Rosenthal gives a new design to the seeming bedrock of Peirce’s position: convergence toward the final ultimate opinion of the community of interpreters in the idealized long run. Focusing frequently on passages from Peirce’s writings which have been virtually ignored in the more traditional interpretations of his work, this book shows the way in which Peirce’s position, far from lying in opposition to the Kuhnian interpretation of science, provides strong and much needed metaphysical and epistemic underpinnings for it in a way which avoids the pitfalls of false alternatives offered by the philosophical tradition. The book examines in depth the various features of Peirce’s position that enter into these underpinnings. Among the topics explored are meaning, truth, perception, world, sign relations, realism, categorical inquiry, phenomenology, temporality, and speculative metaphysics.
|Publisher:||State University of New York Press|
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About the Author
Sandra B. Rosenthal is Professor of Philosophy at Loyola University. She is co-author, with Patrick L. Bourgeois, of Mead and Merleau-Ponty, also published by SUNY Press, and author of Speculative Pragmatism.
Table of ContentsIntroduction
1. World, Truth, and Science
2. Meaning as Habit
Habit and the Dynamical Object
Habit and "The Given"
3. Habit, Temporality, and Peirce's Proofs of Realism
4. Pragmatic Experimentalism and the Derivation of the Categories
5. Peirce's Pragmatic Metaphysics: The Foundation for Pluralism