This book points out that the interaction between the chambers in bicameral legislatures is central to understanding behavior in each chamber, a point neglected in previous studies. It surveys bicameral institutions from numerous countries and presents models that explain the significance of different institutional arrangements. These hypotheses are illustrated and tested with data from the French Fifth Republic, and supplemented with data from Germany, Japan, Switzerland, the United States, and the European Union.
|Publisher:||Cambridge University Press|
|Series:||Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions Series|
|Edition description:||New Edition|
|Product dimensions:||6.00(w) x 9.00(h) x 0.80(d)|
Table of Contents
Part I. History and Geography of Bicameral Diversity: 1. Bicameralism in historical perspective; 2. The institutions of bicameralism; Part II. Models of Bicameral Institutions: 3. The core and the uncovered set of bicameral institutions; 4. A model of intercameral bargaining; 5. A model of conference committees and their proposals; Part III. Empirical Studies of Bicameralism and Implications: 6. The outcomes of intercameral bargaining; 7. The process of intercameral bargaining; 8. Conference committees; 9. Implications; Conclusions.