Few economic events have had the impact of German hyperinflation in 1923, still remembered as a root cause of Hitler's rise to power; yet in recent years historians have defended the inflationary policies adopted after 1918. Niall Ferguson takes a different view. He argues that inflation was an economic and political disaster, and that alternative economic policies could have stabilized the German currency in 1920. To explain why these were not adopted, he points to long-term defects in the political institutions of the Reich from the 1890s. The book therefore not only reveals the Wilhelmine origins of Weimar's failure: it also casts new light on the origins of the Third Reich.
|Publisher:||Cambridge University Press|
|Edition description:||New Edition|
|Product dimensions:||5.98(w) x 8.98(h) x 1.42(d)|
Table of ContentsList of figures; Preface; List of abbreviations; Introduction; 1. Golden years; 2. The sinews of war; 3. The political economy of revolution; 4. Versailles and Hamburg; 5. Relative stabilisation; 6. The failure of 'fulfilment'; 7. Dissolution and liquidation; 8. The legacy of the inflation; Epilogue: Hitler's inflation; Appendix; Bibliography; Index.