China's New Industrialization Strategy

China's New Industrialization Strategy

by Y. Y. Kueh


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Product Details

ISBN-13: 9781847202321
Publisher: Elgar, Edward Publishing, Inc.
Publication date: 06/28/2008
Pages: 296
Product dimensions: 6.40(w) x 9.20(h) x 1.10(d)

About the Author

Y.Y. Kueh, Chair Professor of Economics and Business Administration, Chu Hai College of Higher Education, Hong Kong

Table of Contents

Contents: Preface Part I: Economics of Maoism Revisited 1. Interpreting the Economics of the Cultural Revolution Part II: Deng Xiaoping in Mao’s Mantle 2. Was Mao Really Necessary? An Economist’s Perspective 3. Dengonomics and the Tiananmen Square Incident Part III: Agriculture in China’s Industrialization 4. The Rise of Agricultural Dengonomics 5. The Economics of the ‘Second Land Reform’ 6. Peasant Consumption and Incomes in Critical Turn 7. Mao and Agriculture in China’s Industrialization: Three Antitheses in a 50-year Perspective Part IV: The New Industrialization Strategy 8. The Three Industrial Imbalances 9. Growth Imperatives, Economic Efficiency and ‘Optimum Decentralization’ 10. Bureaucratization, Property Rights and Economic Reforms 11. Inflation and Industrial Deregulation: The Twin Travellers Part V: From Autarky to the WTO 12. Foreign Economic Relations Readjusted, 1979–84 13. The Quest for WTO Entry References Index

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China's New Industrialization Strategy 5 out of 5 based on 0 ratings. 1 reviews.
willyvan More than 1 year ago
Y. Y. Kueh is Chair Professor of Economics and Business Administration at the Chu Hai College of Higher Education, Hong Kong. This book comprises 13 essays, written between 1968 and 2006, grouped into three major subject categories. The first is Deng Xiaoping’s agricultural policy programme, the second China’s new industrialization strategy itself, and the third is Deng’s controversial open-door policy. On Deng’s agricultural policy, Kueh writes, “‘Reparcellization’ of the collective farmland in the early 1980s, coupled with the extension of the leasehold rights to 15 years starting in 1984, brings Chinese agriculture very close to the private land-tenure system of the West. The replacement in 1985 of the Stalinist scheme of compulsory farm delivery with a system of purchase contracts to be signed between the peasants and the state procurement agencies is also meant to further enhance the privatization and marketization process in rural China. No less important is the rapid proliferation of rural non-farm industries, which operate largely on a cooperative or de facto private basis, being detached from any hierarchic-vertical controls following the abolition of the People’s Communes in 1982-83.” He points out that during Mao’s rule industry grew from providing 21 per cent of GDP in 1952 to 48 per cent in 1978. Grain output grew from 285 kilograms a head in 1952 to 388 in 1996. As Kueh observes, “The single most important factor underlying this success is obvious. That is … the remarkable expansion in the country’s irrigation capacity.” GDP rose by 5 per cent a year even during the years of the Cultural Revolution, 1966-76. Kueh concludes, “Mao was, in situ, not at all ‘inward-looking, ‘closed-door’ or ‘autarkic’-oriented, with a predilection for the philosophy of ‘self-reliance’, entirely ignorant of the technological advances made in the West, as many outside observers believe him to be.” He sums up, “what Mao did as an economic strategist was absolutely necessary, underpinned as it was by historical imperatives. … the economic heritage of Mao has to be assessed in its entirety to include the massive material foundation in both agriculture and industry, that he helped to create with the particular economic strategy practised.”