantic and Russia 'would almost have covered the scene of war with which we were concerned'. Since then, Japan had attacked Britain and the United States. 'I know that I speak for the United States as well as for Britain,' he continued, 'when I say that we would all rather perish than be conquered. And on this basis, putting it at its worst, there are quite a lot of us to be killed.'
The widening of the war, so frightening a prospect for those countries not previously closely engaged in it, such as Australia, was for Churchill a miracle of deliverance from more than two years of British isolation, weakness, and omnipresent danger of defeat. The accession of the United States as a 'full war partner', he telegraphed to John Curtin, the Prime Minister of Australia, on December 12, 'makes amends for all and makes the end certain'. 'We have no longer any need to strike attitudes to win United States' sympathy,' he wrote to Attlee that same day, in opposing a reduction in food rations in Britain, 'we are all in it together, and they are eating better meals than we are.' To reduce the ration at such a moment 'would savour of panic'. Britain's position had 'immeasurably improved' by the 'full involvement' of the United States.
American preoccupation with Japan would also clearly affect the promised supplies to Russia: indeed, in the immediate aftermath of Pearl Harbour, all such supplies had been halted. 'I hope to loosen this up,' Churchill had informed Eden on the eve of his departure, adding: 'Am just off.' 'God speed to your journey from us all,' was Eden's message from Murmansk.
Churchill left London by night train on the evening of December 12, accompanied by Lord Beaverbrook. Churchill asked his daughter Mary, a Lance Bombardier in the ATS, to travel north with him. Also on the train was Kathleen Hill, Churchill's secretary and stenographer for the previous five years.
As Churchill travelled, he worked his way through his boxes, dictating to Mrs Hill, and contemplating many different aspects of the war. Commenting on a note from his Parliamentary Private Secretary, Colonel Harvie-Watt, that his broadcast was thought by Members of Parliament to have been 'ill-advised', as he had appeared 'very tired', Churchill replied: 'Yes. Well, who forces me? & why am I not allowed a gramophone record of a statement in the House?': a reference to Parliament's refusal, since he had become Prime Minister in May 1940, to allow his House of Commons speeches to be recorded and then re- broadcast. Replying to a suggestion from the Viceroy of India that negotiations should be opened with the Indian nationalists, on the basis of their demands for 'real power', Churchill minuted: 'Personally, I would rather accord India independence than that we should have to keep an army there to hold down the fighting races for the benefit of the Hindu priesthood and caucus.'
Churchill's principal thoughts during the journey were, however, on the question of future war strategy, and on how most effectively to involve the United States in the Mediterranean and European war. In a minute to Sir Dudley Pound, who was in an adjoining compartment, Churchill expressed his hopes for an American military landing at Casablanca, to 'decide the action of French North Africa', and detach it from Vichy France. To his friend, Field Marshal Smuts, the Prime Minister of South Africa, Churchill wrote of his hopes to 'procure' assistance from Roosevelt for a 'forward policy' in French North Africa, and also in West Africa, but, he cautioned Smuts, 'they may well be too much preoccupied with the war with Japan'.
The war with Japan was also a feature of Churchill's own changing perspective. On December 11 he had asked the Chiefs of Staff Committee if the 18th Division, then rounding the Cape on its way to the Middle East, could be diverted to Burma. The Chiefs of Staff agreed to this, subject to the necessary recommendation of the Joint Planning Staff. Two days later, on December 12, Churchill informed General Auchinleck that the 18th Division would be diverted to Bombay, required there 'by grievous need of strengthening long-starved India and enabling a stronger resistance to be made to Japanese advance against Burma and down Malay peninsula'. Meanwhile, Auchinleck's command was to be extended eastwards to include Iraq and Persia 'thus giving local unity of command', Churchill explained, 'in event of Turkish and Caucasus danger reviving'. General Wavell, who had formerly covered these areas from India, 'must now look east', and would be given command of the Burma front. In addition to the 18th Division, Wavell would receive the four fighter squadrons which were also rounding the Cape, intended for the Caucasus.
'I am glad things are going well in your grand campaign,' Churchill ended. 'Try increasingly to mention names of regiments about which enemy is already informed. It gives so much satisfaction here.'
