Paul Pietroski presents an original philosophical theory of actions and their mental causes. We often act for reasons, deliberating and choosing among options, based on our beliefs and desires. But because bodily motions always have biochemical causes, it can seem that thinking and acting are biochemical processes. Pietroski argues that thoughts and deeds are in fact distinct from, though dependent on, underlying biochemical processes within persons.
|Publisher:||Oxford University Press|
|Edition description:||Revised ed.|
|Product dimensions:||9.10(w) x 6.20(h) x 0.50(d)|
About the Author
Table of Contents
Introduction; 1. Actions as Inner Causes; 2. Fregean Innocence; 3. From Explanation to Causation; 4. Other Things Being Equal; 5. Personal Dualism; 6. Modal Concerns; 7. Natural Causes; Appendix: The Semantic Wages of Neuralism; Bibliography; Index.