The World As Will And Idea

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Overview

General Books publication date: 2009
Original publication date: 1888
Original Publisher: Ticknor Subjects: Philosophy / General

Philosophy / Epistemology

Philosophy / History

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The world as will and idea

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Overview

General Books publication date: 2009
Original publication date: 1888
Original Publisher: Ticknor Subjects: Philosophy / General

Philosophy / Epistemology

Philosophy / History

Read More Show Less

Product Details

  • ISBN-13: 9781425494599
  • Publisher: Kessinger Publishing Company
  • Publication date: 5/5/2006
  • Pages: 516
  • Product dimensions: 6.00 (w) x 9.00 (h) x 1.15 (d)

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48 ) CHAPTER XXIV. ON MATTER. Matter has already been spoken of in the fourth chapter of the supplements to the first book, when we were considering the part of our knowledge of which we are conscious a priori. But it could only be considered there from a one-sided point of view, because we were then concerned merely with its relation to the forms of our intellect, and not to the thing in itself, and therefore we investigated it only from the subjective side, i.e., so far as it is an idea, and not from the objective side, i.e., with regard to what it may be in itself. In the first respect, our conclusion was that it is objective activity in general, yet conceived without fuller determination; therefore it takes the place of causality in the table of our a priori knowledge which is given there. For what is material is that which acts (the actual) in general, and regarded apart from the specific nature of its action. Hence also matter, merely as such, is not an object of perception, but only of thought, and thus is really au abstraction. It only comes into perception in connection with form and quality, as a body, i.e., as a fully determined kind of activity. It is only by abstracting from this fuller determination that we think of matter as such, i.e., separated from form and quality; consequently under matter we think of acting absolutely and in general, thus of activity in the abstract. The more fully determined acting we then conceive as the accident of matter; but only by means of this does matter become preceptible, i.e., present itself as a body and an object of experience. Pure matter, on the other hand, which, as I have shown in the Criticism of the Kantian Philosophy, aloneconstitutes the true and admissible content of the conception of substance, is causality...
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