In a telegram to Wavell, announcing the reinforcements which were on their way to him, Churchill noted that the Russian victories and Auchinleck's Libyan advance 'have for the time being relieved danger of German irruption into Syrian-Iraq-Persian theatre'. Wavell should 'marry' the new forces at his disposal as he thought best and 'work them into the Eastern fighting front to the highest advantage'.
Churchill's train reached Gourock, on the Clyde, on the morning of December 13. In a telephone call from Gourock, Churchill warned General Ismay 'in the strongest terms', as Ismay reported to the Chiefs of Staff Committee that morning, of the need to send towards the Far East, as fast as it could be done, 'everything that was fit for the battle', including if possible 'at least' six squadrons of bombers. There was however, Churchill added, 'no question' of taking anything away from Auchinleck's advance 'until the victory had been won'.
From Gourock, Churchill was taken by boat to the Duke of York, sister ship of the Prince of Wales which had been sunk off Malaya three days earlier. 'Every day on board,' wrote Colonel Jacob, 'brings home the bitterness of that blow.'
Churchill dictated his messages while on board the battleship to Patrick Kinna, who had accompanied him on the first visit to Roosevelt in August. In these messages, Churchill reiterated his confidence in the outcome of the war. 'Entry of the United States as a full partner seems to me decisive on final result,' he telegraphed on December 14 to Alfred Duff Cooper, Britain's Minister resident in Singapore. Churchill also told Duff Cooper that the 18th Division, 'now rounding Cape', as well as four fighter squadrons and some anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns, were being diverted from Egypt to the Far East. As to the air re-inforcements for which Duff Cooper had asked, 'Libyan battle goes well,' Churchill pointed out, 'but till we have a definite decision I cannot withdraw anything from there.' Arrangements were being made however, he added, 'to transfer four to six Bomber Squadrons to your theatre at earliest possible moment thereafter'.
On the following day, Churchill turned his attention to the future of Singapore itself. 'Beware,' he minuted for the Chiefs of Staff Committee on December 15, 'lest troops required for ultimate defence Singapore Island and fortress are not used up or cut off in Malay peninsula. Nothing compares in importance with the fortress,' and he went on to ask: 'Are you sure we shall have enough troops for the prolonged defence?' The Chiefs of Staff might consider, Churchill wrote, moving the 9th Australian Division from Palestine to Singapore, and he ended his minute: 'Report action.'
While on board ship, and amid violent gales, Churchill learned of the continuing success of the Russian counter-attacks launched at Tula on December 1, at Taganrog on December 2 and at Tikhvin on December 8. 'It is impossible,' Churchill telegraphed to Stalin, 'to describe the relief with which I have heard each successive day of the wonderful victories on the Russian front. I never felt so sure of the outcome of the war.' Eden delivered this message to Stalin in Moscow, reporting to Churchill on December 17: 'I am sure that he is entirely with us against Hitler.' Eden added that Stalin 'was much pleased with your message'.
In the Far East, Japanese forces were pressing down the Malay Peninsula, invading Penang on December 17, and seizing intact a large number of small craft which were soon to enable a series of Japanese amphibian attacks further down the coast. 'The House is very depressed about Malaya,' Harold Nicolson noted that day, 'and fears that Singapore may fall. The Tories are angry with Winston, and are in fact in a bad mood.' Events in the Far East, Clement Attlee wrote to Churchill three days later, 'have rather disturbed public, press and MPs, most of whom seem to have been oblivious of danger of which we have been conscious for months'.
The Far East situation worsened daily. On December 17 Japanese forces had landed in North Borneo, Dutch forces having previously withdrawn, destroying the oil-fields as they left. On the night of December 18 Japanese forces on the Chinese mainland effected a landing on the island of Hong Kong. In Malaya, isolated British units, sent to defend the northern regions of the Peninsula, were forced into retreat. On December 17 Duff Cooper had telegraphed to Churchill from Singapore 'we cannot hope to hold the greater part of Malaya', and he added: 'We cannot afford to fritter away our small resources.' The 'greatest danger', Duff Cooper warned, 'is that of our force being exhausted in a series of separate campaigns, e.g. the command reserve is already engaged in the North West'.
