Hume scholar, David Raynor has written an introduction which sets the "Treatise" in its intellectual and historical context and details its early reception. It stands out from the crowd of editions of this work as being the only one that Hume saw printed in his lifetime, and its original scarcity should makes this a valuable reference for college and research libraries.
|File size:||937 KB|
About the Author
David hume (1711-76) devoted himself from early youth to 'philosophy and great learning'. A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40) was not well received on publication, but is now viewed as his masterpiece.
Ernest Campbell Mossner is the author of many books on Hume. He has received fellowships from Columbia, Guggenheim and Fulbright, and has held the post of Professor of English and Philosophy at the University of Texas.
Read an Excerpt
A Treatise of Human Nature
By David Hume
Dover Publications, Inc.Copyright © 2003 Dover Publications, Inc.
All rights reserved.
Of the Origin of our Ideas.
ALL the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds, which I shall call IMPRESSIONS and IDEAS. The difference betwixt these consists in the degrees of force and liveliness with which they strike upon the mind, and make their way into our thought or consciousness. Those perceptions, which enter with most force and violence, we may name impressions; and under this name I comprehend all our sensations, passions and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul. By ideas I mean the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning; such as, for instance, are all the perceptions excited by the present discourse, excepting only, those which arise from the sight and touch, and excepting the immediate pleasure or uneasiness it may occasion. I believe it will not be very necessary to employ many words in explaining this distinction. Every one of himself will readily perceive the difference betwixt feeling and thinking. The common degrees of these are easily distinguish'd; tho' 'tis not impossible but in particular instances they may very nearly approach to each other. Thus in sleep, in a fever, in madness, or in any very violent emotions of soul, our ideas may approach to our impressions: As on the other hand it sometimes happens, that our impressions are so faint and low, that we cannot distinguish them from our ideas. But notwithstanding this near resemblance in a few instances, they are in general so very different, that no-one can make a scruple to rank them under distinct heads, and assign to each a peculiar name to mark the difference.
There is another division of our perceptions, which it will be convenient to observe, and which extends itself both to our impressions and ideas. This division is into SIMPLE and COMPLEX. Simple perceptions or impressions and ideas are such as admit of no distinction nor separation. The complex are the contrary to these, and may be distinguish'd into parts. Tho' a particular colour, taste, and smell, are qualities all united together in this apple, 'tis easy to perceive they are not the same, but are at least distinguishable from each other.
Having by these divisions given an order and arrangement to our objects, we may now apply ourselves to consider with the more accuracy their qualities and relations. The first circumstance, that strikes my eye, is the great resemblance betwixt our impressions and ideas in every other particular, except their degree of force and vivacity. The one seem to be in a manner the reflexion of the other; so that all the perceptions of the mind are double, and appear both as impressions and ideas. When I shut my eyes and think of my chamber, the ideas I form are exact representations of the impressions I felt; nor is there any circumstance of the one, which is not to be found in the other. In running over my other perceptions, I find still the same resemblance and representation. Ideas and impressions appear always to correspond to each other. This circumstance seems to me remarkable, and engages my attention for a moment.
Upon a more accurate survey I find I have been carried away too far by the first appearance, and that I must make use of the distinction of perceptions into simple and complex, to limit this general decision, that all our ideas and impressions are resembling. I observe, that many of our complex ideas never had impressions, that corresponded to them, and that many of our complex impressions never are exactly copied in ideas. I can imagine to myself such a city as the New Jerusalem, whose pavement is gold and walls are rubies, tho' I never saw any such. I have seen Paris; but shall I affirm I can form such an idea of that city, as will perfectly represent all its streets and houses in their real and just proportions?
