ISBN-10:
1598295268
ISBN-13:
9781598295269
Pub. Date:
06/28/1905
Publisher:
Morgan and Claypool Publishers
A Concise Introduction to Multiagent Systems and Distributed Artificial Intelligence / Edition 1

A Concise Introduction to Multiagent Systems and Distributed Artificial Intelligence / Edition 1

by Nikos Vlassis

Paperback

Current price is , Original price is $40.0. You
Select a Purchase Option
  • purchase options
    $40.00
  • purchase options

Product Details

ISBN-13: 9781598295269
Publisher: Morgan and Claypool Publishers
Publication date: 06/28/1905
Series: Synthesis Lectures on Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning Series
Pages: 71
Product dimensions: 7.50(w) x 9.30(h) x 0.30(d)

Table of Contents

Preface     xi
Introduction     1
Multiagent Systems and Distributed AI     1
Characteristics of Multiagent Systems     1
Agent Design     1
Environment     2
Perception     2
Control     3
Knowledge     3
Communication     3
Applications     3
Challenging Issues     5
Notes and Further Reading     5
Rational Agents     7
What is an Agent?     7
Agents as Rational Decision Makers     7
Observable Worlds and the Markov Property     8
Observability     9
The Markov Property     10
Stochastic Transitions and Utilities     10
From Goals to Utilities     11
Decision Making in a Stochastic World     12
Example: A Toy World     12
Notes and Further Reading     13
Strategic Games     15
Game Theory     15
Strategic Games     16
Iterated Elimination of Dominated Actions     18
Nash Equilibrium     19
Notes and Further Reading     21
Coordination     23
Coordination Games     23
Social Conventions     24
Roles     25
Coordination Graphs     26
Coordination by Variable Elimination     28
Coordination by Message Passing     31
Notes and Further Reading     32
Partial Observability     35
Thinking Interactively     35
Information and Knowledge     36
Common Knowledge     39
Partial Observability and Actions     40
States and Observations     40
Observation Model     40
Actions and Policies     41
Payoffs     41
Notes and Further Reading     43
Mechanism Design     45
Self-Interested Agents     45
The Mechanism Design Problem     45
Example: An Auction     48
The Revelation Principle     49
Example: Second-price Sealed-bid (Vickrey) Auction     50
The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism     50
Example: Shortest Path     51
Notes and Further Reading     52
Learning     53
Reinforcement Learning     53
Markov Decision Processes      53
Value Iteration     55
Q-learning     55
Markov Games     56
Independent Learning     57
Coupled Learning     57
Sparse Cooperative Q-learning     58
The Problem of Exploration     59
Notes and Further Reading     60
Bibliography     63
Author Biography     71

Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

See All Customer Reviews