There is almost universal support for the view that the world would be an even more dangerous place if there were to be more nuclear-weapon states. There would be more fingers on more triggers and, probably, a greater risk that a trigger might be pulled with incalculable consequences. It is easy to see, therefore, that there is a collective interest in avoiding the spread of nuclear weapons to further countries. Nations do not, however, normally undertake or refrain from actions because of such a collective interest; they do so because of their individual interests. This is especially true in the field of national security. A nation perceiving that it has a real interest in developing nuclear weapons is not very likely to refrain from doing so merely because it is told such development would be bad for the world community. If the global interest in avoiding the spread of nuclear weapons to more coun tries is to succeed, conditions that make it in the interest of each individual nation to renounce nuclear weapons need to be created or maintained. Fortunately, conditions have prevailed in which the vast majority of nations have seen an advantage in making legally binding nonproliferation commitments. An important rationale for many of these countries has been that these commitments would facilitate the transfer of desired civil nuclear technology.
Table of Contents1. The Nonproliferation Treaty Regime: A Rereading before 1995.- The Concept of Nonproliferation.- Prohibitions.- Promotional Activities.- Security Concerns.- Durability.- Conclusions.- 2. Avoiding the Worst of All Possible Worlds.- Critics and Criticism.- Arguments of Discrimination and Disarmament.- A Historical Rejoinder.- The NPT, Nuclear Proliferation, Peace, and Security.- 3. The Collapse of the NPTWhat if?.- Shocks to the Nonproliferation Treaty.- The Collapse of the NPT: An Initial Damage Assessment.- Damage Assessment: The View from the Front Lines.- What to Do if?.- On the Road to Success in 1995.- Notes and References.- 4. What Happens to Safeguards if the NPT Goes?.- The Collapse of the NPT: A Worst-Case Scenario.- Euratom.- Nonproliferation Survives the NPT: A More Probable Scenario.- Beyond 1995: A New Nonproliferation Order?.- Notes and References.- 5. Does the NPT Matter?.- The NPT and Nonproliferation.- Cries of Discrimination, Calls for Disarmament.- The NPT and National Nuclear Decision-Making.- Notes and References.- 6. Beyond the NPT.- The NPT, the Atom, and Development.- A New International Agenda.- The Problems and Promise of the NPT.- Beyond the NPT.- 7. Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: A Universal Concern.- The Irrational Problem.- The Nonproliferation Treaty.- Enemies of the System.- A Regime for the Twenty-First Century.- 8. Toward a Universal Framework of Nuclear Restraint.- Disillusionment with the NPT.- Rationale for Nuclear Restraint.- Rationale for Nuclear Power.- Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation.- Why Nations Want to Go Nuclear.- Steps toward Restraint by Threshold States.- Conclusion.- Notes and References.- 9. European and Global Security in a World without the NPT.- Bang.- Clash.- Creep.- Abandonment.- Conclusions.- Notes and References.- 10. The NPT and Nuclear Proliferation in East Asia: Views toward the 1990s.- Getting the Bomb.- Atomic Weapons in East Asia: Historical and Geopolitical Trends.- The Divergent Paths of Japan and China.- Korea and Taiwan: Concerns Diminish.- Into the 1990s.- 11. World and Regional Power Relations without the NPT.- Pre-NPT Horizontal Proliferation.- The NPT Regime, from the 1970s to 1995.- The World without the NPT after 1995?.- Notes and References.- 12. Should India Sign the NPT?.- The Current Crisis.- India’s Nuclear Choices.- Strategic Ambiguity.- A Bold Step Forward.- A Bold Step Backward.- Conclusions and Prospects.- Notes and References.- 13. A World without the NPT?.- Effects on the International Regime, Its Purposes, Principles, and Institutions.- Effects on International Security.- Effects on International Relations.- Conclusions.- Notes and References.- Conclusions.- Appendix: Toward 1995: United Nations Documents Relating to the Establishment and Functioning of the NPT, 1959–1988.- General Assembly Resolution 1380, November 20, 1959.- General Assembly Resolution 1576, December 27, 1960.- General Assembly Resolution 1664, December 4, 1961.- General Assembly Resolution 1665, December 4, 1961.- General Assembly Resolution 2028, November 19, 1965.- General Assembly Resolution 2149, November 4, 1966.- General Assembly Resolution 2153, December 16, 1967.- General Assembly Resolution 2346, December 19, 1967.- General Assembly Resolution 2373, June 12, 1968.- Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968.- General Assembly Resolution 3184, December 18, 1973.- General Assembly Resolution 3261, December 9, 1974.- Final Declaration of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, May 30, 1975.- General Assembly Resolution 3484, December 12, 1975.- General Assembly Resolution 31/75, December 10, 1976.- General Assembly Resolution 33/57, December 14, 1978.- The Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1980.- General Assembly Resolution 38/74, December 15, 1983.- The Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1985.- General Assembly Resolution 40/94 M, December 12, 1985.- General Assembly Resolution 43/82, December 7, 1988.- Selected National Statements on the Twentieth Anniversary of the Opening for Signature of the NPT.- About the Authors.