I perceive, therefore, that tho' there is in general a great resemblance betwixt our complex impressions and ideas, yet the rule is not universally true, that they are exact copies of each other. We may next consider how the case stands with our simple perceptions. After the most accurate examination, of which I am capable, I venture to affirm, that the rule here holds without any exception, and that every simple idea has a simple impression, which resembles it; and every simple impression a correspondent idea. That idea of red, which we form in the dark, and that impression, which strikes our eyes in sun-shine, differ only in degree, not in nature. That the case is the same with all our simple impressions and ideas, 'tis impossible to prove by a particular enumeration of them. Every one may satisfy himself in this point by running over as many as he pleases. But if any one shou'd deny this universal resemblance, I know no way of convincing him, but by desiring him to shew a simple impression, that has not a correspondent idea, or a simple idea, that has not a correspondent impression. If he does not answer this challenge, as 'tis certain he cannot, we may from his silence and our own observation establish our conclusion.
Thus we find, that all simple ideas and impressions resemble each other; and as the complex are form'd from them, we may affirm in general, that these two species of perception are exactly correspondent. Having discover'd this relation, which requires no farther examination, I am curious to find some other of their qualities. Let us consider how they stand with regard to their existence, and which of the impressions and ideas are causes, and which effects.
The full examination of this question is the subject of the present treatise; and therefore we shall here content ourselves with establishing one general proposition, That all our simple ideas in their first appearance are deriv'd from simple impressions, which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent.
In seeking for phænomena to prove this proposition, I find only those of two kinds; but in each kind the phænomena are obvious, numerous, and conclusive. I first make myself certain, by a new, review, of what I have already asserted, that every simple impression is attended with a correspondent idea, and every simple idea with a correspondent impression. From this constant conjunction of resembling perceptions I immediately conclude, that there is a great connexion betwixt our correspondent impressions and ideas, and that the existence of the one has a considerable influence upon that of the other. Such a constant conjunction, in such an infinite number of instances, can never arise from chance; but clearly proves a dependence of the impressions on the ideas, or of the ideas on the impressions. That I may know on which side this dependence lies, I consider the order of their first appearance; and find by constant experience, that the simple impressions always take the prec'dence of their correspondent ideas, but never appear in the contrary order. To give a child an idea of scarlet or orange, of sweet or bitter, I present the objects, or in other words, convey to him these impressions; but proceed not so absurdly, as to endeavour to produce the impressions by exciting the ideas. Our ideas upon their appearance produce not their correspondent impressions, nor do we perceive any colour, or feel any sensation merely upon thinking of them. On the other hand we find, that any impressions either of the mind or body is constantly follow'd by an idea, which resembles it, and is only different in the degrees of force and liveliness. The constant conjunction of our resembling perceptions, is a convincing proof, that the one are the causes of the other; and this priority of the impressions is an equal proof, that our impressions are the causes of our ideas, not our ideas of our impressions.
To confirm this I consider another plain and convincing phænomenon; which is, that, where-ever by any accident the faculties, which give rise to any impressions, are obstructed in their operations, as when one is born blind or deaf; not only the impressions are lost, but also their correspondent ideas; so that there never appear in the mind the least traces of either of them. Nor is this only true, where the organs of sensation are entirely destroy'd, but likewise where they have never been put in action to produce a particular impression. We cannot form to ourselves a just idea of the taste of a pine-apple, without having actually tasted it.
There is however one contradictory phænomenon, which may prove, that 'tis not absolutely impossible for ideas to go before their correspondent impressions. I believe it will readily be allow'd that the several distinct ideas of colours, which enter by the eyes, or those of sounds, which are convey'd by the hearing, are really different from each other, tho' at the same time resembling. Now if this be true of different colours, it must be no less so of the different shades of the same colour, that each of them produces a distinct idea, independent of the rest. For if this shou'd be deny'd, 'tis possible, by the continual gradation of shades, to run a colour insensibly into what is most remote from it; and if you will not allow any of the means to be different, you cannot without absurdity deny the extremes to be the same. Suppose therefore a person to have enjoy'd his sight for thirty years, and to have become perfectly well acquainted with colours of all kinds, excepting one particular shade of blue, for instance, which it never has been his fortune to meet with. Let all the different shades of that colour, except that single one, be plac'd before him, descending gradually from the deepest to the lightest; 'tis plain, that he will perceive a blank, where that shade is wanting, and will be sensible, that there is a greater distance in that place betwixt the contiguous colours, than in any other. Now I ask, whether 'tis possible for him, from his own imagination, to supply this deficiency, and raise up to himself the idea of that particular shade, tho' it had never been convey'd to him by his senses? I believe there are few but will be of opinion that he can; and this may serve as a proof, that the simple ideas are not always deriv'd from the correspondent impressions; tho' the instance is so particular and singular, that 'tis scarce worth our observing, and does not merit that for it alone we shou'd alter our general maxim.