(Continues…)
Excerpted from "Winston S. Churchill Volume VII Road To Victory 1941–1945"
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Table of Contents
Illustrations,
Maps,
Preface,
Acknowledgements to the New Edition,
1 'EXTRAORDINARY CHANGES',
2 THREE WEEKS IN THE NEW WORLD,
3 THE FALL OF SINGAPORE,
4 'NOTHING BUT DISASTER TO SHOW',
5 TOWARDS A SECOND FRONT,
6 'WE SHALL DRIVE ON TO THE END',
7 WAR ON MANY FRONTS,
8 JUNE 1942, RETURN TO WASHINGTON,
9 'TORCH': 'A TURNING POINT IN THE WHOLE WAR',
10 CAIRO, AUGUST 1942: 'SINGLENESS OF AIM',
11 MOSCOW, AUGUST 1942: 'THE OGRE IN HIS DEN',
12 RETURN TO CAIRO,
13 FIGHTING FOR 'TORCH',
14 'TIES OF ... SELF PRESERVATION',
15 TOWARDS ALAMEIN AND BEYOND,
16 PLANNING FOR 1943,
17 THE TUNISIAN DISAPPOINTMENT,
18 JANUARY 1943: CASABLANCA,
19 '... IT WOULDN'T BE A BAD MOMENT TO LEAVE',
20 TEMPORARY SETBACKS,
21 TUNISIA, 'THE HUNT IS ON',
22 VICTORY IN THE GULF OF TUNIS,
23 WASHINGTON, MAY 1943: THE SEARCH FOR THE WAY FORWARD,
24 'TRIDENT' IN AFRICA,
25 STALIN'S DISAPPOINTMENT,
26 'WE ALL GO THE SAME WAY HOME',
27 FROM SICILY TO ITALY,
28 AUGUST 1943: THE QUEBEC CONFERENCE,
29 THE WAR IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, 'IMPROVISE AND DARE',
30 SEPTEMBER 1943, RETURNING HOME,
31 RHODES, 'AN IMMENSE BUT FLEETING OPPORTUNITY',
32 THE CHANNEL VERSUS THE MEDITERRANEAN,
33 PRELUDE TO TEHERAN,
34 THE TEHERAN CONFERENCE: 'IMPENDING DOOM FOR GERMANY',
35 'STRANDED AMID THE RUINS OF CARTHAGE',
36 PLANS FOR ANZIO,
37 CONVALESCENCE AT MARRAKESH: 'FULL STEAM AHEAD',
38 ANZIO: 'THE HUN IS STILL VERY TOUGH',
39 THE POLISH AND ITALIAN STALEMATES,
40 'THE WAR WEIGHS VERY HEAVY ON US ALL',
41 APRIL 1944: A MULTITUDE OF PROBLEMS,
42 'EVENTS WHICH NO ONE COULD FORETELL',
43 'OVERLORD' AND BEYOND,
44 'THE FIRST MAJOR STRATEGIC AND POLITICAL ERROR',
45 'HEAVY BURDENS',
46 JULY 1944: DANGEROUS TIMES,
47 AUGUST 1944; 'THESE THORNY MATTERS',
48 ITALIAN JOURNEY,
49 THE WARTIME UPRISING, 'A BLACK CLOUD',
50 PREPARING FOR QUEBEC,
51 QUEBEC, SEPTEMBER 1944,
52 BETWEEN QUEBEC AND MOSCOW,
53 MOSCOW, OCTOBER 1944: 'POWERLESS IN THE FACE OF RUSSIA',
54 'HUNTER WITH BOW AGAINST A BEAR',
55 THE AFTERMATH OF 'TOLSTOY',
56 'MY RELATIONS WITH STALIN ARE SO GOOD ...',
57 DECEMBER 1944: DISPUTES OVER GREECE, ITALY, POLAND ...,
58 CHRISTMAS 1944: ATHENS AMID GUNFIRE,
59 1945: 'THIS "NEW, DISGUSTING YEAR" ...',
60 MALTESE PRELUDE,
61 YALTA: 'THE ONLY BOND OF THE VICTORS IS THEIR COMMON HATE',
62 YALTA: 'THE WEIGHT OF RESPONSIBILITY',
63 'THE SHADOWS OF VICTORY',
64 YALTA BETRAYED,
65 WORSENING RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA,
66 'AN ENVIABLE DEATH',
67 'INTENSE HORROR',
68 'BENEATH THESE TRIUMPHS',
69 VE DAY,
Maps,
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