Governments are currently privatizing firms that were previously under public control in many countries. Providing an overview of the economic issues involved in this transfer of ownership of public assets, this book combines a theoretical framework with case studies. It asks which allocation mechanism a government can adopt and how the choice of allocation mechanism will affect future market outcomes. Contributions from international experts offer an accessible introduction to auction theory in this invaluable non-technical analysis.
|Publisher:||Cambridge University Press|
|Edition description:||New Edition|
|Product dimensions:||5.98(w) x 8.98(h) x 0.91(d)|
About the Author
Table of ContentsIntroduction Maarten Janssen; Part I. Theory: 1. Auction theory for auction design Tilman Börgers and Eric van Damme; 2. Beauty contest design Maurice Dykstra and Nico van der Windt; 3. Preventing collusion between firms in auctions Tim Salmon; 4. Levelling the playing field in auctions and the prohibition of state aid Emiel Maasland, Yves Montangie and Roger van der Bergh; 5. Allocation mechanisms and post-allocation interaction Maarten Janssen and Benny Moldovanu; Part II. Case Studies: 6. Spectrum auctions by the United States Federal Communications Commission Tim Salmon; 7. An analysis of the European 3G licensing process Emiel Maasland and Benny Moldovanu; 8. Auctions to gas transmission access; the British experience Karsten Neuhoff and Tanga McDaniel; 9. The design of treasury bond auctions - some case studies Tilman Börgers and Joseph Swierzbinski; 10. Matching markets Benny Moldovanu; 11. Competitive procurement of reintegration services in the Netherlands Maurice Dykstra and Jaap de Koning; 12. Case study: the provision of rail services Luisa Affuso and David Newbery.