But besides this exception, it may not be amiss to remark on this head, that the principle of the priority of impressions to ideas must be understood with another limitation, viz., that as our ideas are images of our impressions, so we can form secondary ideas, which are images of the primary; as appears from this very reasoning concerning them. This is not, properly speaking, an exception to the rule so much as an explanation of it. Ideas produce the images of themselves in new ideas; but as the first ideas are suppos'd to be deriv'd from impressions, it still remains true, that all our simple ideas proceed either mediately or immediately from their correspondent impressions.
This then is the first principle I establish in the science of human nature; nor ought we to despise it because of the simplicity of its appearance. For 'tis remarkable, that the present question concerning the prec'dency of our impressions or ideas, is the same with what has made so much noise in other terms, when it has been disputed whether there be any innate ideas, or whether all ideas be deriv'd from sensation and reflexion. We may observe, that in order to prove the ideas of extension and colour not to be innate, philosophers do nothing but shew, that they are convey'd by our senses. To prove the ideas of passion and desire not to be innate, they observe that we have a prec'ding experience of these emotions in ourselves. Now if we carefully examine these arguments, we shall find that they prove nothing but that ideas are prec'ded by other more lively perceptions, from which they are deriv'd, and which they represent. I hope this clear stating of the question will remove all disputes concerning it, and will render this principle of more use in our reasonings, than it seems hitherto to have been.CHAPTER 2
Division of the subject.
Since it appears, that our simple impressions are prior to their correspondent ideas, and that the exceptions are very rare, method seems to require we shou'd examine our impressions, before we consider our ideas. Impressions may be divided into two kinds, those of SENSATION and those of REFLEXION. The first kind arises in the soul originally, from unknown causes. The second is deriv'd in a great measure from our ideas, and that in the following order. An impression first strikes upon the senses, and makes us perceive heat or cold, thirst or hunger, pleasure or pain of some kind or other. Of this impression there is a copy taken by the mind, which remains after the impression ceases; and this we call an idea. This idea of pleasure or pain, when it returns upon the soul, produces the new impressions of desire and aversion, hope and fear, which may properly be call'd impressions of reflexion, because deriv'd from it. These again are copied by the memory and imagination, and become ideas; which perhaps in their turn give rise to other impressions and ideas. So that the impressions of reflexion are only antec'dent to their correspondent ideas; but posterior to those of sensation, and deriv'd from them. The examination of our sensations belongs more to anatomists and natural philosophers than to moral; and therefore shall not at present be enter'd upon. And as the impressions of reflexion, viz. passions, desires, and emotions, which principally deserve our attention, arise mostly from ideas, 'twill be necessary to reverse that method, which at first sight seems most natural; and in order to explain the nature and principles of the human mind, give a particular account of ideas, before we proceed to impressions. For this reason I have here chosen to begin with ideas.CHAPTER 3
Of the ideas of the memory and imagination.
We find by experience, that when any impression has been present with the mind, it again makes its appearance there as an idea; and this it may do after two different ways: either when in its new appearance it retains a considerable degree of its first vivacity, and is somewhat intermediate betwixt an impression and an idea; or when it entirely loses that vivacity, and is a perfect idea. The faculty, by which we repeat our impressions in the first manner, is call'd the MEMORY, and the other the IMAGINATION. 'Tis evident at first sight, that the ideas of the memory are much more lively and strong than those of the imagination, and that the former faculty paints its objects in more distinct colours, than any which are employ'd by the latter. When we remember any past event, the idea of it flows in upon the mind in a forcible manner; whereas in the imagination the perception is faint and languid, and cannot without difficulty be preserv'd by the mind steddy and uniform for any considerable time. Here then is a sensible difference betwixt one species of ideas and another. But of this more fully hereafter.
