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An Introduction to the Economics of Information: Incentives and Contracts / Edition 2 available in Hardcover
This is a graduate textbook on the theory of contracting under asymmetric information, a key part of modern microeconomic theory. It examines the characteristics of optimal contracts when one party has certain relevant knowledge that the other party does not. The various problems are presented in the same framework to allow easy comparison of the different results. This updated second edition substantially extends the exercises that test students' understanding of the material covered in each section.
|Publisher:||Oxford University Press|
|Product dimensions:||6.40(w) x 9.30(h) x 1.00(d)|
Table of Contents
2. The Base Model
3. The Moral Hazard Problem
4. The Adverse Selection Problem