There is another difference betwixt these two kinds of ideas, which is no less evident, namely that tho' neither the ideas of the memory nor imagination, neither the lively nor faint ideas can make their appearance in the mind, unless their correspondent impressions have gone before to prepare the way for them, yet the imagination is not restrain'd to the same order and form with the original impressions; while the memory is in a manner ty'd down in that respect, without any power of variation.
'Tis evident, that the memory preserves the original form, in which its objects were presented, and that where-ever we depart from it in recollecting any thing, it proceeds from some defect or imperfection in that faculty. An historian may, perhaps, for the more convenient carrying on of his narration, relate an event before another, to which 'twas in fact posterior; but then he takes notice of this disorder, if he be exact; and by that means replaces the idea in its due position. 'Tis the same case in our recollection of those places and persons, with which we were formerly acquainted. The chief exercise of the memory is not to preserve the simple ideas, but their order and position. In short, this principle is supported by such a number of common and vulgar phænomena, that we may spare ourselves the trouble of insisting on it any farther.
Excerpted from A Treatise of Human Nature by David Hume. Copyright © 2003 Dover Publications, Inc.. Excerpted by permission of Dover Publications, Inc..
All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.
Excerpts are provided by Dial-A-Book Inc. solely for the personal use of visitors to this web site.
Table of Contents
PART 1: INTRODUCTORY MATERIAL
How to Use this Book
List of Abbreviations
Hume's Early years and Education
A Treatise of Human Nature
Book 1: Of the Understanding
Book 1 part 1: The Elements of the Mental World
Book 1 Part 2: The Ideas of Space and Time
Book 1 Part 3: Knowledge, Probability, Belief, and Causation
Book 1 Part 4: Forms of Scepticism
Book 2: Of the passions
Book 2 Part 1: The Indirect Passions of Pride and Humility
Book 2 Part 2: The Indirect Passions of Love and Hatred
Book 2 part 3: The Direct Passions and the Will
Book 3: Of Morals
Book 3 Part 1: The Source of Moral Distinctions
Book 3 Part 2: The Artificial Virtues
Book 3 Part 3: Natural Virtues and Natural Abilities
The Abstract and the Early Reception of the Treatise
A Note on the Texts of this Edition
PART 2: THE TEXT
Book 1: Of the Understanding
Part 1: Of ideas, their origin, composition, connexion, abstraction, etc.
Sect. 1: Of the origin of our ideas
Sect. 2: Division of the subject
Sect. 3: Of the ideas of the memory and imagination
Sect. 4: Of the connexion of association of ideas
Sect. 5. Of relations
Sect. 6 Of modes and substances
Sect. 7: Of abstract ideas
Part 2: Of ideas of space and time
Sect. 1: Of the infinite divisibility of our ideas of space and time
Sect. 2: Of the infinite divisibility of space and time
Sect. 3. Of the other qualities of our ideas of space and time
Sect. 4. Objections answered
Sect. 5: The same subject continued
Sect. 6: Of the idea of existence and of external existence
Part 3: of knowledge and probability
Sect. 1: Of knowledge
Sect. 2. Of probability; and of the idea of cause and effect
Sect. 3: Why a cause is always necessary
Sect. 4: Of the component parts of our reasonings concerning cause and effect
Sect. 5: Of the impressions of the senses and memory
Section. 6: Of the inference from the impression to the idea
Sect. 7: Of the nature of the idea or belief
Sect. 8: Of the causes of belief
Sect. 9: Of the effects of other relations and other habits
Sect 10. Of the influence of belief
Sect. 11: Of the probability of chances
Sect. 12: Of the probability of causes
Sect. 13: Of unphilosophical probability
Sect. 14: Of the idea of necessary connexion
Sect. 15: Rules by which to judge of causes and effects
Sect. 16: Of the reason of animals
Part 4: Of the sceptical and other systems of philosophy
Sect. 1: Of scepticism with regard to reason
Sect. 2: Of scepticism with regard to the senses
Sect. 3. Of the ancient philosophy
Sect 4. Of the modern philosophy
Sect. 5: Of the immateriality of the soul
Sect. 6: Of personal identity
Sect. 7: Conclusion of this book
Book 2: Of the Passions
Part 1: Of pride and humility
Sect. 1: Division of the subject
Sect. 2: Of pride and humility; their objects and causes
Sect. 3: Whence these objects and causes are derived
Sect. 4: Of the relations of impressions and ideas
Sect. 5: Of the influence of these relations on pride and humility
Sect. 6: Limitations of this system
Sect. 7: Of vice and virtue
Sect. 8: Of beauty and deformity
Sect. 9: Of external advantages and disadvantages
Sect. 10: Of property and riches
Sect. 11: Of the love of fame
Sect. 12: Of the pride and humility of animals
Part 2: Of love and hatred
Sect. 1: Of the objects and causes of love and hatred
Sect. 2: Experiments to confirm this system
Sect. 3: Difficulties solved
Sect. 4: Of the love of relations
Sect. 5: Of our esteem for the rich and powerful
Sect 6: Of benevolence and anger
Sect. 7: Of compassion
Sect. 8: Of malice and envy
Sect. 9: Of the mixture of benevolence and anger with compassion and malice
Sect. 10. Of respect and contempt
Sect. 11: Of the amorous passion, or love betwixt the sexes
Sect. 12: Of the love and hatred of animals
Part 3: Of the will and direct passions
Sect. 1: Of liberty and necessity
Sect. 2: The same subject continued
Sect. 3: Of the influencing motives of the will
Sect. 4: Of the causes of the violent passions
Sect. 5: Of the effects of custom
Sect. Of the influence of the imagination on passions
Sect. 7: Of contiguity and distance in space and time
Sect. 8: The same subject continued
Sect. 9: Of the direct passions
Sect. 10: Of curiosity, or the love of truth
Book 3: Of Morals
Part 1: Of virtue and vice in general
Sect. 1: Moral distinctions not derived from reason
Sect. 2: Moral distinctions derived from a moral sense
Part 2: Of justice and injustice
Sect. 1: Justice, whether a natural or artificial virtue?
Sect. 2: Of the origin of justice and property
Sect. 3: Of the rules, which determine property
Sect. 4: Of the transference of property by consent
Sect. 5: Of the obligation of promises
Sect. 6: Some farther reflections concerning justice and injustice
Sect. 7: Of the origin of government
Sect. 8: Of the source of allegiance
Sect. 9: Of the measures of allegiance
Sect. 10: Of the objects of allegiance
Sect. 11: Of the laws of nations
Sect. 12: Of chastity and modesty
Part 3: Of the other virtues and vices
Sect. 1: Of the origin of the natural virtues and vices
Sect. 2: Of greatness of mind
Sect. 3. Of goodness and benevolence
Sect. 4: Of natural abilities
Sect. 5: Some farther reflections concerning the natural virtues
Sect. 6: Conclusion of this book
An Abstract of ... A Treatise of Human Nature
PART 3 SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
Annotations to the Treatise
Annotations to the Abstract
Most Helpful Customer Reviews
Hume sets out rather brilliantly the problems of induction. It is a great read for those new to philosophy, it hits on virtually all philosophical cylinders and debunks them all as an absolute. Like existentialism, Humes skepticisms points its finger at humanities preconceived notions and challenges us to think critically upon everything.
This book is terrific. It is the cheapest version of the treatise that I could find, but its great. However, it is fairly abstruse, and I don't recommend it for an inexperienced reader.
Hume's Treatise of Human Nature is chronicled as a must-read for philosophers. It has such a gamut of philosophical quandries and relative understandings about the machinations of the human mind. The language used by this 18th century philosopher is a little difficult at times, though nothing too contrary to make it unreadable.
Golden state warriors